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The Peacebuilding Puzzle
Political Order in Post-Conflict States
Transformative peace operations fall short of achieving the modern politi-
cal order sought in post-conflict countries because the interventions them-
selves empower post-conflict elites intent on forging a neopatrimonial
political order. The Peacebuilding Puzzle explains the disconnect between
the formal institutional engineering undertaken by international inter-
ventions and the governance outcomes that emerge in their aftermath.
Barma’s comparative analysis of interventions in Cambodia, East Timor,
and Afghanistan focuses on the incentives motivating domestic elites over a
sequence of three peacebuilding phases: the elite peace settlement, the tran-
sitional governance period, and the aftermath of intervention. The inter-
national community advances certain forms of institutional design at each
phase in the pursuit of effective and legitimate governance. Yet, over the
course of the peacebuilding pathway, powerful post-conflict elites co-opt
the very processes and institutions intended to guarantee modern political
order and dominate the practice of governance within those institutions to
their own ends.
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Introduction
International peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict countries
have become widespread since the end of the Cold War – yet they have
often confounded expectations, ending in reversals and disappoint-
ment. The international community’s approach to building sustainable
peace in war-torn states rests upon the notion that an engineered pro-
cess of simultaneous statebuilding and democratization can bringmod-
ern political order to post-conflict states. Indeed, the United Nations
(UN) has, at great cost,made implementing that theory one of its signa-
ture undertakings in its transformative peacebuilding endeavor. But in
all too few of the post-conflict countries in which this transformation
has been attempted have real improvements in the quest for effective
and legitimate governance been achieved. In turn, human security and
global stability remain compromised by persistent political instabil-
ity, weak and corrupt governance, and chronic underdevelopment in
ostensibly post-conflict countries.
This book explains why international post-conflict interventions
have fallen short of the weighty aspirations they embody. It reframes
the peacebuilding puzzle by presenting a new theory of how domestic
elites construct political order during and after peacebuilding interven-
tions. A comparative analysis of the UN’s transformative peacebuild-
ing attempts in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan shows that
while international peacebuilders want to build effective and legitimate
government, domestic elites essentially do not. As is the case in much
of the developing world, post-conflict elites use strategies to prioritize
their own political survival and power that result in a neopatrimonial
political order that better delivers on their goals. Peacebuilding inter-
ventions thus generate a set of unintended yet predictable effects. In all
three cases, the UN’s efforts at peacebuilding through elite settlement
followed by a process of simultaneous statebuilding and democratiza-
tion were co-opted by a small subset of domestic power-holders who
successfully closed down the political space and stunted state capacity.
1
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2 Introduction
To be sure, each of these countries is better off than before the peace
operations. Yet the goals of intervention have not truly been met.
Instead, there are striking similarities in the patterns of neopatrimo-
nial order that emerge in the aftermath of intervention. This book
makes the case that the peacebuilding approach is, at least in part, itself
responsible for the eventually disappointing governance outcomes that
emerge in post-conflict countries.
This introduction briefly presents the core argument of the book,
highlighting the theoretical advances it makes in the context of the
existing literature on peacebuilding and discussing its significance in
light of the contemporary practice of peacebuilding. It sketches the
empirical dynamics associated with the interaction between interna-
tional interventions and domestic elite incentives in Cambodia, East
Timor, and Afghanistan. It then outlines the structure of the book.
The Politics of Peacebuilding
The study of the processes and implications of peacebuilding has devel-
oped significantly over the past twenty-five years, alongside the evolu-
tion of actual policy efforts on the ground over that timeframe. A large
body of work emerging from both the scholarly and practitioner realms
has yielded valuable contributions in terms of exploring the multiple
dimensions of conflict cessation and peacekeeping through negotiated
settlements, defining peacebuilding and its many different dimensions,
distinguishing the effects of different types of international peace oper-
ation, identifying some of the contextual factors necessary for success
or explaining particular failures, and generating policy implications.1
Yet there remain surprising gaps in the study of peacebuilding and
related shortcomings in its practice. In particular, scholars and practi-
tioners have tended to focus on the processes of peacebuilding, empha-
sizing the institutional contours of peace settlements and the mandate
1 On peacekeeping and conflict cessation, see Fortna 2008; and Stedman,
Rothchild, and Cousens 2002. On the multiple dimensions of peacebuilding, see
Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Paris 2004; and Paris and Sisk 2009. On different types
of peace operation, especially the machinery of international transitional
administration, see Caplan 2005, 2012; Chesterman 2004; and Tansey 2009.
On contextual factors conditioning peacebuilding success, see Autesserre 2010;
Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Girod 2015; and Howard 2008. For policy
implications, see Call 2012; Fukuyama 2004; and Ghani and Lockhart 2008.
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The Argument and its Significance 3
and mode of implementation of peace operations. The most rigorous
analyses have centered around what contextual factors condition the
probability of peacebuilding success and failure, but they have largely
neglected the conjunctural nature of the causal interaction between
peacebuilding interventions and domestic political dynamics that truly
determines whether a stable and lasting peace is achieved. Peacebuild-
ing research has also been relatively myopic, focusing on the immediate
question of whether international efforts help to establish peace and
prevent a return to conflict, with much less attention to the aftermath
of these interventions and the political dynamics and outcomes they
set in motion.
This book, by contrast, approaches the study of peacebuilding
through a historical institutionalist lens, viewing it as a hyperpolitical
undertaking that interacts over time with the reconstruction of politi-
cal order in post-conflict states. I illustrate that post-conflict elites react
to, shape, and co-opt international interventions across countries in a
sequence of recognizable patterns that undermine the quest for sus-
tainable peace. The peacebuilding literature’s analytical focus to date
on the peace operations themselves – their mandates, mechanisms, and
immediate outcomes – is partly a result of the recent nature of the
surge in international attempts at peacebuilding. Now that enough
time has elapsed from the wave of peacebuilding efforts initiated fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War, it is also time to focus more squarely
on post-intervention outcomes in fragile and conflict-affected coun-
tries. This book takes on the least-studied aspect of post-conflict inter-
ventions by tying the implementation of peacebuilding interventions
to what happens after the international community leaves. In doing
so, it demonstrates that peacebuilding outcomes are best understood
as the result of a dynamic contest between two alternative visions of
post-conflict political order – that of the international community and
that of domestic elites.
The Argument and its Significance
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has
invested a great deal in what I term the UN’s “transitional gover-
nance” strategy of transformative peacebuilding – a period of simul-
taneous statebuilding and democratization over which international
peacebuilders govern in tandem with domestic elites. In each country
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4 Introduction
in which this approach is applied, it has resulted in new institutions
intended to form the basis for effective and legitimate governance. But,
in case after case, initial euphoria at the successful holding of elections
and design of the formal institutions of the modern state has eventually
turned into dismay at the poor governance outcomes that result. This
book seeks to explain why – and, in so doing, to shed some light on how
peacebuilding strategies might be improved. It does so by pursuing a
comparative analysis of the UN transitional governance interventions
in Cambodia (1991–1993), East Timor (1999–2002), and Afghanistan
(2002–2005), conducted on the basis of fieldwork in each country and
extensive complementary secondary research.2 In each case, as in other
post-conflict countries, the UN made reconstructing state capacity and
building a democratic political system the explicit goals of a peace-
building intervention.
The core contribution of this book is a new historical institution-
alist theory about how post-conflict political order is constructed. It
explains the unintended governance outcomes that emerge as a result
of competing international and domestic visions of post-conflict polit-
ical order at three critical phases along the temporal sequence of the
peacebuilding pathway: the peace settlement that ends violent con-
flict; the implementation of a transformative peace operation; and the
aftermath of the intervention. Elite peace settlements are intended to
mark an agreement on a country’s post-conflict future – but, in real-
ity, they serve more as the terms upon which conflict continues by
political means. A sharper understanding of elite political contest lead-
ing into and coming out of the conflict is crucial to understand how
domestic elites embarked, in tandem with the international commu-
nity, on reshaping post-conflict political order. In turn, the implemen-
tation of transitional governance, a process of institutional engineering
intended to strengthen the state and initiate a process of democratiza-
tion, becomes co-opted in practice by specific elites intent on entrench-
ing their emerging grips on power. By choosing elites with whom to
govern, peacebuilding interventions confer power upon them – and
those elites use that power to enact subtle strategies of institutional
conversion to their own ends. In the aftermath of intervention, finally,
2 Throughout this book, I refer to and discuss the country case studies in the
sequence in which the peacebuilding interventions occurred. In addition,
following scholarly convention, I refer to East Timor by its anglicized name,
rather than by its official name, Timor-Leste.
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elites consolidate a neopatrimonial political order in which traditional,
patronage-based governance co-exists with the formal institutions of
modern governance.
Post-conflict states thus come to rest in a suboptimal political econ-
omy equilibrium that falls well short of the type of political order
the international community aims to transplant through peacebuild-
ing interventions. This outcome, as illustrated by the post-intervention
political landscape of the three cases examined in this book, is charac-
terized by discretionary instead of rule-bound law and policymaking,
weak state capacity and poor service delivery, and attenuated demo-
cratic political practices. The cases illustrate, in subtly different ways,
how the neopatrimonial political order that emerges in post-conflict
states is perversely enabled by the transitional governance model’s
simultaneous pursuit of state- and democracy-building and its unique
need for a domestic counterpart to aid in governance. In undertak-
ing peacebuilding through transitional governance, the UN acts on an
implicit theory about how best to change the domestic political game in
order to create the foundations for sustainable peace. Yet, in practice,
at each phase of the peacebuilding pathway domestic political realities
trump international objectives.
In Cambodia, for example, the UN emphasized a quick route to elec-
tions to excise the Khmer Rouge, which was hostile to the peace pro-
cess, from the legitimate body politic; but this tactic strengthened the
hand of Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The UN’s
reliance on the CPP as its de facto counterpart in administering the
country during the transitional period served to further entrench the
CPP in the state apparatus, to the extent that even losing the coun-
try’s first election was not enough to sever that grip. Since then, the
struggle among Cambodian elites for an unassailable locus of power in
the country has bloated the weak bureaucracy and oriented it toward
patronage politics. Over time, Hun Sen and CPP elites have cemented
in place a hegemonic regime, propped up by extensive and pervasive
patronage networks, for which elections and the power-sharing for-
mula stipulated by the constitution serve as window-dressing.
East Timor’s major peacebuilding hurdle after the independence ref-
erendum was the hollowed-out state infrastructure left behind when
the Indonesian government pulled out of the tiny nation. The UN peace
operation there allowed only a limited degree of Timorese participation
in executive governance of the country during the transitional period.
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Moreover, its assumption that Timorese elites were united and its desire
to maintain its neutrality in Timorese politics meant that the necessary
elite political settlement was neglected. As a result, it mishandled the
growing demands for increased “Timorization” by appointing as its
preferred counterparts a small, yet powerful clique of revolutionary-
era leaders who returned from a long exile to govern their country.
These elites failed to translate their electoral mandate into inclusive
policies for the Timorese population and the country’s reconstruction.
Intra-elite schisms, in the absence of countervailing state authority, spi-
raled into renewed violent conflict. The country’s current leadership
perpetuates a hierarchical governance structure as well as the reliance
on patronage distribution for political support, a dynamic that has
intensified on the basis of East Timor’s petroleum wealth.
In Afghanistan, the tension between state- and democracy-building
was at the core of the international community’s dilemma in develop-
ing a peacebuilding strategy. It was framed as the struggle between the
imperative to stabilize the country and the goal of giving the country,
torn apart by many years of war, a new lease on democratic nation-
hood. The UN and the United States assumed that for the state to func-
tion at all, the loci of power held by themujahideen leaders would have
to be incorporated into the new government. Indeed, the country’s first
contemporary president, Hamid Karzai, invited such warlords to serve
in his cabinet and as his provincial governors. Once bestowed with
this legitimacy, these well-resourced veterans of Afghan political soci-
ety were adept in consolidating their own patron–client networks; and
elites around Karzai mimicked their behavior in the struggle for polit-
ical support. The result is a weak and fragmentary state that struggles
to resource even the limited activities it undertakes and to protect its
society against the predatory rent-seeking and violence perpetuated by
entrenched political elites at both the central and subnational levels.
Post-conflict developing countries, such as the three discussed in this
book, hardly offer the fertile soil necessary for strong and effective
states to take root and flourish. Indeed, a reasonable null expecta-
tion is that international peacebuilding interventions will have no real
impact whatsoever. Yet the evidence from post-conflict Cambodia, East
Timor, and Afghanistan, as I demonstrate in this book, tells a more
nuanced story. Remarkably similar transitional governance processes
in each case were surprisingly successful in (re)constructing the mini-
mal basis for effective state administration and enabling local elites to
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come to some form of agreement on post-conflict institutional founda-
tions. Elites in each of the three countries, guided by the UN, reached
some consensus on a suitable administrative and democratic architec-
ture for the local context and then held democratic elections to mark
the endpoint of the transitional phase.Despite those successes in initiat-
ing the processes of statebuilding and democratization, however, each
country has since faced significant challenges in consolidating effective
and legitimate governance. This book argues that these hurdles are a
result of the interaction between the international interventions and
the domestic elites with whom they work.
These conclusions are by no means intended to damn peacebuilding
efforts in their entirety. On the contrary, in each country, the politi-
cal settlement has successfully prevented the return to full-scale vio-
lent conflict, a major achievement considering that post-conflict coun-
tries face a very high risk of renewed civil war in the absence of
intervention.3 This study is not a challenge to the comprehensive body
of empirical evidence and relative consensus in the literature that inter-
national peacekeeping interventions help to maintain ceasefires and
prevent a return to civil conflict.4 In the three cases studied, as with
the majority of the broader universe of countries in which the interna-
tional community has mounted peace operations, political violence has
been quelled, at least to some degree, by the international presence.5
In addition, each country has recovered some measure of state capac-
ity and political stability – each has increased revenue collection and
the provision of public services and has held a series of elections. The
point, rather, is to elucidate the difficulties in the complex endeavor of
implanting state capacity and democracy in developing post-conflict
countries within a short timeframe – and to make the case that a big
part of the challenge is the logic underpinning the UN’s transitional
governance approach.
The theory and argument advanced here help to shed light on a
number of crucial and practicable policy implications for reforming
3 Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008. 4 Fortna 2004, 2008.
5 Although low-level political violence persists in Cambodia and East Timor, their
civil wars were terminated through international involvement. Afghanistan,
however, remains a country in civil conflict: there, the number of battle deaths
per year fell below 1,000, the typical threshold above which a conflict is
identified as a war, only in 2003 and 2004; otherwise it has remained above
1,000. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, as presented in Gleditsch et al.
2002; and Themnér and Wallensteen 2014.
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8 Introduction
the practice of peacebuilding, detailed in the book’s conclusion. A bet-
ter understanding of how international peacebuilding objectives meet
reality on the ground in post-conflict countries can help design bet-
ter interventions in two major ways. From a theoretical perspective, it
becomes apparent that some objectives may be simply too unrealistic
to be retained in their entirety. It is a significant policy oversight to not
squarely acknowledge that the different components of modern polit-
ical order – stability, government effectiveness, and democratic legiti-
macy – emerge in different ways and are by no means always mutu-
ally reinforcing. In practical terms, nonetheless, it may yet be possible
to adjust the manner in which peacebuilding is undertaken in order to
prevent the undermining of core objectives. Second, viewing the peace-
building pathway in temporal continuity and with an emphasis on
elite incentives highlights, for example, that major policy setbacks have
emerged from an overemphasis on specific institutional form, when
instead the focus should be on the governance functions served at crit-
ical junctures on the pathway to peace.
Structure of the Book
The first two chapters lay the foundation for the book’s analytical
approach and contributions. Chapter 1 discusses the utility of the
study in light of the contemporary practice of international peace-
building. It defines the main focus of inquiry, which is the UN’s transi-
tional governance approach to transformative peacebuilding, and sit-
uates the book’s argument within the existing peacebuilding literature,
highlighting its unique contributions. It then introduces the histori-
cal institutionalist lens the book adopts to better understand peace-
building and describes the research design of the study. Chapter 2
develops the book’s core theory that international interventions enable
and are co-opted by post-conflict elites intent on forging a neopatri-
monial political order. Linking scholarship on conflict and peace to
that on political, institutional, and economic development, it builds
a theoretical framework that outlines what we should expect to see
of elites attempting to build post-conflict political order. It lays out
the logic underpinning the book’s narrative, which spans a sequence
of critical peacebuilding phases that form the course of international
interventions: the peace settlement phase, the transitional governance
period, and the aftermath of intervention. This causal argument is
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Structure of the Book 9
woven from a number of thematic threads concerning the manner
in which elites negotiate and respond to moments of transition and
shape institutions and political order coming out of those formative
junctures.
The three chapters that form the main empirical body of the book
then focus on each of these peacebuilding phases in turn, analyzing
case material from Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan at each
juncture. This phase-by-phase narrative structure, in contrast to the
more typical case-by-case approach, enables scholars and practition-
ers to better understand how critical junctures and path dependence
contribute to the overall outcome of neopatrimonial political order
in post-conflict states. Chapter 3 demonstrates how internationally
mediated peace settlements in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan
attempted to not merely bring an end to conflict but also to resolve the
problems that created conflict at the outset. Through a comparative
assessment of the politics leading into and out of the conflict, it demon-
strates that these settlements are best understood as conditional elite
pacts that initiate a new phase of elite conflict over the construction of
political order. Chapter 4 focuses squarely on the peacebuilding inter-
ventions implemented by the United Nations in tandem with domes-
tic counterparts. Based on the notion that statebuilding and democ-
ratization are mutually reinforcing, the UN attempts to implement
both simultaneously to reorient domestic politics away from conflict.
The chapter shows that there are, in fact, deep contradictions between
these two processes and that they undermine each other when pursued
together. In the three cases, conferring legitimate power and resources
upon specific domestic elites enabled them to restrict political compe-
tition and dominate the process of post-conflict institutional design.
Chapter 5 addresses the neopatrimonial political order that persists in
Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan in the aftermath of their inter-
national interventions, examining the consequences of the institutional
decisions made during the transitional governance process. Through
the historical institutionalist lens, it examines how power shifts and set-
tles through the institutional system, paying particular attention to the
manner in which domestic elites operate within and convert the insti-
tutional infrastructure to their own political–economic advantage. In
all three countries, the neopatrimonial equilibrium has proven unfor-
tunately resilient in undermining the quest for rule-bound, effective,
and legitimate post-conflict governance.
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The conclusion reviews the key findings of the book and discusses
its implications for the future practice and study of peacebuilding.
It probes the validity of the argument through a brief examination
of other peacebuilding interventions. The bulk of the conclusion is
devoted to a discussion of how peacebuilding might be improved on
the basis of the book’s findings. First, it disentangles the statebuild-
ing and democratization imperatives that have been linked together in
the pursuit of transformative peacebuilding. It then offers six targeted
policy implications, along with a caveat, for improving peacebuilding
practice. Finally, it reflects on the implications of this book for future
research on peacebuilding and other challenges facing post-conflict
developing countries.
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1 Rethinking the Peacebuilding Puzzle
State formation and democratization have proven to be inherently
organic, long-term, and complex processes that are extremely difficult
to impose from the outside. Post-conflict countries are the least favor-
able environments in which strong and effective governance can take
root and democracy can flourish. They are typically quite poor, having
lost years of potential economic growth and development; they have
low levels of institutional and human capacity that have been further
attenuated by extended conflict; and they are home to populations with
sociopolitical cleavages that have led to, and become hardened by, vio-
lent civil conflict. Nevertheless, the international community, led by the
United Nations, acts on the belief that a strong state and a democratic
political system are best suited to managing political conflict and pre-
sumes to be able to build the necessary administrative and democratic
institutions to underpin modern political order and peace in these frag-
ile countries.
The crux of the puzzle addressed in this book is why the interna-
tional community has been relatively unsuccessful in building the peace
it thinks it is building in post-conflict states. This chapter lays the foun-
dation for the book’s approach to this puzzle and describes the manner
in which it builds its conceptual, empirical, and practical contributions.
It begins with an overview of the practice of international peacebuild-
ing interventions, defining, in particular, the aspirational underpinnings
of the transitional governance approach to transformative peacebuild-
ing that is the focus of this inquiry. Next, through a brief review of
the existing literature I make the case that we need to better under-
stand the limitations of transformative peacebuilding, and I outline
the unique argument this book builds in doing so. The chapter then
outlines the empirical approach underlying this research, describing
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What is Peacebuilding?
Peacebuilding is the most extensive and transformative type of peace-
keeping intervention undertaken by the international community.
Where traditional peacekeeping entails international assistance to
maintain a ceasefire among former combatants, peacebuilding con-
stitutes a project to transform a post-conflict country’s sociopolitical
landscape so as to prevent the possible recurrence of conflict. In the
aftermath of the Cold War, the UN’s peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing portfolio became one of its fastest-growing and most distinctive
endeavors for two main reasons. First, violent civil conflict around the
globe peaked in the early 1990s as the stability wrought by the Cold
War ended, although the proportion of countries embroiled in civil
conflict then started to decline steadily.1 Second, the end of the bipolar
global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union meant
that the UN Security Council could finally begin to agree to peacekeep-
ing mandates under Chapters VI and VII of the UNCharter.2 The Secu-
rity Council tripled the peacekeeping operations it mandated between
1987 and 1994 and the UN’s annual peacekeeping budget climbed
from $230 million to $3.6 billion in the same period.3 The figure is
double today: the approved UN peacekeeping operations budget in the
fiscal year from July 2014 to June 2015 was just over $7 billion. Over
the past two decades, the UN’s peacekeeping budget has been about
triple its regular operating budget.4 Moreover, peacebuilding is essen-
tially a UN affair: its interventions are by far the predominant form of
multilateral peace operation since 1945.5
1 Blattman and Miguel 2010; Fearon 2010; and Fearon and Laitin 2003.
2 The two sections of the UN Charter deal with dispute resolution: Chapter VI
authorizes the UN to issue recommendations, while Chapter VII authorizes the
Security Council to take forceful measures where necessary. Charter of the
United Nations, San Francisco, 1945.
3 Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 6, citing Boutros-Ghali 1995.
4 The UN’s current two-year operating budget is set at $5.4 billion.
5 Different elements of peacebuilding have been pursued over the same period by
multilateral regional groupings under the rubric of the United Nations (for
example, the peacekeeping missions deployed by the Economic Community of
West Africa States, or ECOWAS, in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and in
Guinea-Bissau in 2012). The United States’ invasion and occupation of Iraq,
beginning in 2003, was undertaken unilaterally, but in many respects the
nation-building project pursued there via the Coalition Provisional Authority
paralleled the logic of the transitional governance experiences described here.
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The broad mandate of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
ations covers a large range of activities – including ceasefire monitor-
ing, humanitarian assistance, military demobilization, power-sharing
arrangements, support for elections, transitional administration, and
operations to strengthen the rule of law and promote economic and
social development.6 Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali laid out the conceptual foundations of the newly ambitious and
growing UN role in peace and security that he presided over as the Cold
War ended in his seminal report,An Agenda for Peace.7 He detailed the
interdependent roles – preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeep-
ing, and post-conflict peacebuilding – that he foresaw the UN carrying
out in the rapidly evolving international system. Over the course of the
past quarter-century, the practice of peace operations has indeed grown
in complexity and ambition, as Boutros-Ghali anticipated. Although
this evolution has not been strictly chronological, a number of analysts
have fruitfully classified UN peacekeeping strategies in generational
paradigms.8 The bulk of the UN’s peace operations since the end of the
Cold War have focused on post-conflict peacebuilding, which Boutros-
Ghali defined as “action to identify and support structures which will
tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into
conflict.”9 Similarly, the influential Brahimi Report on UN peace oper-
ations defined peacebuilding as “activities undertaken on the far side
of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace.”10
The Transitional Governance Approach to Transformative
Peacebuilding
This book defines peacebuilding, following scholarly and practical con-
vention, as the international community’s attempts to transform a post-
conflict country through intervention. What I term transitional gov-
ernance, the focus of this book, is a specific type of peacebuilding
endeavor for a particular environment: it is a transformative approach
to forging sustainable peace in nations riven by civil war by crafting
6 For further discussion of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
mandate and role in post-conflict countries, see Brahimi 2000; Doyle and
Sambanis 2006; Durch 2003; Howard 2008; Jones 2004; and Ratner 1995.
7 Boutros-Ghali 1992.
8 For example, Goulding 1993; Ratner 1995; and Thakur and Schnabel 2001.
9 Boutros-Ghali 1992, para. 20. 10 Brahimi 2000, para. 13.
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the administrative and political governance institutions to underpin
lasting peace. Often other important peacebuilding dimensions – such
as improving internal security, resettling refugees and internally dis-
placed persons, and reconstructing a market-based approach to eco-
nomic development – go hand in hand. The presence of an interna-
tional coercive force, represented iconically by UN blue helmet troops
and police but sometimes handled by NATO and other alliances, is
often a crucial element of multidimensional peace operations.11 Here,
nevertheless, I restrict the analytical lens to focus on the engineered
attempt at simultaneous statebuilding and democratization in post-
conflict countries. Via this form of peacebuilding through transitional
governance, the UN pursues state effectiveness and democratic legiti-
macy as the two essential ingredients of modern political order and the
necessary underpinnings of lasting peace.
To date, the UN has not laid out an explicit model of transitional
governance. Hence, I offer here an inductive definition, built through
an examination of the mandates of the peace operations that attempt
this manner of transformative peacebuilding.12 A negotiated peace
settlement among warring elites, typically brokered by the United
Nations, marks the end to violent civil conflict. Transformative peace-
building through transitional governance begins, subsequently, when
a UN transitional authority or assistance mission is mandated by the
UN Security Council to assist with the implementation of the peace
agreement over a specified transitional period, typically two to three
years. The hallmark of transitional governance – distinguishing it from
other, less transformational versions of multidimensional peacekeep-
ing – is that the appointed mission is responsible, to some degree, for
performing the executive functions of the state.13 Over the course of
11 This is especially the case in the early stages of major interventions, where
peacekeeping is a primary international concern, and ceasefire maintenance can
continue to be crucial right up to a post-conflict election. See Fortna 2008. Yet
the evidence below shows that the role of domestic coercive forces is more
central than that of international troops to the longer-term endeavor of
establishing political order in post-conflict states.
12 This definition is condensed from that elaborated in Barma 2006, 2007. See
also the definitive assessment provided in Caplan 2005.
13 Caplan 2005: 21, concurs as follows, “ . . .what distinguishes [these missions]
from peacekeeping is the scope of their interest in, if not actual responsibility
for, the functioning of a territory or state.”
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the transitional period the UN relies on a small group of domestic
counterparts – sometimes a body that explicitly shares power among
competing local groups – to assist with governance and to provide
some form of domestic political participation in the process. Simulta-
neous processes of statebuilding and democratization are thus embed-
ded in the transitional governance approach. Finally, the transitional
period culminates in a UN-organized national election for a constituent
assembly.14 Once that representative body deliberates and ratifies a
new constitution, making core choices about institutional architecture
along the way, it is transformed into a new, post-conflict national leg-
islature. At this point, while the UN and many international aid orga-
nizations remain involved in various forms of post-conflict assistance,
a legitimate domestic government takes hold of the reins of admin-
istrative power. Figure 1.1 depicts the staged process that comprises
the transitional governance approach between dotted lines show-
ing its relationship to what comes immediately before and after this
period.
The UN’s strategy of peacebuilding through transitional governance
represents the conviction that transformative peacebuilding is possi-
ble. It also represents an implicit theory: the notion that an engineered
process of simultaneous state- and democracy-building is the strategy
through which international interventions can help conflict-affected
countries to transform the sociopolitical dynamics that activated and
perpetuated conflict. In turn, the formal institutions pursued in post-
conflict countries are the trappings of Weberian, rationalized bureau-
cracy and procedural liberal democracy because these forms of gover-
nance fit the international community’s model of statehood. In other
words, international norms concerning what is effective and legitimate
domestic governance play a major role in shaping the UN’s choice of
the transitional governance strategy and the formal institutional out-
comes it seeks in mounting post-conflict interventions to build sus-
tainable peace.15 The international organizations that undertake dif-
ferent elements of peace operations – including the United Nations,
14 Zaum 2012 notes that only in Cambodia and Bosnia did UN mandates specify
that elections would mark the end of the peace operation. Nevertheless,
elections have served broadly as the main practical mechanism of transition
from international to domestic governance.
15 Autesserre 2014; Meyer et al. 1997; and Paris 2003.
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Conflict period
Peace settlement
UN transitional authority or assistance mission 
mandated to assist with implementation of peace 
settlement
UN mission takes on some degree of
executive governance functions, in
collaboration with domestic elite
counterpart(s) 
UN mission relies on domestic elite
counterpart(s) to assist with governing
and provide some domestic political
participation 
State-building component: enhance
institutional and human capacity 
Democracy-building component:
prepare for elections 
UN exit point:
national elections for a constituent assembly 
Constituent assembly drafts and ratifies constitution;
including core choices about administrative and
political institutional architecture  
Legitimate domestic government
takes over reigns of power 
Figure 1.1 The transitional governance approach to transformative
peacebuilding
the World Bank, and multilateral security groupings such as the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – are, in turn, the repositories
and promulgators of such international norms.16 These norms persist
even in the face of evidence from developing countries that the formal
16 Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; and Meyer and Rowan 1977.
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structures of bureaucracy and democracy are often fairly ineffective at
performing their intended governance functions.17
This book tells a particular story about how these international
norms and objectives about modern political order meet reality on the
ground in recipient post-conflict countries. The theoretical framework
advanced in the following chapter, along with the empirical investi-
gation of peacebuilding through transitional governance in Cambo-
dia, East Timor, and Afghanistan, explain and illustrate why and how
domestic political elites adapt and use the symbols, resources, and insti-
tutions associated with peacebuilding in constructing, instead, their
own version of political order, one rooted in neopatrimonialism. Each
chapter deals with one particular phase of the peacebuilding path-
way, describing the international objectives animating that part of
the sequence and then illustrating systematically how pursuit of those
objectives was co-opted and upended by domestic elites. I turn now
to a brief review of the existing literature in order to explain how this
book’s argument builds upon and adds to our understanding of peace-
building.
What Do We Know About Peacebuilding?
Scholars have delved deeply into what began in the early 1990s as
a relatively new theoretical space at the intersection of international
relations, comparative politics, and public administration in order to
examine the increasingly regular and significant phenomenon of post-
conflict peacebuilding. Resting on various subdisciplinary perspectives,
research on peacebuilding has evolved from the initial set of largely
descriptive and policy-prescriptive assessments of peace operations to
work that develops a deeper emphasis on the interaction of interna-
tional and local actors and a more nuanced approach to the politics of
peacebuilding. Nevertheless, thinking on peacebuilding tends to inade-
quately capture the agency of domestic elites on long-term governance
outcomes because it underemphasizes the importance of taking a his-
torical perspective on the central challenge of building political order.
The bulk of the peacebuilding scholarship, as I illustrate in this section,
comes from perspectives that place the peace operations themselves at
the center of the inquiry. They thereby explain outcomes on the basis of
17 Herbst 2000; Jackson 1990; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; and Scott 1998.
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an intervention’s scope, its size, the way it is organized, and so on, con-
textualized within the constellation of factors that condition its suc-
cess or failure. My argument differs from these rival explanations in
that the analysis privileges the role played by post-conflict elites – their
interests, their actions, their agreements – in dealing with international
interventions along the temporal sequence represented by the peace-
building pathway.
The study of peacekeeping has its genealogical roots in international
relations, originating with a body of work concerned with explain-
ing when and why interventions successfully achieve and maintain
peace. The first wave of research in this field was focused squarely on
the peace operations themselves, with a view to understanding why
some failed where others succeeded, and primarily based on a case-by-
case analysis of post-conflict countries.18 Single-country case studies
of peace operations abound, many written by experienced practition-
ers. These are rich in empirical description but pre-theoretical, tending
to underplay the causal mechanisms leading to success in outcomes
as well as the interaction of international peacebuilding strategies with
the domestic political environments in which they unfold. Another line
of inquiry focuses on the machinery and processes of transformative
peacebuilding – comparing the various mechanisms through which the
international community has attempted to aid post-conflict states.19
These studies typically come from a liberal internationalist perspec-
tive that takes as given the appropriateness of the norms pursued and,
while acknowledging the importance of political context in shaping
outcomes, many are oriented as evaluations geared toward improving
policy and practice. Thus they tend to attribute the relative success of
peacebuilding exercises less to causal political dynamics and more to
technocratic details subject to policy manipulation such as the scope
and implementation of the operational mandates themselves.
The second wave of research on peacebuilding approached similar
questions through the adoption of a more deliberate focus on method-
ological and theoretical rigor, with the aim of developing systematic
18 Fortna and Howard 2008 outline the development of the first two waves of
research discussed here. They also point to an earlier wave of work that was
focused on peacekeeping in interstate wars.
19 Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004; Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2004;
Chesterman, Ignatieff, and Thakur 2005; Chopra 1999; Diehl and Druckman
2010; and Fukuyama 2004.
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causal arguments that can be generalized across cases.20 Much of this
work was concerned with the extent to which peace lasts in post-
conflict countries, with the inquiry focused on the factors that either
impede or enhance the prospects for peace. The analytical logic driving
this work is thus typically probabilistic or what Paul Diehl has termed
“behavioral.”21 One line of scholarship has essentially confirmed the
simple and important finding that peacekeeping operations lengthen
the duration of peace after civil wars – peace lasts longer when there
are international forces deployed than when former parties to conflict
are left to themselves.22 Other path-breaking research has identified
a number of key determinants limiting the success of peace opera-
tions in terms of the incidence of violence and the success of democ-
ratization and reconstruction efforts.23 These approaches tend to be
rationalist, focusing on the degree to which optimal interaction was
achieved between the characteristics of an intervention and the context
in which it is undertaken. In general, however, this strand of peace-
building scholarship is restricted to binary outcome measures of the
presence or absence of peace and democracy at some relatively short
remove from the end of an intervention.24 The probabilistic, rationalist,
and variable-centered nature of this body of work has yielded impor-
tant knowledge about the likelihood of specific governance outcomes
obtaining in a given timeframe after a peace operation.Yet, overall, this
analytical approach has fallen short of developing a causal understand-
ing of longer-term governance outcomes.We still lack a comprehensive
explanation of the conditions under which a genuine transformation
takes place in post-conflict societies, or a causally reasoned account of
why that so often fails to transpire – a gap that the conjunctural and
contingent logic of this book’s approach seeks to fill.
In its early incarnations, a large body of the peacebuilding schol-
arship was fused to the desire of peacebuilding practitioners to be
more successful. Practice and theory on this topic emerged contempo-
raneously and many of the first crop of peacebuilding analysts were
20 Fortna and Howard 2008. 21 Diehl 2014.
22 Fortna 2004, 2008; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; and Walter 2002.
23 Call 2012; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Girod 2015; Jarstad and Sisk
2008; Paris and Sisk 2009; Stedman 1997; and Stedman, Rothchild, and
Cousens 2002.
24 Call 2008 identifies the four standards for measuring success that have been
common in the peacebuilding literature.
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themselves also practitioners concerned with policy results. Roland
Paris argued that this quirk of the peacebuilding scholarship led to
a “cult of relevance” that limited theoretical and empirical advances
in the field.25 A third wave of peacebuilding research connects itself
more deliberately, by contrast, to broader debates in international
relations theory. Some scholars have, for example, framed the pur-
suit of peacebuilding goals and norms in relation to broader think-
ing about the construction and transmission of international norms.
Deploying a constructivist or sociological institutionalist lens, these
studies have focused on issues such as the replication of externally legit-
imate norms of statehood, the mechanisms of organizational learning
at the United Nations, and the operative frames employed by expa-
triate peacebuilders working in post-conflict contexts.26 Others have
considered from a more rationalist ontological perspective the impli-
cations of theories of international governance and state sovereignty
for peacebuilding practice and policy.27
The peacekeeping literature rooted in international relations gener-
ally stops short of analyzing the dynamics of transitional governance
processes in terms of how international objectives interact with domes-
tic forces. Turning to comparative politics for insight on these domes-
tic dynamics of peacebuilding, other theoretical shortcomings become
clear. Scholars have much to impart about the effects of elections and
constitutional design on post-conflict peace as well as the connection
between peacebuilding and democratization.28 Externally imposed and
managed interim governments in post-conflict countries have been ana-
lyzed in comparison to other types of provisional governance arrange-
ments during major regime transitions.29 There has been much lively
debate on whether power-sharing, in its various forms, is a valuable
25 Paris 2001. One particular problem that resulted from this closeness to policy
concerns was an overreliance on the UN’s narrative and data concerning
specific peace operations. Della Porta 2013 argues, similarly, that dominant
approaches to understanding terrorism are biased by their closeness to the
United States government’s interests and data. I thank Maiah Jaskoski for
making this connection.
26 Autesserre 2010, 2014; Barnett et al. 2007; Howard 2008; Ottaway 2002;
Paris 2004; Westendorf 2015.
27 Fearon and Laitin 2004; Keohane 2003; Krasner 2004; Krasner and Risse
2014; Lake 2016; and Matanock 2014.
28 Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Reilly 2002; Reynolds 2002; and Roeder and Rothchild
2005.
29 Shain and Linz 1995; also Gutierri and Piombo 2007.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
What Do We Know About Peacebuilding? 21
post-conflict peacebuilding tool – an intellectual legacy of the predom-
inance of ethnicized civil conflict in the post-Cold War period.30 Yet
while this focus on institutional form is certainly warranted, it is also
essential to explicitly consider the interaction of institutions with the
political environment in which they exist and the agency of domestic
elites who both control and are constrained by them.
This latter point is made in a different manner by a final group of
scholars, who have turned a critical theoretical eye on the very con-
cept and practice of peacebuilding. Some have focused their critique
on the implementation of peacebuilding through “neotrusteeship,” or
the imposition of governance by an external power, and on themechan-
ics of international involvement and donor-driven assistance.31 Others
have reappraised the “liberal peacebuilding” model itself, questioning
the international community’s motivation in applying it and the appro-
priateness of its content – Weberian bureaucracy, liberal democracy,
and neoliberal economics – in the post-conflict countries in which it is
attempted.32 One strand of this critique focuses on expatriate peace-
builders’ myopia about local, indigenous practices of peace and gov-
ernance, arguing that peacebuilding should better resonate with the
actual needs of the society emerging from conflict.33 Overall, this most
critical strand of the literature focuses on how international norms and
objectives are externally imposed on a recipient country.
In sum, in theorizing about peacebuilding and studying its outcomes,
analysts have tended to focus on the processes and institutional forms
comprising the practice of peacebuilding. There are notable exceptions
advancing the perspective that peacebuilding attempts can be improved
only by better apprehending the political incentives of domestic
elites – and emphasizing, contrary to the conventional assumption,
that the strategic interests of international and domestic actors rarely
coincide.34 Yet the various strands of the peacebuilding literature
tend overall to suffer from a short-term focus, a probabilistic or
variable-centered logic, and an overemphasis on the institutional forms
30 Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; Horowitz 2002; Jarstad 2008; Lijphart 2002; and
Sisk 1996, 2013.
31 Barnett 2006; Butler 2012; Call 2008; and Paris 2010.
32 Chandler 2006; Hughes 2003; Pugh 2005; Richmond 2006; and Richmond
and Franks 2009.
33 Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; and Richmond 2014.
34 Barma 2012a; Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Call 2012; Curtis 2013; Lake and
Fariss 2014; Manning 2007; Tansey 2014; and Zürcher et al. 2013.
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associated with peacebuilding. In order to truly understand whether
peacebuilding approaches can and do achieve their objectives of build-
ing sustainable and lasting peace, it is necessary to explain longer-
term governance outcomes by focusing on the causal and conjunctural
mechanisms through which domestic elites interact with interventions
and continue to build political order in their aftermath.
This book thus emphasizes how domestic post-conflict elites have
been extremely adept at co-opting international peacebuilding inter-
ventions for their own political concerns and objectives. The approach
of peacebuilding through transitional governance is not undertaken
in a political vacuum even when formal institutional structures have
collapsed. On the contrary, peacebuilding is a hyperpolitical undertak-
ing; and the political–economic incentives facing domestic elites in the
course of peacebuilding are crucial in explaining outcomes. Recogniz-
ing this issue in practice, the policy community on peacebuilding and
development has recently converged on the broad consensus that the
ability of an institution to deliver good governance – in the sense of
producing public services and achieving legitimacy – is not simply a
technocratic matter; instead, successful institution building is embed-
ded in political processes, power structures, and societal sources of
legitimacy.35 The narrative presented in this book pays careful empiri-
cal attention to the elite incentives that define and condition their pur-
suit of political order. In particular, it examines how post-conflict elites
garner political support and legitimacy, focusing on how they use polit-
ical and administrative institutions to deliver the various benefits that
underpin their compact with society.
Rethinking the Peacebuilding Puzzle
What explains the relative disappointment in the pursuit of effective
and legitimate governance through peacebuilding interventions despite
the tremendous financial, human, and intellectual resources devoted to
this endeavor? The answer presented here rests upon two theoretical
innovations that help to reframe the peacebuilding puzzle. Uniquely,
I approach the study of peacebuilding through a temporal perspec-
tive, adopting a historical institutionalist lens. The book’s causal
35 Barma, Huybens, and Viñuela 2014; Jones and Chandran 2008; OECD 2011;
Whalan 2013; Westendorf 2015; and World Bank 2011.
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narrative – as outlined briefly below – is structured around the pathway
of three critical peacebuilding phases that form the course of interna-
tional interventions: (1) the settlement phase, which marks an end to
outright violent conflict; (2) the transitional governance period, over
which a transformative peacebuilding intervention is implemented, in
tandem with domestic elites, with the intent of creating a sustainable
peace through statebuilding and democratization; and (3) the after-
math of the intervention and the pivot of a “post-conflict” country
to a “normal development” phase. Emphasizing the temporal dimen-
sions of political phenomena in this manner – viewing political pro-
cesses “in time” as Paul Pierson coins it – can be essential to uncover-
ing elements of the causal mechanisms at hand.36 One crucial insight
that emerges from the temporal causal picture presented here is that
international peacebuilding efforts do not, contrary to their implicit
logic and expressed goals, bring about a fundamental break with the
political patterns of the past. Instead, we can only achieve a true under-
standing of the outcomes of peacebuilding when we see these efforts
in temporal continuity. Over the course of the peacebuilding pathway
that forms the narrative arc of this study, the manner in which domes-
tic elites interact with an international peacebuilding intervention in
shaping political order – unintended consequences and all – comes into
sharp relief.
Intertwined with the historical institutionalist approach, this book
imports a new political economy perspective to the study of peace-
building. The study of intra-state conflict was revolutionized by an
attention to the economic incentives that influenced the behavior of
warring parties.37 The study of how societies end and recover from
conflict requires a similar emphasis on the political–economic motiva-
tions orienting the parties to peace. The vast majority of post-conflict
countries are developing countries in which the central governance
challenge is the construction of a viable modern political order con-
ducive to economic productivity. Yet those who study post-conflict
peacebuilding, typically rooted in the study of violent conflict and its
resolution through peacekeeping and institutional engineering, have
36 Pierson 2004. See also Thelen 1999 on the importance of temporality in
historical institutionalist approaches to politics, as well as the significance of
examining politics as a dynamic process that often results in unintended
consequences.
37 Ballentine and Sherman 2003; also Collier and Hoeffler 1998.
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paid scant attention to the study of the political economy of develop-
ment – which is focused on how institutions and resources shape elite
incentives, the state–society compact, political order, and economic
development. We cannot fully explain post-conflict governance out-
comes unless we understand the incentives motivating elites as they
attempt to construct political order and see how the choices of these
actors are conditioned by context – features that come into sharp relief
over the course of the peacebuilding pathway.
The empirical chapters in this book advance the following causal
argument through a comparative analysis of UN peacebuilding expe-
riences and post-intervention outcomes in three countries: Cambodia,
East Timor, and Afghanistan. First, I examine how warring elites come
to a peace settlement in the context of the grievances and competing
claims to governing legitimacy that contributed to conflict in the first
place. Mediating a peace settlement is the first step taken by the inter-
national community in an attempt at transformative peacebuilding –
and, in turn, serves as the basic agreement upon which the rest of the
peacebuilding intervention is then predicated and implemented. Pre-
vious scholarship has emphasized that the settlement phase of peace-
building is best understood as a conditional elite pact, yet the litera-
ture typically views and assesses these peace settlements in the limited
context of marking an end to violence. A post-conflict settlement deal
should, more importantly, be interpreted as a critical juncture marked
by exceptionally fluid politics that, in turn, initiates a new pathway
featuring heightened elite conflict in the political arena. The way elite
settlements are typically pursued has the perverse effect of freezing in
place an unstable equilibrium of power; this makes it more likely for
elites to perceive the immediate post-conflict period as a “winner takes
all” game with short time horizons. A sharper understanding of elite
political contest leading into and coming out of the conflict becomes
central to understanding how domestic elites embarked, in tandem
with the international community, on reshaping post-conflict political
order.
Second, I demonstrate how the simultaneous state- and democracy-
building approach pursued by the archetypal transformative peace-
building intervention empowers particular domestic elites to capture
the legitimate political space and concentrate state resources in their
own hands. In order to quickly establish basic state functions, the
international community chooses specific elites with whom to govern,
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undermining the creation of a level political playing field to promote
democratization. The new political pathway initiated by the peace set-
tlement thus locks in advantages to a small group of elites. In turn,
a self-reinforcing dynamic is established whereby these early win-
ners continue to gain benefits in a manner that leads to a permanent
reshaping of the power balance. Peacebuilding interventions them-
selves deliver sources of patronage to these specific political actors in
the form of financial and other resources and the conferral of legitimate
power. Perhaps most crucially, these elites are also centrally involved in
the process of institutional engineering that takes place over the tran-
sitional governance period itself. Thus, over the course of an interven-
tion and in the election that marks its endpoint, a small group of elites
benefits from gradually increasing returns to power, while actively nur-
turing a political coalition and shaping institutions to their continued
advantage.
Third, I explain how and why post-conflict countries tend to consol-
idate neopatrimonial political orders in the post-intervention phase.
The UN’s peacebuilding model rests on the liberal ideal that well-
functioning, democratic states will deliver the public goods and ser-
vices and shared prosperity that are pillars of sustainable peace. In real-
ity, however, the political–economic incentives motivating post-conflict
elites make it easier and more profitable for them to distribute pub-
lic rents and patronage goods to their clients in exchange for politi-
cal support. When time horizons are short and citizens cannot hold
elites accountable for their commitments to provide public goods, elite
incentives privilege narrow benefit provision to specific clients instead
of public goods that benefit all citizens. Under these conditions, elites
can channel their appeal to citizens through hierarchical patron–client
networks. The formal structures of authority – such as government
agencies and institutionalized political parties – are undermined, in
turn, because elites do not need to build credibility with the broader
populace. The patterns of political contestation evidence an inter-elite
battle to gain political authority, as well as the struggle to use politi-
cal power to continue to reinforce advantage.38 This neopatrimonial
political–economic order is an obviously suboptimal one that privileges
the short-term interests of elites and their networks over the long-term
38 Pierson 2015 identifies this as a major feature of how power distribution is
path-dependent.
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welfare of society at large. Even as a return to violent conflict is fore-
stalled, genuine improvements in state capacity and democratization
prove to be illusory.
Rethinking the peacebuilding experiences in Cambodia, East Timor,
and Afghanistan through the lens of this narrative demonstrates the
contest between two competing visions – international and domestic –
of political order. Quite simply, during the course of transitional gov-
ernance powerful domestic elites co-opt the UN-led process of institu-
tional design, which is intended to serve as the basis for lasting peace,
and subsequently consolidate their holds on power through various
discernible strategies, damaging the prospects for democratic gover-
nance. Peacebuilding operations bring with them significant resources
and, in turn, the allocation and control of those resources become
a new site of power for elites.39 In Cambodia today, the hegemonic
ruling party quashes dissent and controls all the levers of adminis-
trative, economic, and political power in a situation of grand state
capture. In East Timor, a nascent peace was upended by continuing
elite factional battles that turned violent and the subsequent political–
economic settlement remains contentious. In Afghanistan, competing
elites maintain a pitched battle for control of the state and the country’s
resources – a struggle framed by the political dominance of ethnore-
gional patron–client networks. In subtly different ways, each country’s
trajectory reveals how elites faced a political–economic calculus that
oriented their incentives toward the construction of a neopatrimonial
political order characterized by discretionary rule-making, weak state
capacity, and compromised democratic accountability.
Viewed in time and with the role and incentives of post-conflict elites
firmly in mind, it becomes evident that the international peacebuilding
endeavor paradoxically fails at achieving its goal of sustainable peace
through state- and democracy-building because these elites instead suc-
ceed at using the peacebuilding intervention for their own ends. I wish
to be clear at the outset that those ends are not unquestionably nega-
tive. In each of the three cases in this book – as well as in other coun-
tries – the post-intervention political order is undoubtedly better than
the conflict that preceded it, with elements of more political stabil-
ity, government efficacy, and democratic accountability. But these out-
comes fall short of what the international community believed itself
39 Barma 2012a; Hughes 2009a; and Richmond 2006.
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capable of achieving. The contention here is that viewing post-conflict
peacebuilding interventions as sequenced contests between two com-
peting visions of political order explains why the desired results of
the transformative peacebuilding enterprise are not fully met as well
as the outcomes we see in place. Next, I discuss how I construct this
argument.
A Unique Approach to Understanding Peacebuilding
This study hews to the three defining features of comparative-historical
analysis identified by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen and their
collaborators in their recent, thorough, and eloquent case for the
approach40 – which has often, until relatively recently, also been
referred to as historical institutionalism. First, this book adopts a firmly
macroscopic orientation to the study of peacebuilding, focusing on
large-scale political outcomes and causal patterns, along with a con-
figurational logic, whereby the mode of explanation emphasizes vari-
ables combining in patterns defined by context. Second, the study was
inspired by a desire to focus on problem-driven, case-based research,
geared toward the explication of causal mechanisms through deep
understanding and retelling of case empirics as opposed to a stylized
rendering of cases coded on isolated variables of interest. Third, the
analysis in this book presents a temporal emphasis, whereby the tim-
ing and sequencing of when specific things occur matter a great deal
to the way that outcomes play out, as much as any other element of
context.
I have chosen to define this book’s analytical logic as resting on a
foundation of historical institutionalism even though “comparative-
historical analysis” has perhaps become the dominant label for this
approach in the political science scholarship. This choice reflects the
wish to emphasize the metatheoretical reframing that the historical
institutionalist approach affords the study of peacebuilding, especially
through its temporal and configurational causal logic, over other, more
granular methodological concerns being addressed by those in the
40 Mahoney and Thelen 2015. In their introduction to the volume, Thelen and
Mahoney 2015 discuss each of these characteristics at length, establishing the
case for their analytical importance.
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vanguard of comparative-historical analysis.41 This section thus makes
a particular case for a temporal understanding of peacebuilding,
characterizing the international community’s model of peacebuilding
through transitional governance as a critical juncture and emphasizing
the value of a path-dependent approach to the study of this transforma-
tional experience. It then specifies the macropolitical and institutional
variables that are of interest in the study and discusses the configu-
rational mode of explanation. Finally, it explains the selection of the
Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan cases and outlines the case-
intensive empirical research design underpinning the study.
Viewing Peacebuilding in Time
One of the central aims of this book is to make an original contri-
bution to the study of peacebuilding by grounding it “in time.”42 To
deepen our understanding of peacebuilding and political order in post-
conflict states, this book emphasizes the importance of temporal causal
sequences and mechanisms and views institutions – formal rules, pol-
icy structures, and norms – as both the legacies of the concrete politi-
cal struggles of the past and the contours of the political arena of the
present.43 In this light, the temporal location of peacebuilding inter-
ventions is crucial, in relation both to the conflict and political land-
scape that precedes them and also to their aftermath and the political
dynamics and outcomes they set in motion. The analysis here is thus
differentiated from the more common approach to the study of peace-
building, which favors a probabilistic logic and typically treats inter-
ventions as exogenous treatments to be assessed in terms of the extent
to which they met their objectives. Adopting an in time approach helps
to expand our conjunctural and contingent understanding of where
institutional change comes from, opening it up to endogenous change
shaped by the interaction of specific actors, and avoids the risk of an
improperly truncated analysis.44
This book embeds the abrupt transformational experience repre-
sented by a peacebuilding intervention in a longer view of the grad-
ual building of political order. In so doing, it recognizes that as
41 I am extremely grateful to Paul Pierson for a clarifying exchange about use of
these various labels. I alone am responsible for the choices made here.
42 Pierson 2004.
43 Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 7; and Pierson and Skocpol 2002.
44 Pierson 2004.
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consequential for political outcomes as the critical junctures at which
wholesale change occurs is the slow and piecemeal adaptation in and
around institutions that follows.45 The rich literature on state forma-
tion and the building of political and institutional order has taught us
that the sequencing of political and institutional choices and processes
is central to explaining outcomes.46 In particular, causal conjunctures –
the interaction effects between causal sequences – are especially impor-
tant for understanding the effects of competition over political space.47
Institutions, in the narrative I build in this book, are both an outcome
of interest and important intervening variables in generating other out-
comes – they emerge from temporal processes of political struggle and
are deeply embedded in social context, shaping both going forward. In
short, institutions – including those that are at the heart of peacebuild-
ing interventions – are the path-dependent products of both continuity
and change.48 When we view peacebuilding efforts in temporal per-
spective it becomes clear that the formal institutions they transplant
into post-conflict states interact with the patterns of the past instead
of serving as a break with them.
A peacebuilding intervention is a transformative moment from its
inception (via peace settlement and UN mandate) through to its close
(exit via elections), encompassing its implementation on the ground
through transitional governance. A peacebuilding operation of this
nature is thus fruitfully treated as a watershed event that, like a classic
critical juncture, “establish[es] certain directions of change and fore-
close[s] others in a way that shapes politics for years to come.”49 Such
an intervention, like a critical juncture, can be seen as both a structural
phenomenon that reshapes the polities in which it is undertaken, as
well as a moment of contingent choice for the agents involved in the
transformation.50 Indeed, Giovanni Capoccia notes that the defining
feature of a critical juncture is contingency – because of the uncertainty
45 Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 1.
46 For example, Ertman 1997; Skocpol 1979; Slater 2010; Tilly 1990; and
Waldner 1999.
47 Pierson 2004; and Waldner 1999.
48 Katznelson 1997; Pierson 2004; and Thelen 1999.
49 Collier and Collier 1991: 27.
50 In this regard, I hew to the insight that the relative balance of structure and
agency during this transformative event is an empirical rather than a
definitional issue, as argued in Brady and Collier 2004; and Slater and
Simmons 2010. Assessing this relationship is precisely one of the contributions
of the empirical approach in this book.
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as to what institutional arrangements will come to look like, “political
agency and choice . . . play a decisive causal role in setting an institution
on a certain path of development, a path that then persists over a long
period of time.”51 What makes a peacebuilding intervention a particu-
larly interesting type of critical juncture is that it represents a series of
wide-ranging institutional choices superimposed by an external actor
upon the fluid political landscape of a post-conflict country.
Peacebuilding Outcomes: Institutions and Governance
The transformative aspirations of the broader peacebuilding project
are represented in the belief that the international community can, in
a relatively short period of time, establish the institutional underpin-
nings for rule-bound, effective, and legitimate government. Animated
by the objective of building the foundations for lasting peace, inter-
national interventions focus operationally on the construction of the
formal institutional structures of the administrative and political are-
nas. Yet those institutional structures are transposed onto dynamic
political contexts, hence eventual governance outcomes are a prod-
uct of the domestic political game. The results of peacebuilding inter-
ventions are decidedly mixed, therefore, with a notable gap between
the formal institutions transplanted through transitional governance
and the eventual governance outcomes in the aftermath of interven-
tion. Open contestation around formal institutional choice is only the
tip of the iceberg in terms of the real power battles that are going on
under the surface – such that the politics of initial institutional adop-
tion are often very different from the politics of later implementation
and adaptation.52 Thus, I examine two sets of outcomes: the formal
institutional choices surrounding statebuilding and democratization;
and the extent to which effective and legitimate governance are con-
solidated in the post-intervention phase.
Formal Institutional Choices
In undertaking peacebuilding that aims to resolve the roots of conflict,
the international community has come to believe that a political solu-
tion to stalemated civil conflict cannot be “all or nothing,” and that
51 Capoccia 2015: 148. 52 Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2015.
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institutional design is the major policy instrument available for recon-
ciling previously warring segments of a population. With the eventual
aim of building a stable and lasting peace by establishing the founda-
tions for democratic governance, two sets of institutional structures are
emphasized in peacebuilding through transitional governance: admin-
istrative structures – the set of institutions through which a govern-
ment exerts control or broadcasts authority over its population; and
constitutional arrangements – the set of institutions through which a
governing authority administers a polity with legitimacy. Agreement
on the institutional architecture of the modern state – including an
administrative structure, a constitution, and the design of an electoral
system – represents the outcome of crucial political negotiations among
domestic elites, as well as a critical step in the longer process of building
rule-bound, legitimate, and effective government.
Post-Intervention Governance Outcomes
Transformative peacebuilding focuses, in the peace settlement and
transitional governance implementation phases, on the construction of
the administrative and political institutions discussed above. Its objec-
tives, however, are to resolve the roots of conflict and thereby build
a stable peace. The degree to which those institutions are the channel
through which effective and legitimate governance is built and thereby
serve as a stepping stone to sustainable peace can only be assessed by
looking at consolidated governance outcomes in terms of state capac-
ity and democratization. We know a strong state and its hallmarks
when we see them in action. The Weberian ideal state is one that is
effective, resting in turn on the autonomy and internal organization
or rationalization of the bureaucracy.53 The state is also in constant
interaction with society, both shaping and being shaped by it.54 Theda
Skocpol thus argues that analysis of the state should also include the
“Tocquevillian”dimension of state strength that emphasizes the state’s
connections with society.55 Peter Evans captures this two-sided con-
ception of strong state capacity with the notion of embedded auton-
omy, a term that echoes Michael Mann’s distinction between “exten-
sive” and “intensive” power.56 The widely used working definition of
53 Evans and Rauch 1999.
54 Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Kohli 2002; and Migdal 1997.
55 Skocpol 1985. 56 Evans 1995; and Mann 1986.
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a consolidated democracy developed by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan
captures the notion of democratization in a similarly inductive man-
ner. Briefly, a democratic regime is consolidated behaviorally, when no
significant actors attempt to create a nondemocratic regime or turn to
violence; attitudinally, when a strong majority of the public believes
that democratic procedures and institutions are the best way to govern
their collective life; and constitutionally, when governmental and non-
governmental forces alike are habituated to conflict resolution within
the laws, procedures, and institutions laid out by the new democratic
process. In short, consolidated democracy is a political situation in
which democracy has become “the only game in town.”57
It is worth noting here that the criteria outlined above – especially
the latter set, concerning the consolidation of effective and legitimate
governance – constitute a higher bar than most analysts of peace-
building have adopted in assessing its outcomes. Most scholars and
practitioners, while acknowledging that the situation often deterio-
rates as time elapses, have judged the success of UN peace opera-
tions mainly by assessing the degree to which peace obtained at the
point the UN exited the country or a few short years later. There are
good reasons for the adoption of this conventional approach. Some
have pleaded that not enough time has elapsed to realistically ana-
lyze consolidation. Others claim that state- and democracy-building
are, by their very nature, extremely difficult and time-consuming pro-
cesses, and thus assessments of consolidation are based on unreason-
ably high standards of peacebuilding success that cannot properly be
attributed to the implementation of the peace operation itself.58 These
are certainly complex and lengthy processes and evaluating proximate
cause is indeed methodologically difficult.59 Yet assessing the outcomes
of peacebuilding operations in achieving their own objectives means
examining critically what happens after peacebuilders leave the coun-
try in addition to understanding what they did while they were there.
Fortunately, an assessment of longer-term peacebuilding records has
now become possible as more time has elapsed since the close of the
57 Linz and Stepan 1996: 5–6; they attribute the phrase to Di Palma 1990.
58 Downs and Stedman 2002.
59 Tansey 2014 makes a case for strengthening causal inference in the study of
peacebuilding and suggests that this can be achieved through methods of
process-tracing, counterfactual analysis, and control cases.
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UN transitional governance missions considered here. Lengthening our
perspective in this manner – alongside a macroscopic and conjunctural
perspective, in contrast to a more probabilistic and evaluative logic –
enables a critical assessment of the international community’s assump-
tion that a transformative process of elite peace settlement followed
by simultaneous state- and democracy-building will achieve sustain-
able peace.
Case Selection
Transitional governance interventions are rare events. To recap, these
are the transformative operations in which the UN pursues lasting
peace through a strategy of simultaneous statebuilding and democrati-
zation, enacted via the implementation mechanism of shared interna-
tional and domestic governance over a transitional period that begins
with a peace settlement and ends with a first post-conflict election. In
common with most scholars in this area, I focus on the UN as the
major actor undertaking and coordinating international peacebuilding
interventions. Moreover, UN transitional governance serves implicitly,
due to its multidimensional and transformative nature, as an umbrella
rubric for the post-conflict activities of other global actors – including
international financial organizations, bilateral development agencies,
and international nongovernmental organizations. Since 1948 the UN
has mounted a total of 70 peace operations, 55 of which have taken
place since the end of the Cold War in 32 different countries, with a
number of countries having hosted multiple operations.60 Christoph
Zürcher et al. classify 19 of these as major peacebuilding operations –
they meet this definition if they lasted over 6 months, comprised more
than 500 personnel, and were intended to maintain peace at least in
part by facilitating socio-political change.61 Of these 19, only 6 meet
the criteria established here for transitional governance: these are, in
60 These figures are constructed from the list of peacekeeping operations
maintained by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf.
61 Zürcher et al. 2013. By this definition, missions focused solely on ceasefire or
election monitoring or security sector capacity-building would not qualify as
major peacebuilding operations. See also Paris and Sisk 2009, who identify an
almost identical list of 21 major post-conflict peacebuilding operations during
the period 1989–2007 on the basis of slightly different criteria.
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chronological order, Cambodia, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, East Timor,
and Afghanistan.62
This book focuses on the transitional governance interventions that
were deployed by the UN in Cambodia (1991–1993), East Timor
(1999–2002), and Afghanistan (2002–2005). Cambodia, East Timor,
and Afghanistan are the only three developing countries with weak
institutional capacity in which the transitional governance approach
has been implemented. The analysis in this book does not includes
the three remaining instances of transitional governance peacebuild-
ing – Bosnia, Croatia (Eastern Slavonia), and Kosovo.63 All of these
countries are more wealthy and institutionally advanced than the three
developing nations I consider here – nevertheless, the transitional gov-
ernance strategy itself remains similar in these cases, which should
thus provide an opportunity for the further testing of the findings of
this book. I also do not systematically examine major peacebuilding
operations that do not meet the definition of transitional governance
because they were not governed in tandem with the UN through a civil
administration component to the peace operation, even if they encom-
passed UN-run elections and some elements of statebuilding. These
cases would include, chronologically, Namibia, Mozambique, Haiti,
Rwanda, Tajikistan, Angola, Macedonia, the Central African Repub-
lic, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Côte
d’Ivoire, Burundi, South Sudan, and Mali.64
The lack of an African transitional governance case is analytically
unfortunate for this book, since Africa is the region where by far the
62 Zürcher et al.’s 2013: 59–63 systematic coding of the scale and scope of the
universe of peacebuilding missions clearly delimits Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Cambodia, Croatia, East Timor, and Kosovo as the only countries in which
interventions took on major executive, legislative, policymaking, and even
judicial responsibilities.
63 Although the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)
itself did not bear the executive governance roles that are the hallmark of
transitional governance, these executive functions were performed by the
Office of the High Representative, the ad hoc international agency established
to implement the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and later mandated to
provide guidance to UNMIBH. As such, the Bosnian case falls within the
transitional governance universe in practice.
64 The excellent volume by Zürcher et al. 2013 offers a comparative analysis of
this broader universe of transformative peacebuilding cases.
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most peacebuilding occurs.65 Namibia was the first country in which a
major peacebuilding operation was undertaken and some would con-
sider it the first case of transitional governance. Per my reading of the
intervention’s mandate, however, the United Nations Transition Assis-
tance Group (UNTAG, 1989–1990) in Namibia does not meet the def-
inition of a transitional governance mission advanced here because it
did not comprise a civil administration component responsible for a
broad scope of governance functions. UNTAG did, in practice, take on
some executive governance roles, but the range of those functions was
relatively circumscribed, at best qualifying the intervention as a proto
version of the more full-blown transitional governance interventions
that were mandated soon after.66 The two most recent major peace
operations, in South Sudan (2011–present) and Mali (2013–present),
are similarly multidimensional in scope and transformative in ambi-
tion, but with circumscribed governance functions for the UN in terms
of implementation. Nevertheless, the empirical chapters below incor-
porate, where possible, conclusions from published research on major
African peacebuilding operations that shed some light on the theoret-
ical generalizability and empirical validity of the arguments advanced
here.
Peacebuilding through transitional governance is uncommon. It does
not occur very often in part because of what it entails – big, expen-
sive, ambitious operations in countries where civil war has contributed
to the disintegration of governance. To date, the East Timor inter-
vention represents the high-water mark of the approach – and it is
entirely possible that the peacebuilding ground has shifted enough over
the decade since it concluded that we will no longer see such tran-
sitional governance attempts. Yet it is precisely the ambitious nature
of these instances of transformative peacebuilding – and the contem-
porary international aspirations they represent – that makes them an
important object of study.67 This book’s argument and implications
65 See Curtis and Dzinesa 2012 for an overview and compilation of work on
peacebuilding in Africa.
66 See Howard 2008: 52–87 for an excellent focused discussion of the UN’s role
in Namibia and the relative success of the UNTAG peace operation.
67 Steinmo 2008 notes that scholars working with a historical institutionalist
approach are often interested in important and rare events.
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will remain relevant even as the precise manner in which the interna-
tional community’s transformative peacebuilding endeavor is pursued
continues to evolve.
Research Design
The research design underpinning this book is a comparative case study
approach that traces the process of how transformative peacebuild-
ing interventions in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan led to
a series of unintended political–economic consequences that shaped
post-intervention governance outcomes. I present the argument the-
matically, instead of in case-narrative format, delivering a structured,
focused comparison of the three cases at three critical peacebuilding
phases – peace settlement, transitional governance, and the aftermath
of intervention. The analytical strategy for doing so echoes Charles
Call’s insight that the transition from warfare to peace, in general,
goes through a series of temporal junctures or critical moments, at
which typical clusters of decisions arise.68 Peacebuilding disappoint-
ments in post-conflict states are overdetermined; the odds are stacked
against success and numerous causal pathways can be identified in
leading to failure. But a robust comparative methodological approach
that also relies upon process-tracing can be used to identify a plausible
causal chain. Employed together, a controlled comparison and process-
tracing offer a “middle ground”approach between heavily ideographic
descriptions of particular cases and overstylized cross-case compar-
isons that lose granular texture.69
My purpose is to assess the merits of the international community’s
approach to post-conflict intervention through a critical analysis of the
process it applies in interaction with domestic elites in attempting to
achieve its stated outcomes. This purpose forms the basis of the struc-
tured, focused methodology employed to examine the cases. The logic
of the method is straightforward: the empirical research was guided
by a series of questions asked of each case intended to collect evidence
on the outcomes of interest and potential causal patterns. In turn, this
makes possible both systematic comparison across cases and cumula-
tive conclusions.70 Within-case analysis through process-tracing helps
68 Call 2012. 69 Slater 2010: 21; also Collier and Collier 1991.
70 George and Bennett 2005, especially pp. 67–124.
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to strengthen the argument that, rather than the pre-existing conditions
in each case, it was the interaction between the international interven-
tion and domestic elite incentives that led to the observed outcomes.
The approach underpinning this study is particularly well suited to gen-
erating new hypotheses about understudied phenomena, carrying out
contextualized comparison, and dealing with causal complexity. Like
many historical institutionalist works, the approach here begins with
a specific empirical puzzle in a limited number of cases sharing a uni-
fied political experience and focuses on developing mid-range theory
on the topic.71
The case-comparative approach grounded in historical institutional-
ism is sometimes regarded as being difficult to falsify. Although this is
not inherently true, the criticismmay apply to a specific empirical inves-
tigation – hence it is worth being explicit about what could falsify my
argument. In short, empirical inklings that domestic elite incentives and
actions are not truly path dependent, or linked temporally,would prove
the argument wrong. Evidence that would support a more rationalist
and probabilistic logic, for example,would be signs that domestic elites
were repeating rounds of interaction among themselves or with the
international intervention with little impact from the outcomes of pre-
vious rounds; or that powerful actors were able to impose their instru-
mental designs on institutions such that their preferred functions were
achieved quite perfectly. My analysis of the evidence from the cases, as
presented in the empirical chapters, instead supports the conjunctural,
path-dependent logic that allows for, among other things, explanations
for the high level of institutional ambiguity and mismatch seen in the
cases. Moreover, any limitations of the approach adopted here with
regards to Popperian falsifiability are, I believe, outweighed by the ben-
efits of a problem-driven, case-oriented approach that is geared toward
generating a theoretically informed causal account of the peacebuild-
ing outcomes across these three cases.72
Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan display a substantial degree
of variance in pre-intervention pathways, in terms of their trajectories
into conflict and the nature of the peace settlement that ended con-
flict. The three countries thus serve as a set of “most different systems”
71 Thelen 1999: 373 identifies these features as hallmarks of historical
institutionalism.
72 Mahoney and Thelen 2015.
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cases in terms of many potential explanatory variables, including: the
nature of the conflict; the configuration of competing groups and elites
that engaged in conflict and came to a peace settlement; and the nature
of sociopolitical cleavages and macrohistorical context. In Cambodia,
three major coherent factions opposed to each other on ideological
grounds fought a 21-year civil war against the backdrop of Cold War
geopolitics and a genocidal regime. The peace settlement of 1991 was
the result of a mutually hurting stalemate between still hostile groups.
In East Timor, the settlement marking the end of a 24-year resistance
struggle against Indonesian occupation was the independence vote in
1999. The revolutionary front served as an umbrella group that, albeit
quite incoherent, dominated the political landscape in the transitional
phase. Afghanistan emerged in 2001 from 22 years of conflict that saw
an anti-imperialist struggle morph into civil war among many fairly
coherent ethno-tribal groupings. A peace agreement was struck among
a coalition that had come together, aided in the end by the US military,
to defeat the Taliban – but political, financial, and armed resources
in the country continued to be spread widely across still hostile
groups.
Despite the many differences between the cases, each country under-
went the transformative critical juncture of a peacebuilding interven-
tion through transitional governance. My argument here thus emerges
from the method of agreement:73 the shared transformational expe-
rience that all three countries went through is the transitional gover-
nance process – hence any similarities in outcomes that result from
that process should be more compelling given their differences. While
the comparative case material presented here generates a causal logic,
it cannot rigorously demonstrate the external validity of that logic.74
The theory-building research objective here is a heuristic, building-
block approach that seeks to inductively identify causal patterns to
better understand peacebuilding.75 As discussed above, the transitional
73 Mill 1843; also George and Bennett 2005; and Przeworski and Teune 1970.
74 One complementary research agenda would examine a set of cases of
indigenous peacebuilding in which the international community did not
implement a transitional governance process. See, for example, Barma, Levy,
and Piombo 2015; and Weinstein 2005.
75 Eckstein 1975; and George and Bennett 2005, especially pp. 74–78.
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governance approach is one type of broader peacekeeping and peace-
building intervention. The scope of the research here is necessarily lim-
ited; nevertheless, the analysis I develop in this book fills a gap in and
contributes to the more general theory of peacebuilding being devel-
oped by scholars and practitioners today. In addition, this book gener-
ates a theory of the politics of international intervention and its inter-
action with domestic elite incentives that is generalizable beyond the
issue of peacebuilding.
My analysis rests on the approximately one hundred personal inter-
views I conducted from 2002–2014 in Cambodia, East Timor, and
Afghanistan, as well as in Canberra, London,New York, andWashing-
ton, DC.76 Each interview lasted between one and two hours and was
conducted on a semi-structured basis using an interview guide adapted
for each country or for other specific purposes. Interviewees were
identified using snowball sampling – i.e., a nonrepresentative chain of
referrals – and included legislators, government officials, national- and
provincial-level civil servants, journalists, civil society and private sec-
tor representatives, scholars, natural resource sector experts, and offi-
cials representing international organizations, bilateral development
agencies, and international nongovernmental organizations. Almost all
of my interviewees requested that they not be quoted directly and that
they not be identified in relation to specific responses. In the text below
interviewees are therefore identified only by their general role in rela-
tion to certain findings; the appendix to this book provides a full list
of all interviews. The analysis also draws upon the rich case study evi-
dence available in published work and policy reports on international
peacebuilding interventions.
The research was organized as a series of questions that map to the
three critical phases along the peacebuilding pathway, around which
sequence this book is structured: the peace settlement phase; the tran-
sitional governance period; and the aftermath of intervention. It is
during these critical moments marking the course of an intervention
76 These interviews were conducted in Kabul, Afghanistan, in July 2002; Phnom
Penh, Cambodia, in May and October 2005 and October 2014; in Dili and
provincial capitals in East Timor in April 2005, November 2009, and February
2013; and in Canberra, London, New York, and Washington DC over
numerous occasions from 2002 to 2014.
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that the dynamics of interaction between the international commu-
nity and domestic elites are thrown into sharp relief – and political
and administrative institutions serve as a crucial arena in which these
interactions play out. The following chapter establishes the theoretical
framework that orients the study, presenting it in terms of the peace-
building pathway.
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2 Political Order in Post-Conflict States
A Theoretical Framework
Peacebuilding interventions typically fall short of achieving their aspi-
rations because of a mismatch between the objectives of the interna-
tional community and those of post-conflict elites. The United Nations
is intent on building the basis for effective and legitimate governance
through a transformative approach to peacebuilding. Domestic elites,
by contrast, are intent on forging a very different type of political order,
one geared toward bolstering their own political survival and power,
with claims to governing authority that are rooted in the distribution of
patronage spoils. These post-conflict elites are empowered by the strat-
egy of institutional engineering pursued by international peacebuilding
interventions and, in turn, manipulate it, pursuing different tactics of
institutional conversion that result in a neopatrimonial political order.
This chapter advances a theoretical framework for understanding why
and how this transpires, arguing that peacebuilding outcomes are best
understood as the result of a phased contest over the course of the
peacebuilding pathway between two alternative visions of post-conflict
political order.
The practice of externally supported attempts to simultaneously
construct states and democracies in developing countries is relatively
new and offers fertile ground for mid-range theory generation. My
approach to understanding the puzzling outcomes of peacebuilding
interventions begins with the premise that the pursuit of effective and
legitimate governance through peacebuilding must be situated in the
context of the broader quest for modern political order. The first part
of this chapter thus lays out a general framework for understanding the
nature of political order and what we know about how it is typically
established over time – focusing on the incentives elites everywhere face
and the consequent choices they make in ordering power in specific
ways. In that light, I then build a sequenced causal framework suggest-
ing the outcomes we should expect to see obtain over the course of a
peacebuilding intervention – one that links scholarship on conflict and
41
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peace to that on political, institutional, and economic development.
At each stage of this causal sequence, I weave together relevant the-
matic threads from different literatures in comparative politics, inter-
national relations, and political economy about the manner in which
elites negotiate and respond to moments of transition and shape the
political order emerging from those formative moments. These insights
are grounded in a historical institutionalist approach, viewing institu-
tions as the arenas in which agents interact with structural historical
forces and emphasizing the temporal dimension of causal processes,
especially their sequencing.1 Through this lens, institutional arrange-
ments can be seen as both an outcome of the power struggles of the
past and a crucial factor in determining the form of political order that
emerges as a result of transformative peacebuilding.
In post-conflict states, through the transitional governance app-
roach, the United Nations attempts to create administrative and polit-
ical institutions to underpin effective and legitimate governance and
serve as the foundations for lasting peace. In practice, these formal
institutional arrangements become the site of contest between the
international community’s vision of political order and the political–
economic interests animating the power struggles among domestic
elites. At each of the three critical phases of the peacebuilding path-
way, therefore – the peace settlement phase, the transitional governance
period, and the aftermath of intervention – we see a mismatch between
the goals of the intervention and what transpires in the real world. The
theoretical framework advanced in this chapter explains this gap, sug-
gesting what we should expect to see at each phase as domestic elites
attempt to build post-conflict political order and resist and manip-
ulate international interventions as they do so. At the peace settle-
ment phase, elites preoccupied with their own survival and empow-
erment come to an agreement to end the conflict. But that settlement,
instead of serving as an end to conflict, becomes the next stage over
which their internecine struggles to create a political order continue.
In turn, during the transitional governance phase, the simultaneous
attempt at statebuilding and democratization becomes co-opted by a
small subset of domestic power-holders, paradoxically closing down
the political space and stunting state capacity. In the aftermath of
the intervention, domestic elites attempt to find the balance between
1 Pierson 2004; and Thelen 1999.
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distributing patronage through their clientelist networks to build polit-
ical support and delivering a measure of stability and public goods in
order to create an environment of some collective stability and pros-
perity. Thus, in post-conflict countries, we see a hybrid political order
emerging that is neopatrimonial in nature – forestalling the effective
and legitimate governance of the modern state to which international
peacebuilding aspires.
The Pursuit of Political Order
How different societies construct political order is one of the single
most important questions in the study of politics and perhaps the most
elemental.2 What are the forces that propel societies to move from the
“traditional state,” characterized by persistent violence and patrimoni-
alism, to a “modern state,” defined by stable, effective, and legitimate
government?3 Political philosophers grappled with this basic inquiry
as they articulated social contract theory. Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan
still gives us the label by which we understand that some concentra-
tion of sovereign authority in the hands of an individual or group of
individuals is necessary to achieve the transition away from the state
of nature; even as the debate between Hobbes’s insistence on the neces-
sity of authoritarian rule in that transition and John Locke’s rebuttal in
favor of the merits of constitutionally constrained government contin-
ues to the present day.4 The study of political order has a distinguished
contemporary intellectual history, serving as the core subject matter
upon which landmark theoretical works in the political science canon
have been written.5 It has also enjoyed a resurgence in the past decade,
with much of the renewed interest in the subject coming from the
2 Margaret Levi, in her address as President of the American Political Science
Association, noted that political science is “driven by a common desire to
understand what makes for good governments and how to build them,”
defining good governments as effective and accountable. Levi 2006: 5.
3 Here, I use the term “modern” in its Weberian sense, which is normative
concerning the qualities of political order, as opposed to meaning
“contemporary.” This conventional usage means that “traditional” or
non-modern forms of political order can and do exist today.
4 Hobbes 1968 [1651]; and Locke 1963 [1698].
5 Bates 2001; Ertman 1997; Huntington 1968; Levi 1989; Skocpol 1979; and
Tilly 1990.
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economics discipline.6 Yet the links between the search for modern
political order and the putative goals of peacebuilding – despite their
great similarity – have been made surprisingly rarely in the peacebuild-
ing literature, albeit with some notable exceptions.7
A political order constitutes the underlying system by which a soci-
ety organizes its political actions and behavior. Institutions – formal
rules, policy structures, and norms – are the cornerstone of this polit-
ical order and are central to understanding how it evolves over time.
These institutions are the legacies of the concrete political struggles
of the past and, in turn, provide the contours of the political arena
of the present – shaping the incentives facing individuals and organi-
zations, guiding the patterns in which they interact, and constraining
their political behavior.8 The process of defining a political order is thus
best understood as the process of institutional development. It concerns
the building of stable institutional arrangements that govern political
behavior, including, especially, the rules and norms that give elites con-
trol over resources and social functions and constrain these elites from
using violence. The process of ordering power, in other words, is in
large part about how elites organize themselves – including, crucially,
alliances among elite factions – to govern their subjects.9 In turn, insti-
tutions and the public policies they create reflect, magnify, and per-
petuate the distribution of political power, actively empowering some
groups and individuals while marginalizing others from the political
sphere.10 These institutional outcomes need not necessarily reflect any
particular set of interests – they can be compromises between actors
6 Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Boix 2015; and North, Wallis, and Weingast
2009.
7 These exceptions include Barnett 2006; Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009;
Hamieri 2010; and Paris 2004.
8 This definition of institutions follows the historical institutionalist perspective
on institutions, for example in Pierson 1996; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; and
Thelen 1999. Thelen 1999 observes that historical institutionalism emphasizes
how institutions emerge from and are embedded in temporal processes, while
rational choice institutionalism views institutions more as coordination
mechanisms that generate equilibria; she also notes that this distinction,
however, does not preclude much fruitful overlap and cross-fertilization
between the two approaches. The theoretical framework in this chapter does
indeed bring together both rational choice and historical institutionalist
approaches to political order.
9 Slater 2010; also Waldner 1999. 10 Weir 1992.
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with different goals or even the unintended consequence of conflict –
and this, especially, makes them open to change.11
The concept of “political order” is often discussed with a positive
valence, connoting political stability and good governance – with its
opposite, “political disorder” or “political decay,” seen as the undesir-
able outcome on the other end of the spectrum.12 Here, I adapt this
usage in part to conceptualize a political order as a set of political
institutions and practices that rest in equilibrium. A political order is
thus an institutional arrangement itself rather than a set of governance
outcomes that are inherently desirable and the modifying adjective is
crucial in telling us what kind of order we are talking about. In turn,
there are three crucial elements by which a political order can be char-
acterized: the control of violence through the rule of law; government
effectiveness through state capacity; and mechanisms of legitimacy and
accountability. The modern state is thus characterized by peaceful sta-
bility, state strength, and democratic accountability, or – to use the
language of transformative peacebuilding – a stable and lasting peace,
underpinned by effective and legitimate governance.
Conceived of in this way, political order can more usefully be seen
as a characteristic of political systems that, as it varies in degree, also
varies in kind. The governance challenge facing post-conflict countries
is fruitfully viewed through this lens on political order. Fragile and
conflict-affected countries are evidently in, or close to, the Hobbesian
natural state of political instability, violence, and disorder. Indeed, state
failure is commonly defined by the disintegration or absence of the
main qualities of modern political order.13 There are also, importantly,
hybrid forms of political order distinct from both the natural and mod-
ern state. There are four crucial things to note about these hybrid or
intermediate states of political order. First, most obviously, measures of
the control of violence, of government effectiveness, and of democratic
accountability are at intermediate levels. Countries with intermediate
forms of political order are those with some political stability and some
elements of effective and legitimate governance – but recognizably not,
for example, what peacebuilding interventions are intended to achieve.
Second, the three components vary independently, to a degree, such
11 Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 8.
12 For example, Fukuyama 2011, 2014a; and Huntington 1968.
13 OECD 2008a; and Rotberg 2004.
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that different pathways to the modern state are entirely possible. This
logic runs counter to modernization theory, where all good things go
together, a point I expand on below. Third, the three elements are, nev-
ertheless, mutually reinforcing, which means that the hybrid or inter-
mediate state is an equilibrium just like the modern state, albeit a sub-
optimal one. Fourth, each of these components or characteristics of
political order – indeed, the process of political development itself –
are potentially reversible – they can improve or they can disintegrate.
What closes the “political gap,” as Samuel Huntington coined it,
between underdeveloped and developed political systems?14 What is
the process by which a country succeeds in “getting to Denmark,” a
land of peaceful stability, rule of law, effective government, and demo-
cratic accountability?15 Max Weber gave us the bare bones of the
answer in his very definition of the modern state: creating the leviathan
requires endowing it with a monopoly over the legitimate use of vio-
lence. In practical terms, achieving a monopoly of violence for the state
becomes a question of how to contain, in Robert Bates’s inimitable
phrase, society’s “specialists in violence,” or rulers by might.16 In tra-
ditional political orders, these elites retain the ability to mobilize vio-
lence in the service of their own particular interests and to their own
benefit. Carles Boix notes that individuals can either exploit or cooper-
ate to survive.17 Getting to modern political order – rule-bound, effec-
tive, and legitimate governance – thus requires elites to agree to some
binding of their power. Dan Slater frames this, in his study of develop-
mental authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, as the intrinsic chal-
lenge of elite collective action, asserting that “severe threats to elites’
property, privileges, and persons are a necessary condition” for elites
to give up some of their individual power to establish the leviathan.18
Stable, effective, and legitimate governance materializes when elites
recognize that their interests are best served by deploying their coer-
cive powers not for predation but to invest in the institutions, policies,
and public goods that instead enhance the productive use of society’s
resources.
14 Huntington 1968: 2. 15 Pritchett andWoolcock 2002; also Fukuyama 2011.
16 Bates 2001, 2008a. 17 Boix 2015: 7.
18 Slater 2010: 13, italics in original. On the importance of threat as an impetus
to elite collective action in the service of statebuilding, see also Bates 2001;
Ertman 1997; and Waldner 1999.
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Why do elites – those with recourse to violence in the service of
their own ends – form an agreement to restrict themselves? Elites bind
themselves to cooperate in a coalition because their reward is access to
the coalition’s spoils, through processes of rent creation and distribu-
tion. The political and economic foundations for development come
together when those who are specialists in violence realize that their
interests are best served by creating the environment for economic
prosperity.19 Once a government has accumulated enough hegemonic
power to ensure its survival, thereby lengthening its own time horizon,
it serves the interest of that government to make the territory as rich as
possible so that it can extract as much as possible over multiple time
periods. Mancur Olson famously referred to this type of hegemonic
government as a “stationary bandit,” recognizing that societal stabil-
ity is achieved at the cost of institutionalized extraction.20 Restrict-
ing access to the privileges of the coalition only to its members gives
them a stake in the coalition and makes their commitment to protect-
ing it credible, leading Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Wein-
gast to dub this type of regime a “limited access order.”21 These elites
secure political order by creating a monopoly on economic activity
and, thereby perpetuating an extractive, instead of inclusive, political–
economic equilibrium.22 The form that the elite collective bargain
takes, in turn, structures the nature of the state’s interactions with
society.
The Neopatrimonial Equilibrium
Patrimonial political orders are the default institutional pattern
through which elites have reached these governing pacts with soci-
ety over most of human history, including into today.23 In a patrimo-
nial system, authority is personalized – individuals rule through per-
sonal prestige and power, privileging their own preferences. The ruler
ensures basic political stability and his own political survival by pro-
viding some measure of security and by distributing patronage spoils
19 Bates 2001; also Boix 2015. 20 Olson 1993.
21 North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009. 22 Acemoglu and Robinson 2012.
23 North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009 calculate that about 85 percent of the
world’s population in some 170 of the world’s countries live in various forms
of neopatrimonial (or limited access) orders, compared to 15 percent in 25
countries in modern (or open access) orders.
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to his clients in exchange for their support.24 In other words, the way in
which most human societies have escaped the brutish state of nature is
to endow some measure of sovereignty in one all-powerful individual
or in a small group of elites. Patrimonialism is thus the prevailing form
of political order that has to be overcome in constructing rule-bound,
effective, and legitimate government. This is no easy task. Patrimonial
political orders are stable equilibria, taking on the institutional forms
they do because these systems benefit elites. Rulers in these orders sit
atop hierarchical patron–client networks and the logic of instrumen-
tal exchange between patron and client serves as the ordering logic
of the political system.25 Weber drew a distinction between patrimo-
nial authority, the principle of governance in traditional polities, and
the rational-legal authority that is the hallmark of the modern state –
a system in which the public and private spheres are distinct and the
former is governed by the routine application of law and bureaucratic
institutions.26
The reality in much of the contemporary developing world is that
the patrimonial and rational-legal systems of authority coexist, cre-
ating systems of personalized politics within the bureaucratic and
legal trappings of the modern-state. It is conventional to use the label
neopatrimonial to characterize these “hybrid political systems in which
the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suf-
fuse, rational–legal institutions.”27 What appears formally as a mod-
ern state apparatus is undermined by practices abusing the state in the
service of systematic patronage distribution. The ruling group domi-
nates and stands above the state apparatus. Officials lower down use
their bureaucratic positions to gain access to state resources in order
to enrich themselves and their networks and to demonstrate loyalty
to their patrons. Typically, parallel structures of power such as party
cliques and other patron–client networks hold more authority than
the formal administrative structures. As a result of rivalry among elites
to secure the top spot or, at least, for the top ruler’s favor, politics is
often secretive and opaque. Neopatrimonial systems, moreover, have
self-reinforcing properties. Upward mobility in these systems occurs in
24 Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 61. 25 Scott 1972.
26 Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; and Weber 1978.
27 Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 62; also Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; and
Jackson and Rosberg 1984. This paragraph draws heavily on these seminal
definitions of neopatrimonialism.
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the context of the patron–client hierarchy and perpetuates rather than
transforms the system. Elites enrich and empower themselves through
patrimonial activities and accrue a traditional form of legitimacy on the
basis of particularist patronage distribution through their networks. In
turn, they use the rational-legal capacity of the state to the bare min-
imum degree required to deliver a modicum of public service delivery
and collective welfare to the populace at large, earning some measure
of output-based legitimacy; and rely upon the trappings of democracy
to garner at least a stamp of the normative dimension of legitimacy
sought by the international community.
Transformative peacebuilding represents the assertion that it is pos-
sible to guide countries in the move from political disorder to the effec-
tive and legitimate order of the modern state in a short period of time.
Yet this assertion seems implausible at best, if not simply hubristic,
when examined in the light of what the literature has established about
the dynamics of building political order and, in particular, the per-
vasiveness and stickiness of neopatrimonialism in the contemporary
developing world. International peacebuilding interventions attempted
to transpose modern political order onto the post-conflict landscapes
of Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan, specifically by facilitat-
ing a process of administrative and political institutional engineering.
Few would deny that some important successes were achieved in terms
of stability, state effectiveness, and legitimate government: in all three
countries, violence is below the levels scholars qualify as civil conflict,
some degree of state infrastructure and a public service delivery foot-
print has been developed, and successive elections have been held. In
no way do I wish to imply that any of the three countries considered
here are worse off than they otherwise would have been as a result
of peacebuilding through transitional governance. Indeed, they are all
fundamentally more stable than before the interventions and maintain
a basic degree of the government effectiveness and accountability that
are the hallmarks of the modern state and among the essential ingre-
dients of a modern political order.
Yet what best characterizes Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan
is the hybrid state of neopatrimonial political order. In these post-
conflict countries, a patrimonial logic pervades the institutional trap-
pings of the modern state and orders the political system, structur-
ing political incentives and behavior. The evidence from the three
countries demonstrates that no matter how well administrative and
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political institutions are designed, during the course of transitional gov-
ernance powerful domestic groups co-opt the process of determining
new institutional arrangements and, through strategies of institutional
conversion, subsequently consolidate their holds on power. As they do
so, they move the political order away from the goal of rationalized
and democratic governance, coming to rest, instead, in the subopti-
mal political economy equilibrium of neopatrimonialism. The remain-
der of this chapter elaborates a theory about how this happens over
the course of peacebuilding interventions. At its heart, this theory is a
story about how the dynamic contest between two alternative visions
of post-conflict political order plays out over the temporal course of
the peacebuilding pathway.
Elites and Transformative Events
Theories of political order typically cast the process of organic institu-
tional development as a gradual, even glacial, process of change over
time. Yet historical institutionalist accounts of political development
also emphasize the importance of seeing continuity and change as two
sides of the same coin.28 Establishing political order may take a long
time – but it is not a uniform, linear process of change. It happens in
fits, starts, and reversals, which are often the most revealing parts of
the process. At these crucial moments, it is the interaction of struc-
tural patterns with exogenous shocks and the actions of individuals,
especially elites, that serve in establishing patterns of political order.
Transformative peacebuilding represents an attempt to make a delib-
erate break with the past, through a conscious process of institutional
engineering and political management. Yet a peacebuilding operation
cannot be understood simply as an exogenous event to be analyzed for
its treatment effects on desired outcomes. The patterns through which
these interventions unfold are, like all other transformative political
events, the product of temporal processes that combine the effects of
structure, shock, and agency. They are critical junctures of extraordi-
narily fluid politics that, in turn, set in motion specific pathways of
post-conflict order building along which elites undertake recognizable
strategies, especially vis-à-vis institutions, to continue to gain and bol-
ster authority. Thus, the established scholarship on other key junctures
28 Pierson 2004.
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of political transformation – such as democratization, the transition
from socialism, revolutions and mass movements, and so forth – offers
a number of stylized lessons to apply to our understanding of peace-
building.
The central argument of this book is that the incentives motivating
post-conflict elites interact with international interventions and shape
their outcomes, paradoxically undermining the possibility and quality
of effective and legitimate governance in the longer term. The role of
domestic elites – their incentives, their interactions, their choices – is
thus crucial in creating the outcomes that obtain. Peacebuilding is a
hyperpolitical process, seeking to fundamentally transform polity and
society in the quest for sustainable peace. It is therefore inherently a
highly contested process, in which local stakeholders are central over
the course of intervention – agreeing on an elite settlement, engaging
with the interactive dynamics of state- and democracy-building, and
shaping both the institutions and the governance outcomes that result.
It is domestic political actors who make specific institutional choices
within the parameters established by international interventions. In
turn, these powerful elites maneuver within those formal institutions
to shape the political order that emerges.
The “spoiler” concept has served as the main lens for understand-
ing the role of elites in implementing peace operations.29 In his semi-
nal article on spoilers, Stephen Stedman defined them as the “leaders
and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threat-
ens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to under-
mine attempts to achieve it.”30 He cast spoilers as the greatest source
of risk in a peace process, implying, in turn, that successful interven-
tions require implementers to correctly diagnose and manage spoilers.
Extensions of the spoiler concept emphasized that the preferences and
strategies of spoilers must be understood in light of the structural con-
text in which they are embedded and that their sources of power and
legitimacy are historically formed. An excessive reliance on the agency
of spoilers was seen to underemphasize structural factors, particularly
the opportunity structure and relative power balance that define spoiler
behavior.31
29 Greenhill and Major 2007; Hoddie and Hartzell 2010; Newman and
Richmond 2006; Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 2011; and Stedman 1997.
30 Stedman 1997: 5.
31 Greenhill and Major 2007. On opportunity structures, see Tarrow 1998.
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This book’s approach to understanding the peacebuilding pathway
broadens the emphasis on elites from a focus on their spoiler behav-
ior or potential, focusing instead on the incentives motivating elites
in concrete situations along the peacebuilding pathway. The causal
narrative I develop here rests on the view that peace agreements
themselves are elite settlements, and that the subsequent transitional
process and its attendant process of institutional engineering are dom-
inated by the elites designated by the UN as counterparts and legiti-
mate contenders to power. The nature of these elites and their resource
bases can vary dramatically, as evidenced by the cases considered here.
In Cambodia, the leaders of the major political factions that fought
the civil war were the key power-holders in society, supported by their
factional armies and, in the case of what became the dominant Cam-
bodian People’s Party, by the institutional power vested in their con-
trol of the state. In East Timor, the organizational backbone of the
guerrilla front stepped into the power and institutional void left at the
nation’s independence, bolstered by the powerful shared symbology of
a widespread national resistance movement. In Afghanistan, the United
States and United Nations played kingmaker, installing a compromise
choice from the Afghan diaspora as the core leader – one who, in his
subsequent attempts to consolidate the central state, was hamstrung
by the diffuse loci of power throughout the country.
Yet, such differences among elites notwithstanding, a crucial part
of my argument is that the political actors empowered by UN tran-
sitional governance interventions – no matter what type of elite they
might be – act, surprisingly, in roughly parallel ways as they engage
with and, eventually, undermine those interventions over the three
phases of the peacebuilding pathway. The political landscape in con-
temporary post-conflict states is populated by elites who are attempt-
ing to solve the practical puzzle of protecting and expanding their own
power bases while attempting to assure the international community
that they are also acting in the service of legitimacy and political inclu-
sion. The post-conflict context has been mistakenly inferred to resem-
ble an institutional vacuum. The reality is that the political trajectory
of the past, including the conflict itself, is enormously significant for
what transpires next. Potential contenders to authority compete with
each other, with different claims to authority based on their relative
power and other political resources such as financing and social sup-
port. A perspective that focuses on the process of state engagement
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with other social forces highlights the mutual transformation of the
state and social groups that must be inherent to any statebuilding
process.32 These political struggles and compacts must be viewed tem-
porally, since they necessarily emerge from a country’s historical expe-
riences with political order. In turn, the temporal sequence through
which domestic elites interact with international interventions matters
a great deal. The following causal framework suggests what we should
expect to see at each of the three phases of the peacebuilding pathway
as domestic elites attempt to build their version of post-conflict polit-
ical order and interact with and shape international interventions as
they do so.
Elite Settlements: The Continuation of War by Other Means
Peace settlements have been emphasized as a crucial factor in explain-
ing the relative successes of international peacekeeping operations in
bringing an end to civil conflict. Treating peace settlements as medi-
ated elite pacts, scholars have built a large body of knowledge along
two main avenues of investigation. First, how are peace settlements
negotiated? Here, the focus has been on the processes of bargaining
and deal-making, with an emphasis on the mechanisms put in place
to build credible commitment into peace deals.33 Second, how can the
substance of a peace deal be constructed to lead, in turn, to successful
implementation and the desired outcomes? Here, the analytic focus has
been placed on institutional design, with a particular emphasis on the
merits and drawbacks of power-sharing in peace settlements.34
Peace agreements are, in practice, conditional elite pacts. Political
dynamics are heavily elite-driven at the peace settlement stage of trans-
formative peacebuilding, reflecting the high level of contingency associ-
ated with critical junctures. This is, in part, a direct result of the conflict
itself: during periods of civil war political participation becomes mili-
tarized, as civil society organizations and other institutional channels
for nonviolent political participation wither away. The predominance
of elites at this stage is also a result of the fact that, to stand a chance of
32 Herbst 2000; Mann 1986; and Skocpol 1985.
33 Fearon and Laitin 2008; Licklider 1995; Martin 2013; Toft 2010; and Walter
1999, 2002, 2009.
34 Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 2015; Horowitz 1985; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008;
Lijphart 1977; and Sisk 1996, 2013.
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being successful, post-conflict peacebuilding must rest significantly on
reconstructing the state’s societal support.35 Domestic elites are critical
in helping to remedy both of these shortcomings since they are central
in mobilizing political support and building social consensus around
the legitimacy of new rules and institutional structures for the political
and administrative arenas.36
Yet post-conflict peace settlements should not be seen as the out-
comes of rational deal-making, or as compromises that satisfice among
the various claims to authority and legitimacy advanced by domestic
elites. Instead, peace settlements are better viewed as the legacies of pre-
conflict political trajectories and the particular power balances emerg-
ing out of conflict. Nor should they be reified as just outcomes or as
a stable resolution of the preceding civil violence. Instead, they should
be understood as momentary terms of settlement within an ongoing
elite power struggle. Elite bargaining is better seen not as pertaining
to a single isolated event – for example, embodied in the discrete set-
tlement deal itself – but rather as a series of decisions embedded in a
longer bargaining process.37 In this light, a peace treaty does not repre-
sent an end to political bargaining. As Michael Doyle observes: “After
the parties agree to the creation of a peacekeeping operation, they con-
tinue to compete for advantage.The agreement becomes, as do somany
other constitutional texts, an invitation to struggle.”38 Mediated settle-
ments at moments of duress may represent the only possible solution
at that particular point in time, but they are inherently unstable equi-
libria. In short, peace settlements should be interpreted as initiating a
new phase of elite conflict through politics – the continuation of war
by other means.39
A peace settlement is hence the beginning of the peacebuilding path-
way, rather than the end goal of an elite negotiation process. It is a
crucial transformative moment, serving as the pivot away from violent
conflict. As such, it is useful to view the elite settlement phase in light of
what we know about how elites act at other moments of fundamental
35 Doornbos 2002; and Zartman 1995.
36 Barma 2006; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994; and Snyder 2000.
37 Walter 2009 makes this point in analyzing why more civil wars do not end
through negotiation. The same logic applies when considering why elite pacts
might not hold in the post-conflict aftermath.
38 Doyle 1995: 66.
39 Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is the continuation of politics by
other means seems to hold equally true inversed in post-conflict countries.
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political transition that are similarly critical junctures. In understand-
ing how such pivotal transformations occur during democratic transi-
tions, revolutions, and social movements, scholars have built explana-
tions that combine attention to structural conditions with the central
roles that elites play as agents of change. Crucially, as elites engage in
the political bargains around moments of sociopolitical transforma-
tion, they do not simply rely on and reward existing support but also
find it necessary to continually mobilize and manipulate new support.
Elite negotiations and pacts are a central feature of the democrati-
zation scholarship. Dankwart Rustow’s landmark essay on democratic
transitions explicitly abandoned the quest for the functional requisites
of democracy rooted in modernization theory and other structural per-
spectives and argued that democracy was the fruit of the conscious
decisions of political elites.40 In this view, elite consensus on the new
rules of the game is an essential requisite for a successful transition
from authoritarianism to democracy. A particular emphasis has thus
been placed on the role of elites, their strategies, and the pacts among
them, in crafting democratic transitions and consolidation, as well as
on the importance of the links between elites and their supporters.41
The literature on social revolutions echoes this emphasis on the cen-
trality of elite bargains as well as their social bases of support. Arthur
Stinchcombe conceived of a revolution as a period of uncertainty about
who will govern – and crystallized the challenge of rebuilding author-
ity coming out of that Hobbesian state as lying in the “difficulties of
finding a set of bargains among the interests contending in a revolu-
tion and a reliable apparatus to enforce them.”42 In revolutions, elite
competition for authority spurs leaders to mobilize and manipulate the
mass participation of groups that were previously politically excluded.
In turn, the elite group that finally consolidates its hold on power sys-
tematically reconstructs state organizations in order to embody direct
control by their supporters. Other competing political forces are, in
the process, eliminated from structures of control and authority, again
through mass mobilization and the manipulation of major public insti-
tutions, including the legal system, schools, civil bureaucracies, and
40 Rustow 1970. On modernization theory see Lipset 1959; Parsons 1951; and
Rostow 1962.
41 On “crafting” democratic transitions, see DiPalma 1990; on elite links with
supporters, see Bermeo 1997; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; and Karl 1990.
42 Stinchcombe 1999: 50.
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military forces.43 Some scholars argue that social movements fall onto
the same continuum of mechanisms for political change as revolu-
tions – the difference being the extent to which existing power struc-
tures are put at risk.44
One crucial insight from these other transformative moments is that
elites are central not only in terms of their own individual preferences
but also because they are the leaders of specific sociopolitical coalitions.
In negotiating peace settlements, elites are hence playing a two-sided
game. They must negotiate with other elites and survive the collective
battle for authority, while simultaneously satisfying the groups that
keep them in power. Elites are thus not only self-interested; they are,
of course, embedded socially, drawing on groups for their support. In
turn, the status of such groups influences the resources that elites bring
to the bargaining table. As I explain below, post-conflict elites manage
this two-sided game by constructing a neopatrimonial political order.A
peace settlement marks a new opportunity to create a political order –
and it necessarily echoes the basic political order and struggles of the
past. Understanding the sources of elites’ power, especially their con-
flicts with each other and their relationships with their supporters, is
crucial to explaining the political dynamics around the peace settle-
ment phase. The process of coming to a settlement is, quite simply, a
fascinating political struggle that should be seen not as resolving all the
issues at play but as reflecting and perpetuating them.
Transitional Governance: A Process of Inherent Contradictions
The hallmark of the transitional governance approach to peacebuild-
ing is that the UN works with domestic elites simultaneously on two
aspects of peacebuilding over a transitional period of two to three
years: it governs the country in collaboration with domestic coun-
terparts during this period, which ends with the holding of an elec-
tion; and it works concurrently with domestic elites to reconstruct the
institutional and human capacity of the state apparatus and to build
a democratic political system. The approach is thus designed around
two intertwined assertions. The first proposition is that it is possible for
the international community to help post-conflict countries build the
foundations for a lasting peace by imposing and assisting a process of
43 Skocpol 1988. 44 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997.
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simultaneous state- and democracy-building in these countries. The
second proposition is that the best mechanism for implementing a
transformative peacebuilding intervention is a particular form of gov-
ernance collaboration between domestic elites and the UN peace oper-
ation. In this section, I argue that both assertions are unfounded, illus-
trating that we should expect otherwise based on what we know about
the dynamics of state formation and other transformative events star-
ring powerful entrenched interests, especially post-socialist transitions.
The simultaneous state- and democracy-building process that is the
centerpiece of the transitional governance approach has rarely, if ever,
obtained organically. It is not accidental that the notion of “state for-
mation” is expressed more passively than is the more muscular late
twentieth century activity of “statebuilding.”Western European coun-
tries became states through a time-consuming process and only later
evolved into democracies – and this is the quintessential trajectory
upon which much of the state formation literature is based. The expe-
rience of the United States, which is rarely considered in comparative
assessments of state formation, tells the opposite story in which state-
building was purposefully retarded and central administrative institu-
tions were intentionally kept weak by strong party machines to pro-
tect their political interests in the context of a flourishing democracy.
Successful statebuilding in the developing world has generally pre-
ceded and hampered, and sometimes foreclosed, democratization, as
evidenced by the strong, developmental, and long-time authoritarian
states of East and Southeast Asia.
Political science scholarship, although filled with rich accounts of
statebuilding processes on the one hand and democracy-building pro-
cesses on the other, has no real conceptualization of the comple-
mentarities or tensions embodied in the combined approach. Indeed,
Francis Fukuyama recently noted that “one of the most understud-
ied and undertheorized relationships is that between democracy and
the state.”45 Even Samuel Huntington’s seminal thesis that the level of
political institutionalization in the developing world must stay one step
ahead of social mobilization in order to channel popular participation
focused on political institution building, rather than articulating a the-
ory of how state institution building interacts with democratization.46
Cutting into the Gordian knot of indeterminate causality that plagued
45 Fukuyama 2014b: 1326. 46 Huntington 1968.
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classical modernization theory,Huntington argued that all good things
do not go together and that it matters a great deal in which sequence
they occur. Political instability and disorder in the developing world
results from the unequal dynamics of modernization. For Huntington,
achieving political stability requires the level of political institution-
alization to stay one step ahead of the forces of social mobilization
brought about with economic development. Logically, and troublingly,
then, the sacrifice of democratic pluralism is the price to be paid for
stability in politically modernizing developing countries.
Others have extended this logic to the state realm as well, agreeing
with the basic thesis that institutionalization must come first to prop-
erly handle the other fruits of modernization. Roland Paris’s influential
work on peacebuilding proposes the normatively easier to digest “insti-
tutionalization before liberalization” approach to democracy-building
in post-conflict states.47 He suggests postponing the electoral aspect
of democratization until after complementary institutionalization has
first been undertaken in both the political and state realms. Fukuyama
echoes the basic sequencing thesis that a strong state must come first
for modern political order to be consolidated, arguing that democracy
coming first is a recipe for patronage and corruption.48 Martin Shefter
offered a causal explanation for this phenomenon in his pioneering
studies of the presence or absence of clientelist politics in the United
States and Europe. He critiqued the existing sociological approach to
clientelism, which focused on social structure and political culture as
the explanation for patronage, delivering instead a historical institu-
tionalist explanation hinging on how the process of state formation
interacted with patterns of political and social mobilization.49 Shefter
argued that when the rise of professional bureaucrats occurred before
democratization, the clientelistic logic of spoils distribution did not
take hold and parties were compelled to appeal to voters with pro-
grammatic appeals.
Conventional accounts of the rise of the modern, bureaucratic
nation-state emphasize its functional advantages at collecting rev-
enue, broadcasting authority over a territory, and providing security.50
Modern – i.e., rule-bound, effective, legitimate – government was,
47 Paris 2004. 48 Fukuyama 2011; also Linz and Stepan 1996.
49 Shefter 1977, 1994; also Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 5.
50 Levi 1989; Skocpol 1979; and Tilly 1985, 1990.
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therefore, first andmost easily established in the states in which author-
itarian governments had to wage war to ensure security, such as
nineteenth-century Prussia.51 State formation in this account is inher-
ently violent: in addition to protecting the state from without, the
leviathan also had to take away the ability to impose violent coercion
from all other agents within. By contrast, countries that democratized
before they established modern state bureaucracies, such as the United
States, developed patronage-riddled public sectors.52
Post-socialist transitions offer a further illustration of the obstinate
powers of entrenched interests in the face of reforms – along with the
deliberate strategies vis-à-vis institutions through which they can pow-
erfully resist and even prevent change. Scholars of Central and Eastern
Europe have identified a common sequence of bureaucratic opposition
to neoliberal economic reforms.53 New institutional blueprints asso-
ciatedwith reform threaten bureaucrats who in turn attempt,with their
political supporters, to sabotage the implementation of those reforms.
What begins as a backlash turns into strategies of institutional drift
and conversion, manifesting through a process of bargaining and tin-
kering with institutional and policy reforms so that outcomes better
suit the political balance of forces.54 Post-socialist transitions also dis-
play the crucial significance of elite objectives and sequencing in the
exceptionally fluid environment in which new institutional arrange-
ments are forged.55 Another important insight from political and eco-
nomic transition in Eastern Europe is that social change emerges from
a reconfiguration of institutional orders in different realms – politi-
cal, economic, and social – that are in many ways incongruous instead
of coordinated.56 Thus, understanding how politics writ large changes
over time is often squarely about the interaction of different, sometimes
competing, ongoing political processes.57 This fact is often obscure,
however, to international agents supporting transformation because of
their own particular normative and operational frames.
51 Tilly 1990. Cf. Ertman 1997, who elaborates four distinct combinations of
regime type and state apparatus, each marking a different path-dependent
sequence in early modern European state formation.
52 Shefter 1977, 1994; and Skowronek 1982.
53 For example Bockman and Eyal 2002; and Hellman 1998.
54 Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2015. 55 Smith and Remington 2001.
56 Stark and Bruszt 1998. 57 Thelen 1999.
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Historical institutionalist accounts of the relationships between
statebuilding, democratization, and patronage politics illuminate more
generally the shaky foundations of the assumptions underpinning the
transitional governance approach to peacebuilding. Investigating the
varying pathways out of socialism, Conor O’Dwyer demonstrates
that many of the new democracies of Eastern Europe suffered from
the excessive politicization of their state institutions, thereby under-
mining government effectiveness even in these administratively better
endowed nations.58 In particular, rapid democratization in an environ-
ment of unconsolidated state structures led to a rapid overexpansion
of the bureaucracy as a result of patronage politics.
Two key patterns emerge in considering the prospects of a pro-
cess of statebuilding and democratization. First, most obviously,
simultaneity is an unpromising strategy – sequencing is crucial. The
foregoing discussion has established that democratization in an under-
institutionalized context contributes to instability and patronage-
oriented politics. Second, more subtly, there is never truly a level
playing field among contenders to power – incumbents hold a dis-
tinct set of advantages. Elites supported by formal or informal insti-
tutional power – resting, for example, in bureaucratic, party, or tra-
ditional power structures – retain and rely upon those resources and
the legitimacy they generate. Paul Pierson catalogs the mechanisms
through which “power may beget power,” including the ability of pow-
erful elites to control the stock and flow of resources and encourage
others to fall in line. Furthermore, these elites are adept at mobilizing
new sources of power and legitimacy in their favor – by altering polit-
ical discourse they change other elites’ and society’s views of what is
desirable and target institutions and policies in ways that change soci-
etal preferences to their benefit.59 Scholars have vividly described, for
example, how post-conflict domestic elites have been able to success-
fully re-appropriate the resources and symbols of international peace-
building strategies in their countries in ways that reinforced their own
authority.60
Institutional change and innovation often occur when entrenched
stakeholders exercising vetoes over reform are neutralized. The transi-
tional governance model tries to do that in principle by attempting to
58 O’Dwyer 2006. 59 Pierson 2015: 134–141.
60 For example, Curtis 2013 on Burundi; and Hughes 2009a on Cambodia and
East Timor.
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create a level playing field among legitimate domestic elites. In prac-
tice, however, it does exactly the opposite. By appointing domestic
counterparts, the UN gives certain elites the power to exercise a veto
against reform, without other checks and balances, like the rule of law,
a strong state, or enough democratic accountability to ensure that, if
necessary, some other political force can “throw the rascals out.”61
Domestic elites view the politics of the transitional governance period
and its aftermath as a “winner-takes-all” game. In turn, their determi-
nation to survive in the context of that game leads them into cementing
a neopatrimonial political order, undermining both the consolidation
of autonomous state structures and nascent democratic accountability.
State capacity-building is hampered since the rulers of the state use it
for patronage distribution; and democracy-building is thwarted by the
use of patronage resources to bolster a hegemonic hold on power. State-
and democracy-building, when pursued together, act at cross-purposes
so that the objectives of neither are met.
Neopatrimonial Political Order: A Hybrid Form of Governance
The peacebuilding literature focuses for the most part on the imple-
mentation of peace operations and the extent to which they achieve
their goals. Most such studies assess the durability of a peace opera-
tion’s performance by examining outcomes after the end of the man-
date – but even the most sophisticated of these studies use a relatively
short timeframe for assessment, for at least three reasons.62 First, a
short-term perspective is due to the recent nature of such interventions;
not enough time has elapsed across a large enough sample of cases to
go much further. Second, this type of study reflects the scholarly per-
ception of an international intervention as an exogenously imposed
treatment, the effect of which can be fruitfully assessed through cross-
sectional analysis. Third, it also reflects the relatively broad consensus
that international peacebuilding seeks uncontested objectives; thus a
reasonable topic of study is the extent to which the effective and legit-
imate governance of the modern state has indeed been met in post-
conflict states subject to interventions.
61 Powell 1989: 119.
62 For example, Doyle and Sambanis 2006 focus on outcomes two years after the
termination of conflict while Zürcher et al. 2013 assess outcomes five years
after the start of a peace mission.
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This book aims to add a new perspective to the peacebuilding schol-
arship by emphasizing that international interventions represent and
seek to establish one particular conception of political order. Domestic
elites in post-conflict states, by contrast, seek to establish a very dif-
ferent form of political order. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the
dynamic contest between these two visions over time – and, especially,
as long into the aftermath of interventions as possible. Doing so makes
it apparent that post-conflict political order is typically neopatrimonial
in nature. The analytical stance here is in line with new scholarship in
the political economy of development that emphasizes that neopatri-
monialism should be understood as a core element in explaining how
states function, not simply advanced as a reason for their failure.63
Clan-based and other forms of patrimonial governance, along with
the “competitive authoritarianism” they regularly exhibit, coexist with
more rational-legal and democratic systems of governance, often for
long periods of time.64 It is crucial to understand these hybrid political
orders as resting in an equilibrium of their own, which is not simply a
deviation from the pathway to modern political order.65
Poor governance and economic outcomes in the developing world
are not a result of inept leaders, nor of international organizations dis-
pensing faulty advice. Political and economic institutions are the way
they are because elites have an interest in structuring them that way;
over time, those institutions replicate and perpetuate the power strug-
gles of the past. Acemoglu and Robinson observe, for example, that
there is a mutually reinforcing synergy between economic and politi-
cal institutions.66 Typically, inclusive economic institutions – featuring
secure property rights, the unbiased rule of law, and equitable public
service provision – create a more equitable basis for political power;
in turn, inclusive political institutions, rooted in pluralism, ensure con-
tinued economic inclusion. Similarly, extractive political institutions
that favor the political elite allow them to write the economic rules
to benefit themselves at the expense of broader society; in turn, the
63 Smith 2014 elaborates this point in the case of conflict-affected countries that
have found their own pathways to peace without international interventions.
64 On competitive authoritarianism, see Levitsky and Way 2002.
65 Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009.
66 Acemoglu and Robinson 2012. The discussion of inclusive and extractive
institutions rests on their work.
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extractive economic institutions that are structured to privilege pow-
erful elite interests entrenches their future extractive potential and thus
political dominance. Crucially, however, there is sometimes a mismatch
between economic and political orders and these are typically unsta-
ble equilibria. Of particular note here is the negative spiral that can
unfold. An extractive economic order can, over time, effect changes to
an inclusive political system so that the political balance also becomes
more extractive. In turn, the narrow interests that gain a concentrated
hold on political order will gradually transform economic institutions
into more extractive ones that more narrowly benefit and empower
themselves.
A rich vein of contemporary scholarship takes as a starting point the
insight that a better understanding of patronage and clientelism is cru-
cial to better understanding stunted democratic consolidation across
the developing world.67 Programmatic and unbiased delivery of public
goods and services to the population is a hallmark of a well-functioning
democracy. By contrast, pervasive clientelism is both a cause and effect
of a lack of democratic consolidation. In this book, I rely on Scott’s
seminal definition of patronage or clientelism as the logic of instrumen-
tal exchange – biased distribution of public goods and services from
patrons to clients in exchange for votes and other forms of political
support from clients to patrons.68 Similarly, Stokes et al. have more
recently defined clientelism as nonprogrammatic distribution of public
resources in conditional exchange for political support.69
Neopatrimonial political orders in Cambodia, East Timor, and
Afghanistan, as in other developing and post-conflict countries, encom-
pass both the patron–client relationship between elites and their imme-
diate networks, typically referred to as patronage, and the less per-
sonalized and yet still instrumental exchange of goods and favors for
broad political support, commonly labeled clientelism. In describing
post-conflict political orders as neopatrimonial – hybrid systems where
both patrimonial and rational-legal elements of governance coexist –
I use the terms patronage and clientelism interchangeably.70 In post-
conflict states, the concern is not electoral clientelism per se but, more
67 See, especially, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; and Stokes et al. 2013.
68 Scott 1972. 69 Stokes et al. 2013: 18.
70 Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007 also use the terms interchangeably. Cf. Stokes et
al. 2013, who distinguish patronage as the subset of clientelist practices
targeted at party members.
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broadly, relational clientelism, which constitutes a broader set of dis-
tributional strategies that deliver ongoing benefits to clients.71 This
broader form of political clientelism is essential in the democratiz-
ing developing world as a means through which to achieve inter-elite
accommodation and compromise,more so than to bind the population
to different elite patrons. In other words, state and public resources are
used to forge and cement alliances among different groups of elites,
instead of serving the logic of mass party patronage.72
This book emphasizes the clientelism and patronage associated with
the building of post-conflict political order, focusing especially on the
ability of elites to make credible commitments to each other and to
the populace. This commands attention, in turn, to how political and
administrative institutions shape time horizons and elite incentives;
and to how the elites who control the state deliver the patronage goods
and benefits that underpin their neopatrimonial compact with society.
The liberal ideal embedded in the UN’s peacebuilding model is that
democratically elected elites will interpret social preferences and will
use the state apparatus to deliver the programmatic policies, collective
public services, and shared prosperity that serve as pillars of sustain-
able peace. The post-conflict reality, however – as illustrated in the
empirical chapters that follow – is that the political–economic incen-
tives facing elites are such that it is easier and more profitable for them
to focus, for the most part, on distributing narrowly targeted public
rents and particularist patronage goods to their clients in exchange for
political support.73
The relative weakness of party organization in post-conflict and
other developing countries, moreover, makes clientelism even more
appealing as a strategy for gaining political support.74 In particular,
while outsider parties with no access to state resources will attempt to
make more programmatic appeals as their only viable strategy, incum-
bent parties with access to state resources will be more likely to mobi-
lize those material resources in clientelist appeals for support.75 At the
same time, incumbents can continue to consolidate power by alter-
ing social discourse and by using targeted policies to reshape social
preferences.76 In furthering all such practices, elites find that they are
71 Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014.
72 Van de Walle 2007: 55; also Slater 2010.
73 Joshi and Mason 2011; and Keefer and Vlaicu 2008. 74 Reilly 2013.
75 O’Dwyer 2006; and Shefter 1977, 1994. 76 Pierson 2015.
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able to channel their appeal to citizens through hierarchical patron–
client networks, thus obviating their own need to build credibility with
the populace – through, for example, institutionalized political par-
ties – and undermining the formal structures of authority.77 This equi-
librium not only privileges elites and their networks over society at
large; it also has adverse consequences for peace because underlying it
is a new form of persistent insecurity.78
Elite factions in limited access orders curb violence by structuring
the creation, extraction, and distribution of rents; they also structure
violence itself, serving as the main fault lines of conflict in patrimo-
nial societies.79 Most of what I have said about violence to this point
has been implicit. The fact of violence – including coercive threats of
violence – is, of course, central to theories of political order.80 The
logic is simple: those who have access to violence will use it to extract
what they can from the rest of the population, unless they are con-
strained in some way – through a pact with others who have access
to violence or because the costs of using it outweigh the benefits of
using it.Amodern, rational-legal political order limits violence through
institutions, including both formal measures and informal norms. Yet
Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud observe, “ . . .much of what we iden-
tify as order is simply violence in disguise. Political institutions are
often erected on violent foundations, and maintained through implicit
and explicit threats of bloodshed should obedience be withheld.”81 It
should not surprise us that post-conflict orders rest on a delicate knife-
edge balancing a certain degree of order with the ever-present specter
of violence.
A suboptimal political economy equilibrium of the sort I have
described here may be relatively common to new democracies suf-
fering from weak credibility. Yet transformational peacebuilding pur-
ports to build legitimate and effective governance – and this book
demonstrates that it fails to do so because domestic elites succeed
instead at using the resources of international interventions to aid
them in establishing a neopatrimonial political order. This neopatri-
monialism has proven obstinate in the face of attempts to impose the
77 Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Olson 1993; and Scott 1972. 78 Barma 2012a.
79 North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009: 36.
80 Weber defined violence as the essential feature distinguishing the political from
the social, economic, and cultural. As noted in Bates 2008b.
81 Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008: 1, fn. 1.
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rule-bound, effective, and legitimate governance of the modern state.
The post-conflict regimes under study here are neopatrimonial before
the outbreak of conflict; they retain some elements of neopatrimoni-
alism during the political disorder that characterizes conflict; and, in
the end, even after experiencing a peacebuilding intervention designed
explicitly to shape a different political order, they return to neopatri-
monialism.
The Peacebuilding Pathway
Peacebuilding is “a matter of political crafting,” with elites playing a
crucial role in the unfolding of the pathway, especially through the
strategies they use to gain and reinforce power through institutions.82
This chapter has distilled a series of stylized expectations from other
types of major transformative events and the political economy of the
contemporary developing world to suggest what we should expect to
see as elites in post-conflict states and international interventions inter-
act with competing visions of political order. Transformative peace-
building efforts represent the international community’s attempt to
transpose the rule-bound, effective, and legitimate governance of the
modern state in post-conflict countries. Peacebuilding through transi-
tional governance tries to move post-conflict elites toward this mod-
ern political order by constraining their behavior through a process
of institutional choice that represents the norms of international
statehood. International interventions thus guide post-conflict states
through the negotiated elite settlement that marks the initiation
of a peace operation; through a deliberately managed transitional
governance process of shared domestic and international authority
that simultaneously pursues statebuilding and democratization; and
through the electoral, constitution-writing, and legislative rule-making
process that marks the end of a transitional governance experience.
Yet post-conflict elites are adept at maneuvering within the param-
eters of this internationally engineered, sequenced competition over
political space and thereby shaping interventions and the resulting
institutions to their advantage. They aim to assuage the international
82 DiPalma 1990: 8 uses the notion of political crafting to describe
democratization.
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community’s concerns about modern forms of governance, while try-
ing simultaneously to ensure their own political survival and enrich-
ment. As a result, their actions over the phases of the peacebuilding
pathway are geared toward establishing and bolstering a neopatrimo-
nial political order that embeds the instrumental logic of patron–client
exchange within the institutional trappings of the modern state. A
peace agreement becomes, in this light, not the final resolution to civil
conflict but the new impetus for continued internecine political strug-
gle. The impact of the de facto power recalibration that takes place
during this phase becomes apparent quite quickly as the initial victors
act to assert their first-mover advantages. In turn, the transitional gov-
ernance approach and the formal institutional engineering process it
emphasizes become the new arena for political conflict between elite
factions. The truncated timeframe of transitional governance forces
upon the post-conflict elites in question a specific series of institutional
choices and outcomes, setting in motion one particular pathway and
foreclosing other potential pathways. Moreover, through the transi-
tional governance model of shared governance, even as they attempt to
impose particular constraints on domestic actors, peacebuilding inter-
ventions are simultaneously giving specific elites new and unmatchable
resources in the form of funding, legitimacy, and authority. In turn,
elites are adept at manipulating the outcomes of the intervention to
mobilize and reward supporters, attract new support, and more firmly
establish their grips on power.
In the aftermath of intervention, finally, a crucial insight of tempo-
ral analysis becomes apparent: because of the dynamics of sequencing,
alternatives forgone due to the exigencies of transitional governance
become increasingly difficult to reach as time passes and countries
continue to move along the peacebuilding pathway. Post-intervention,
when external support for compliance has waned, those domestic elites
who have been given the responsibility to implement and enforce new
rules of governance find it more beneficial to subvert those institu-
tions. Thus we see outcomes making it clear that elites might honor
the letter of the new governance rules but violate their spirit such that
they are obviously being exploited.83 They govern, within the formal
institutional constraints, in ways that attempt to eliminate compet-
ing political forces from authority. In the neopatrimonial order that is
83 Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 13.
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established, the formal institutions of the modern state, so deliberately
unveiled at the end of the transitional governance period, are under-
mined in the service of systematic patronage distribution that cements
the grip on power of specific elite factions. Savvy elites know that they
will acquire an aura of legitimacy by cooperating with the UN’s rules –
and that they will in time be able to reassert their power based on
their underlying resources. In each of the cases examined here, pow-
erful elites cooperated with the transitional governance process only
to make a bid for hegemonic power once the UN presence had ended.
Thus, the vision of political order acted upon by domestic elites out-
lasts and outmaneuvers that of international peacebuilders.
This causal narrative serves as the logic underpinning the analy-
sis presented in the rest of the book, which focuses on the interna-
tional community’s model of peacebuilding through transitional gov-
ernance as a transformative experiment. The empirical chapters that
follow bear out the expectations derived in this chapter, through the
post-conflict peacebuilding experiences of Cambodia, East Timor, and
Afghanistan. Much has been written about these cases, so much so
that there is little new to be gleaned on the details of the interven-
tions themselves. Yet I aim to make a twofold contribution through
my presentation of the case material and additional evidence collected
through interviews. First, as this chapter has articulated, the histori-
cal institutionalist approach to examining these interventions and the
consequent emphasis on neopatrimonial political order offers a new
comparative take on the particular details of the cases that are worth
emphasizing and thereby streamlines their presentation. Second, the
temporal dimension of the analysis connects familiar historical details
in new ways, especially by highlighting specific elements of the cases in
light of the phases along the peacebuilding pathway.
For these analytical purposes, the empirical narrative in this book
is structured through the sequence of critical peacebuilding phases:
moving post-conflict countries from conflict to settlement; implement-
ing transitional governance measures of statebuilding and democra-
tization; and post-intervention governance outcomes. At each phase,
I emphasize how domestic elites interpret and interact with interna-
tional interventions in patterns that condition the possibility and qual-
ity of a stable and lasting peace in the longer term. The next chap-
ter delivers a comparative assessment of the politics behind the elite
peace settlements that mark the first critical juncture in the process of
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transformative peacebuilding. These settlements are the hinge between
the country’s past political trajectory, including the conflict itself, and
the post-conflict future that the international community aspires to
help shape. They offer a crucible through which to examine compet-
ing domestic and international conceptions of appropriate strategies to
build political order.
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3 From Violent Conflict to Elite
Settlement
The international peacebuilding endeavor is framed as the attempt to
create sustainable peace in post-conflict countries by transforming the
root sources of conflict in these societies. The crucial first stage is to
bring together the leaders of warring factions in constructing a peace
settlement by which all sides agree to abide. A peace settlement can be
reached in a number of different ways, as illustrated by the case stud-
ies in this book: as a result of a stalemated conflict as in Cambodia;
attained as part of the journey toward independence as in East Timor;
or forged through a decisive externally assisted military victory as in
Afghanistan. No matter how it is reached, however, the contours of the
peace deal are the manifestation of the terms on which parties previ-
ously locked in conflict are willing, at a particular moment in time, to
attempt to coexist with each other. The peace settlement is, in effect,
an externally imposed critical juncture that sets in motion the peace-
building pathway that follows. In addition, an elite peace pact offers a
snapshot of the domestic power balance emerging out of conflict and
a strong indication of the goals and motivations of the parties to it,
providing essential clues into the political realities of the peacebuild-
ing challenge. Like other critical junctures, the peace settlement phase
represents a moment of highly contingent politics, where the choices
made by political actors have lasting repercussions.
Internationally mediated peace settlements in Cambodia, East
Timor, and Afghanistan attempted to resolve the problems that created
conflict at the outset – and served, in turn, as the basic agreements upon
which the subsequent peacebuilding interventions were predicated and
implemented. Each country narrative presented in this chapter analyt-
ically explores the causes and nature of the conflict period and illus-
trates how the peace settlement was achieved. The historical overviews
emphasize those structural elements of each country’s political trajec-
tory that had lasting effects on the domestic elite power balance and
political culture. In particular, they focus on the ways in which elites
70
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use the infrastructure and resources of the state in their power strug-
gles and in building neopatrimonial networks of political support – in
attempting, in short, to establish political order. In the previous chapter,
I made the case that a peace agreement is, in practice, a conditional elite
pact that is best understood not as a rational deal that strikes a stable
compromise between elite factions but rather as the concrete repre-
sentation of the legacies of the pre-conflict political trajectory and the
particular power balance that emerges from the conflict. The empirical
evidence presented in this chapter illustrates how the extraordinarily
fluid politics of the settlement phase, against the structural backdrop
of the preceding political trajectory, initiate a new phase of regularized
elite conflict over the construction of political order.
For each country, I begin with a brief historical background, paying
particular attention to the basic challenges of governance and political
order – focusing especially on the political–economic objectives of dif-
ferent elite factions and the rivalries among them as well as the overall
institutional infrastructure and capacity of the state. I then turn to a dis-
cussion of the conflict, emphasizing the composition of the warring fac-
tions, the contours of their grievances and the nature of their claims to
state authority. In outlining the nature of political group competition in
each of the cases I build onMichael Doyle’s insightful notion of “ecolo-
gies of transitional politics” to characterize the nature, coherence, and
orientation of the different factions to conflict and settlement.1 The
political–economic characteristics of the factions must be understood
in a dynamic sense, since they change over time, and they are crucial
for explaining the subsequent interaction between international peace-
builders and domestic elites during the transitional governance phase.
The coherent Cambodian factions may have originally been resigned
to the peace process but, over time, they became increasingly hostile
to it and to each other. The umbrella national resistance movement in
East Timor, seen as the natural broad-based counterpart to the United
Nations, fractured quite quickly after independence. In Afghanistan
there were a handful of relatively coherent factions that have, since the
country’s liberation from the Taliban, proliferated into many smaller
groups with particularist claims. The narratives in this chapter attempt
to capture the dynamics of fluid elite factional interests that are,
1 Doyle 2001: 547–550; and Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 321–333.
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in turn, central to understanding how post-conflict political order is
constructed.
The Cambodian Civil War
Modern Cambodian political history combines the legacy of an ancient
indigenous empire, the effects of colonization, independence, and Cold
War external influences, and the agonies of civil conflict and the geno-
cide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge.The combination of these factors
contributed to the length and severity of the civil war, as well as to the
difficulty of the political settlement to the conflict. In turn, the legacy of
weak state capacity and compromised political legitimacy have deep-
ened the challenge of constructing post-conflict political order.
The ancient Khmer empire, immortalized in the temples of its capital
city Angkor, controlled a large part of what now constitutes modern
Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries
CE. With the decline of the Angkor empire, Cambodia became vulner-
able to periodic invasion and occupation by these neighbors. The wars
fought between Thailand and Vietnam on Cambodian soil in the 1830s
and 1840s severely weakened the small kingdom’s fragile institutions
and carved up its territory. Cambodia’s place on the map was saved
when France imposed a protectorate upon the country and its obso-
lescent monarchy in 1863. As in their other colonies, the French pre-
vented the development of a cohesive political or bureaucratic elite in
Cambodia. Instead, they brought into the country a super-class of Viet-
namese civil servants, merchants, and farmers who, along with a small
overseas Chinese population, came to dominate the administrative and
commercial realms in Cambodia.2 The French constructed some degree
of infrastructure in the country, but the Cambodian economy remained
largely based on subsistence agriculture and traditional extractive prac-
tices in commodities such as rubber and other agricultural products.
The colonial French authorities designated the 19-year-old Prince
Norodom Sihanouk king in 1941, marking a landmark event in con-
temporary Cambodian political history. Originally installed on the
throne as a colonial puppet, Sihanouk proved over the following seven
decades to be a shrewd political operator and remained one of the
2 Gottesman 2003; Shawcross 1994; and Strangio 2014.
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dominant figures of Cambodian political life until his death in 2012.3
He played a central role in winning Cambodian independence in 1954,
having decided at an early stage that his political survival hinged on his
ability to emerge as a champion of Khmer nationalism against French
rule. In 1955, Sihanouk abdicated the throne in favor of his father
to become eligible to participate in national politics. In the election
that followed his party won every seat in the national assembly. His
party remained dominant for the next 15 years and he governed with
no intermediaries between himself and his people, claiming legitimacy
on the basis of his semi-divine connection with the peasantry. Like the
French, he prevented the development of an independent political class
in Phnom Penh, and continued the tradition of personalized political
authority practiced by Cambodian rulers before him.
From 1970 onward, Cambodia underwent two decades of extreme
political instability and a brutal civil war that included a tragic geno-
cide. That year Sihanouk was overthrown and his regime was replaced
by a right-wing civilian–military alliance supported by the United
States and led by General Lon Nol. Sihanouk, who had been exiled
in Beijing, decided to throw in his lot with the North Vietnamese and
the small group of Cambodian communists he dubbed “les Khmers
Rouges.” By making common cause with the latter and assuring the
rest of the world of their benign intentions, he endowed them with a
measure of legitimacy and political prominence that had earlier eluded
them.4 Between 1970 and 1975, the “carpet-bombing” of Cambodian
territory by the United States and the radical insurgent tactics of the
Khmer Rouge made it increasingly difficult for peasants to live on the
land, destroying the agricultural economy as well as the fabric of Cam-
bodian peasant society. On April 17, 1975, following a series of vic-
tories in provincial cities throughout the country, the black pajama-
clad peasant soldiers of the Khmer Rouge seized the capital city of
Phnom Penh and ousted Lon Nol’s government. The very same day
they embarked on a radical Maoist agrarian program to return the
3 The discussion of Sihanouk’s political career draws heavily on Shawcross 1994:
6–7.
4 By contrast, American foreign service officers stationed in the region alerted
Washington – where they were met with relative disinterest – in mid-1973 to the
already disturbing violence and forced migration being pursued by the Khmer
Rouge in the southern Cambodian zones they then controlled, and again in
1975 soon after the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh. Strangio 2014: 13 and 17.
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Cambodian economy and society to “Year Zero,” emptying the city
and forcing people to migrate to provincial labor camps. In September
of the same year, the Khmer Rouge brought Sihanouk back to a ghost
city and declared him the titular head of state. He resigned in April
1976 and was held captive on the grounds of the royal palace for three
years until he returned to exile in Beijing. The infamous Pol Pot became
prime minister at the head of the Democratic Kampuchea regime and
Cambodia was governed by the reign of terror imposed by the Khmer
Rouge’s ruling party organization known as the Angkar.
The horrors of the Khmer Rouge regime and the genocide it per-
petrated have been well documented.5 Over one million Cambodi-
ans, out of a 1975 population of about 7.5 million, are estimated to
have been killed through outright execution, starvation and disease,
and the physical burdens of forced labor.6 In addition to carrying out
indiscriminate murderous rampages, the Khmer Rouge systematically
destroyed the very fabric of Cambodian society by targeting for execu-
tion and displacement the most educated and trained sectors of soci-
ety – including teachers, lawyers, doctors, and Buddhist monks, as well
as the Vietnamese and Chinese leaders of the commercial class. The
Khmer Rouge operated a network of prisons and execution centers,
the most infamous of which were Tuol Sleng, or S-21, in Phnom Penh,
and the Choeung Ek “killing fields” on the outskirts of the city. The
chilling phrase widely repeated by Khmer Rouge cadres as they car-
ried out their purges of “enemies of the revolution”was “To keep you
is no gain; to kill you is no loss.”7 Over time, as the small inner fac-
tion around Pol Pot became increasingly paranoid, the organization
also purged its own ranks. The Khmer Rouge decimated Cambodia’s
small elite and crushed any forms of dissent, destroying in its wake the
country’s civic institutions and all forms of community and religious
association.
In parallel to these assaults on their own people, the Khmer Rouge
carried out numerous attacks against Vietnam. The Vietnamese finally
retaliated with an invasion, driving the Khmer Rouge out of Phnom
5 See, among others, Chandler 1991; and Kiernan 1996.
6 Gottesman 2003. Chandler 1998 puts the figure at over 1.5 million. Kiernan
2003, in a scrutiny of population and death estimates, calculates that the
1975–79 genocidal toll was 1.7–1.9 million people, or 21–24 percent of
Cambodia’s 1975 population.
7 Strangio 2014: 2.
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Penh in January 1979 and installing a Hanoi-backed client regime, the
self-styled People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), headed by defec-
tors from the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam,with the full support of its Soviet
patrons, thus liberated Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge’s grip at the
same time as it installed an occupying regime there. Almost no coun-
try outside the Soviet bloc recognized the new regime in Phnom Penh.
The Khmer Rouge retained the country’s UN seat, passing it in 1982
to the newly formed Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
(CGDK). That coalition was headed by Sihanouk and included three
armed Cambodian resistance groups: the Khmer Rouge; Sihanouk’s
royalist political party FUNCINPEC (National United Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia);8 and the
non-communist Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF).
External involvement became further entrenched, with the Chinese
arming the Khmer Rouge, and the United States, Britain, and France
supporting the other coalition partners. Schisms in the domestic elite
became hardened by the logic of these Cold War alliances. In turn,
Cambodia’s societal and political divisions deepened and persisted
after the civil conflict was brought to an end.
Its lack of UN recognition notwithstanding, the PRK regime con-
trolled the country from 1979 onward. When Vietnam withdrew in
1989 it became known as the State of Cambodia before subsequently
restyling itself as the Cambodian People’s Party in order to contest the
UN-administered elections in 1993. It was led by Heng Samrin and
then Hun Sen, both Cambodian-born Khmer Rouge defectors with
strong ties to Vietnam. This regime “developed out of the devasta-
tion inherited from the Khmer Rouge an effective (albeit dictatorial)
authority over more than 80 percent of the territory”9 and rebuilt and
controlled the organs of the state. Yet it lacked legitimacy on both
international and domestic fronts.10 The PRK was nowhere near as
brutal as the Khmer Rouge, but it remained a hardline, one-party state
controlled by Vietnam. It brooked no dissent, cracked down on oppo-
nents, sometimes through the use of torture and murder, controlled
the judiciary and press, and stifled civil society. The PRK also had to
contend with the Cambodian population’s widespread mistrust of, and
8 The acronym comes from the party’s French name, Front Uni National pour un
Cambodge Indépendant Neutre Pacifique Et Coopératif.
9 Doyle 1995: 18. 10Shawcross 1994: 10.
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distaste for, the Vietnamese. Few in the country supported the regime
and few Cambodians returned from the diaspora to assist it with gov-
erning the country.
In this context, the PRK faced a major challenge in constructing
a viable political order. In essence, it was an illegitimate occupying
regime that needed to extract resources and some form of legitimacy
from the provinces in order to govern the country from the center.
It did so by constructing an extensive patronage network throughout
Cambodia, primarily through a strategy of delegation that enabled per-
sonal gain for co-opted provincial officials while ensuring some mea-
sure of governance and public goods provision throughout the country.
Caroline Hughes observes that the PRK’s statebuilding project “com-
prised the establishment and cementing of clientelist networks running
through the ministry, military, and provincial structures” that drew
upon the cultural repertoires of clientelism that had long character-
ized Cambodian governance.11 Political order rested upon, and power
came to be deployed by, instrumental and highly personalized clien-
telist ties between top elites and the agents upon whom they relied to
carry out their orders. In a classic manifestation of a neopatrimonial
hybrid order, this led to the evolution of flexible, informal, even evasive,
administrative and political cultures, in combination with a hierarchi-
cal and cohesive party patronage structure that penetrated Cambodia
down to the village level, where kinship and patronage ties remained
the basis of customary Khmer peasant relationships.12
The PRKmirrored earlier governing strategies deployed by Sihanouk
and even Lon Nol, who, while personalizing political control, simi-
larly tried to extend the reach of the state out to the rural areas of
the country. This twin tactic served to extend the scope of patrimonial
and patronage-based politics.13 Yet the reach of the state under the
PRK extended even further down to the village level. The regime con-
solidated the dominance of its party apparatus, concentrated political
control, and lengthened the hierarchy of patron–client relationships by
introducing, for example, a three-member village committee that com-
prised appointed representatives, as well as rice cooperatives, which
collectivized rural agricultural production.14 The extensive reach of the
11 Hughes 2009a: 28.
12 Hughes 2003, 2009a; and Pak et al. 2007, especially pp. 51–53.
13 Pak et al. 2007; and Turner 2013.
14 Gottesman 2003: 34–56; and Pak et al. 2007: 52.
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PRK state apparatus into the Cambodian countryside hadmajor conse-
quences during and after the international peacebuilding intervention.
The competition for political control over the country developed out
of the collapse of the legitimacy of the Cambodian state, which had
begun in earnest under the Khmer Rouge’s violent regime and con-
tinued under the Vietnam-installed regime. The PRK regime and its
Vietnamese and Soviet backers considered the civil conflict against the
Khmer Rouge to be a necessary counterinsurgency waged against a
genocidal opponent. The CGDK coalition and its UN and US support-
ers saw the roots of the conflict in the armed intervention and occu-
pation of the country by Vietnam.15 The difficulty of finding a bargain
that was palatable to all these competing sets of interests prolonged
the conflict.16 As Doyle and Sambanis succinctly observe, the chal-
lenge of building a peace in Cambodia was the challenge of joining
effective government – the PRK – with legitimate sources of author-
ity – the exile coalition, led by Sihanouk.17 That disconnect between
effectiveness and legitimacy has continued to thwart the Cambodian
peacebuilding process to the present day and it remains the defining
obstacle to constructing a modern political order in the country.
The Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia
The Cambodian civil war was finally ended by the Paris Peace Agree-
ment – the centerpiece of which was the Agreement on a Comprehen-
sive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. This peace deal was
arrived at by Cambodian elites as their various external backers with-
drew support in the waning years of the Cold War. The settlement was
intended to be a firm coda to the long battle for control of the country.
Instead, it served as the preface to the next phase of the elite conflict
that had long divided Cambodia. The negotiations in the run-up to
the Paris Peace Agreement highlight the deeply entrenched animosi-
ties between the Cambodian factions – and reveal that the final agree-
ment resulted from changes in the geostrategic context rather than
from any real domestic political rebalancing. Vietnam began to con-
sider the possibility of compromise between its client regime and the
other Cambodian contenders to power as Soviet support for the PRK
began to diminish in the mid-1980s and Vietnam sought closer ties
15 Doyle 1995: 18. 16 Walter 2009: 253. 17 Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 217.
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with its Southeast Asian neighbors.18 In November 1987, Sihanouk
had his first meeting with the PRK’s leader, Hun Sen, to begin nego-
tiations for a political settlement. In addition to the rapidly chang-
ing geopolitical context, Doyle observes that other factors, such as
Sihanouk’s age,Hun Sen’s aspiration for international recognition, and
military exhaustion on all sides, helped prompt these talks, as did
the increasing desire of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) to see a resolution to the conflict.19 Informal meetings – facil-
itated by an ASEAN eager to assume a regional leadership role – iden-
tified the need for some degree of interim international involvement
over the full transition to peace without any agreement on what that
mechanism would look like.
In the search for a comprehensive settlement, the first Paris Confer-
ence on Cambodia was convened in July 1989. Yet these talks stalled
initially, deadlocking over the nature of the interim control mecha-
nism as well as the issue of power-sharing among the Khmer fac-
tions. The notion of a UN trustee-like interim administrative super-
vision of Cambodia was first mooted at this time.20 A power-sharing
system was proposed, whereby the control of several crucial min-
istries – defense, public security, finance, information, and foreign
affairs – would be shared across the four major competing factions,
along with additional mechanisms for scrutiny and oversight. The
PRK, however, balked at allowing Khmer Rouge participation in the
proposed interim quadripartite government; and the CGDK coalition
of the other Khmer factions was leery of legitimizing the Vietnam-
installed government in Phnom Penh and granting it an advantage
in any future elections. Vietnam removed its troops from Cambodian
soil in 1989, intent on normalizing relations with the United States,
China, and ASEAN. Hun Sen’s government, known formally from
1989 onward as the State of Cambodia (SOC), was left behind, still
in control of the country. Yet the civil war continued, with the Khmer
Rouge continuing to make territorial advances at the end of the 1980s.
Finally, in 1990, the Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security
Council drafted a peace plan that called for the establishment of an
interim administration made up of the four factions to run the country
18 Solarz 1990 observes, “Cambodia became Vietnam’s Vietnam, an obstacle to
Vietnam’s economic development and a drain on Soviet-supplied resources.”
19 Doyle 1995: 21–22. 20 Solarz 1990.
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under UN supervision. By this time the context had changed suffi-
ciently to put in place the institutional arrangement that had earlier
been rejected. The parties to the conflict agreed to this framework,
although coming to a workable peace settlement took another year.
The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cam-
bodia Conflict was signed in Paris on October 23, 1991. In this peace
settlement, the four warring parties agreed to a ceasefire and disarma-
ment, as well as refugee repatriation, the re-establishment and mainte-
nance of law and order, the promotion of human rights, and principles
for a new constitution committed to democratic pluralism. This nego-
tiated peace was to be pursued in the context of UN administrative
supervision and a UN-managed election. The Paris Peace Agreement
was thus the genesis of the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC). The agreement also mandated that the Supreme
National Council (SNC), a quadripartite body created in the run-up
to the final peace deal and endowed with Cambodian sovereignty and
authority, would become the ongoing institutional manifestation of the
temporary consensus achieved at the Paris Accords. The SNC would
hence serve as UNTAC’s parallel domestic counterpart during the tran-
sitional governance phase.
Yet the Cambodian factions did not sign the Paris Peace Agreement
(sometimes also referred to as the Paris Peace Accords) out of their own
desire for peace, but did so unwillingly due to the pressure applied to
them by their external backers as a result of the changing geopoliti-
cal context.21 Each of the parties continued to view itself the rightful
regime to govern the country. The SOC believed itself to be in control
of 90 percent of the country, while the Khmer Rouge believed it could
continue to mount a guerrilla war and later did so. These “compet-
ing conceptions of how the accords would affect them . . . undermined
the consent critical to peacekeeping.”22 It appears that each group
agreed to the institutional terms of the settlement while planning to
manipulate and even subvert them as best they could moving for-
ward. In practice, this meant that if the parties saw the UN as acting
against their interests they would react with entrenched resistance –
an approach that often led to impasse. The SOC and the Khmer Rouge
actively resisted UNTAC whenever it sought to implement its man-
date in a manner that they perceived to be against their interests.
21 Doyle 1995: 68. 22 Ratner 1995: 158.
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Perhaps most significantly, the Khmer Rouge refused to comply with
the second phase of the ceasefire in June 1992, which included the
cantonment, disarmament, and partial demobilization of each of the
factional armies. The SOC used this refusal to disarm as its own justi-
fication for resisting UNTAC control and soon the two factions were
once again engaged in violent conflict – with each other, against oppo-
sition party officials, and even targeting civilians and UNTAC staff –
as the election neared.
The resolution of the Cambodian conflict through the Paris Peace
Agreement, albeit facilitated by external powers, serves as an example
of how a “mutually hurting stalemate” can, as described by William
Zartman, result in a convergence of preferences in the form of a peace
treaty.23 Yet although the Paris accords represented an inflection point
in the Cambodian civil conflict, the peace settlement did not mark a
final resolution to the civil war. In many ways, and increasingly so over
time, subsequent Cambodian reconstruction occurred within the con-
text of deep political animosity that sometimes simmered over into vio-
lence and instability and compromised the goals of the peacebuilding
process from being achieved.
The East Timorese Resistance to Occupation
East Timor’s national independence referendum in August 1999
marked the final victory of the country’s 24-year-long fight for freedom.
The challenges of constructing political order in East Timor emanate
from both its long Portuguese colonial history and the shorter, yet trau-
matic Indonesian occupation.
The eastern half of the island of Timor was colonized by Portu-
gal in the sixteenth century. Initially, the Portuguese ruled indirectly,
through the traditional Timorese kings, or liurai. Binding together the
country in the face of its ethnolinguistic diversity was a ritualized web
of exchange relationships and political alliances, travel for trade and
social purposes, and the spread of Tetum as the common indigenous
language.24 In the nineteenth century, Portuguese rule shifted toward
greater territorial administration and became increasingly intrusive.
The country’s administrative division into villages, or sucos, disrupted
the traditional political order associated with the liurai, who rebelled
23 Zartman 1985. 24 Hughes 2009a; and Taylor 1999.
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against their colonizers in 1912. The crushing of this rebellion ush-
ered in a stable period until 1975. With the liurai acquiescing to the
Portuguese administration, the traditional political order was over-
laid by a new colonial order that empowered the mestiço Timorese –
those with blood ties to Portugal. This colonial order created, in
turn, a deep, lasting – and, later, politically salient – social cleav-
age between the urban, mostly Portuguese-speaking and Portuguese-
oriented elite and the “Maubere”mountain people, who retained their
traditional names, languages, and beliefs. The lives of the latter, who
constituted the vast majority of the Timorese population, were rela-
tively untouched by the centuries of Portuguese colonization, which
had done little to build national institutions or infrastructure.25 Over-
all, the colony’s political and institutional development, particularly
at the subnational level, had been severely attenuated. The legacies of
this under-institutionalization, weak local capacity, and marginaliza-
tion of the majority of Timorese from their country’s governance have
remained major challenges in the construction of political order in the
country.
In 1974, Portugal’s “Carnation Revolution” brought to power a
new government in Lisbon that set in motion the dissolution of the
Portuguese empire by accepting the right to self-determination of its
colonies, even if they chose independence. Nascent political actors in
East Timor quickly mobilized into three major competing political par-
ties that espoused different positions with regard to the issue of self-
determination. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) was the most
conservative group, comprising the more prosperous Timorese and
administration officials, many of whom were mixed race Portuguese–
Timorese. UDT leaned toward the status quo, favoring a long transi-
tional period of 15–20 years of autonomy with continued association
with Portugal prior to full independence.26 The Timorese Social Demo-
cratic Association (ASDT) advocated a quicker move to independence.
In a sign of how close the parties’ original political stances were, how-
ever,ASDT still beganwith a desire for an 8 to 10-year transition period
of progressive autonomy, giving the country time to build its politi-
cal and economic infrastructure.When its political program adopted a
25 Dunn 2003; and Hughes 2009a.
26 By convention, the acronyms for the parties’ names come from the Portuguese
formulation.
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more radical tack a few months later, with more strident demands for
Timorese inclusion in the administration and a clear demand for inde-
pendence, ASDT became the Revolutionary Front for an Independent
East Timor (FRETILIN).27 The Timorese Popular Democratic Asso-
ciation (Apodeti), finally, was a smaller party that desired the inte-
gration of East Timor as an autonomous province within Indonesia.
As James Dunn observes: “The polarization of the three main par-
ties around three distinct goals tended to exaggerate the differences
between their young leaders in that early stage of the territory’s polit-
ical development.”28 Yet the lines had been drawn early and would
harden quickly.
In January 1975, UDT and FRETILIN, the two pro-independence
parties, formed a short-lived coalition.29 Initially, there was little differ-
ence between the viewpoints and aspirations of the leaders of these two
groups. Yet FRETILIN became increasingly radical and it hardened its
attitude toward other parties; while UDT moved to expel FRETILIN
radicals in order to build a more conservative coalition. In a relatively
short period of time, the alliance collapsed and there was subsequently
a rapid escalation of the hostility between the parties. By the second
half of 1975, East Timor was engulfed in a brief yet violent civil war
that resulted in both urban fighting and intense battles among rural
villages with competing party allegiances. In August of that year, the
Portuguese governor and administration left Dili, withdrawing to the
nearby island of Atauro and washing their hands of the East Timorese
political situation.
FRETILIN had emphasized building its political organization across
the country, outside the main towns where UDT operated, and its polit-
ical strategy paid off. It was able to quite quickly gain control of much
of the territory and forced UDT out of Dili within weeks. Its relatively
loose political organization proved surprisingly adept at the formidable
tasks of setting up a provisional administration and restoring law and
order and basic services. As a result, by mid-October 1975 Dili was
27 FRETILIN was modeled in large part on FRELIMO, the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique. Dunn 2003 points out that rather than being truly
radical, FRETILIN remained an essentially populist and nationalist party that
was influenced by the socialist aims of similar movements in other developing
countries rather than by the objective of becoming a communist state.
28 Dunn 2003: 62. Also Babo Soares 2003.
29 UDT was originally the largest party in East Timor, but soon lost ground to
FRETILIN. Some observers, for example, Nicol 1978, have argued that
FRETILIN used the coalition with UDT tactically to win over supporters.
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functioning normally. This was despite the fact that waves of Timorese
refugees to both Australia and Indonesia, along with the withdrawal of
the Portuguese administration, led to the loss of approximately 80 per-
cent of East Timor’s officials – leaving a particular lack of administra-
tive personnel at the district level.30 FRETILIN leaders recognized their
administration could only be temporary and called on the Portuguese
to return and implement a phased decolonization process. FRETILIN’s
successful, albeit brief, interregnum – whereby it established its pop-
ulist and nationalist roots down at the village level and entire sucos
shifted allegiance to it based on village chief preferences – forged a
strong emotional bond between the party and the Timorese people,
and had a lasting impact on the national psyche. By sending its young
cadres out into rural areas to work on agriculture and literacy pro-
grams, FRETILIN “captured peoples’ hearts.”31 Dunn estimates that
FRETILIN’s support had, by September 1975, risen to 80 percent of the
population from its initial 60 percent in elections a couple of months
earlier.32
Meanwhile, Indonesia had embarked upon a program of subver-
sive activities intended to destabilize the country and undermine
FRETILIN’s claim to authority over all of East Timor, with the goal
of providing the pretext for Indonesian occupation through ties with
the integrationist party, Apodeti. In October 1975 Indonesia began a
series of covert attacks, codenamed Operasi Komodo, to perpetuate
the notion that the civil war between FRETILIN and UDT was ongo-
ing. The FRETILIN leadership’s main preoccupation became blocking
Indonesia’s designs over the country, preventing instead a deeper atten-
tion to reconstructing the administration and economy. FRETILIN
appealed in vain to Indonesian President Suharto and the rest of the
world for a negotiated solution. Its sense of isolation grew, along with
the recognition that its energies would have to shift from building a
new administration to defending the country. The leadership began to
make preparations for a guerrilla struggle against Indonesia, sending
food, supplies, and arms into the mountains.
The denouement came when Portugal agreed in November 1975
to talk with Indonesia over the status of the territory with no UN
30 Dunn 2003. The discussion of this era of Timorese politics draws heavily on
this excellent source.
31 Author interviews with East Timorese and donor officials; Dili, East Timor,
April 2005. See also Babo Soares 2003.
32 Dunn 2003: 221.
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or Timorese representation. Although FRETILIN leaders realized they
were in no position to govern an independent country, they unilaterally
declared the independence of East Timor on November 28, 1975. Two
days later, a coalition of pro-Indonesia parties, comprising mainly UDT
and Apodeti, also proclaimed the independence of the territory from
Portugal and its integration with Indonesia. East Timor had never been
part of the Dutch East Indies, and Indonesia had never laid any formal
territorial claim to the country. Yet, on December 7, 1975, Indonesia
launched a naval, land, and air invasion of East Timor, under the pre-
text of preventing instability in its neighbor and eradicating what it
identified, to promote Western acceptance of its invasion, as the radi-
cal leftist independence parties there.
The initial Indonesian assault was brutal. The many incidents of vio-
lence included the summary mass executions of hundreds of Timorese
and Chinese residents and the abduction, torture, and rape of women
and girls affiliated with FRETILIN. The remnants of the Portuguese
colonial administration on the island of Atauro bore witness to the
first day’s assault and set sail the next. Dili was ransacked first; but
similar mass executions took place in the towns of Liquiça, Maubara,
and Aileu as the Indonesians extended their grip on the country. In
response to the savage onset of the invasion, many Timorese fled their
homes: tens of thousands fled to West Timor and, in the eastern half
of the country, tens of thousands moved their households behind rebel
lines in the mountains. In the area around the FRETILIN stronghold
of Baucau, for example, the local population fell from about 85,000
people prior to the invasion to about 32,000 three months later and
less than 10,000 a year after that.33 All told, two-thirds of the remain-
ing Timorese population were behind rebel lines during the course of
the occupation.34 Those who chose to surrender once famine condi-
tions took hold in the mountains were placed in resettlement camps in
which the conditions were equally dire.
Indonesia gradually increased its territorial control at FRETILIN’s
expense, continued its alliance with the pro-Indonesian parties, and
perpetuated the fiction that the Timorese people supported the Indone-
sian presence. A “Regional Popular Assembly” was established to
33 Figures reported to the governor of Baucau province, as cited in Dunn 2003:
253.
34 Dunn 2003: 258.
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determine the status of East Timor and this carefully Indonesian-
assembled group petitioned Indonesia on May 31, 1976, to formally
integrate East Timor. Six weeks later, Indonesia’s President Suharto
promulgated a law integrating East Timor into his country as its
twenty-seventh province. From that point onward, Indonesia main-
tained that the East Timorese people had exercised their right to self-
determination and had chosen integration with Indonesia, albeit under
autonomous status.35 Portugal, however, never ceded its governing
authority over East Timor and the United Nations declined to recog-
nize the authority of the Regional Popular Assembly concerning the
status of East Timor. The country was all but under an Indonesian
military occupation, a fact made possible by American and Australian
silence on the issue.36
FRETILIN continued to resist East Timor’s integration into Indone-
sia, retreating into the interior mountains of the island and fashion-
ing itself into a guerrilla movement with an armed wing, FALINTIL
(Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor). Few Tim-
orese were in favor of integration to begin with, and Dunn notes that
“the rapacious and brutal behavior of the occupying forces greatly
stiffened the resolve of the resistance and provided FRETILIN with
a degree of popular support greater than it might otherwise have
enjoyed.”37 From mid-1976 onward, the pattern of Timorese resis-
tance shifted firmly from political action toward guerrilla warfare, and
FRETILIN devoted considerable attention to ensuring adequate food
supplies for the swollen mountain population.38
The Indonesians made some attempts to revive East Timor’s econ-
omy, but they concentrated their attention on those sectors from which
they could derive the most rents. The majority of Timorese who refused
35 Martin 2001: 16–17.
36 Australia was the only country to formally recognize the annexation of the
territory, granting de jure recognition to Indonesia’s claimed sovereignty in
talks on settling the seabed border between Australia and East Timor. The
United States never publicly objected to the annexation and continued its
military support to Indonesia, which had portrayed FRETILIN as a communist
movement.
37 Dunn 2003: 253.
38 In a fictionalized account of the island of Danu and the forging of its guerrilla
resistance, Mo 2002 mirrors very closely the lived experiences of FALINTIL
fighters, their relationship with Timorese civilians, and the early years of East
Timor’s occupation and struggle for independence.
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to accept the Indonesian citizenship necessary for a government job
found very few formal employment opportunities available to them.
Although some Timorese officials and politicians accepted positions
of authority under the new administration, the undisputed leaders
of the territory were Indonesian officers from the armed forces, Ten-
tara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), and the Kopassus special forces units.
East Timor became an important financial resource and symbol to
the Indonesian military elite – a fact that later fed into the TNI-
inspired post-referendum violence in 1999. The political and economic
marginalization of East Timorese under Indonesian occupation was
more extreme than under Portuguese colonization.
FRETILIN’s political and military structure coalesced during the ini-
tial years of the occupation.Nicolau Lobato became the main leader of
the resistance, overseeing both political and military strategy, as other
leaders who favored a negotiated settlement with Indonesia were grad-
ually purged from the organization. Lobato was killed in 1978 and
the death of this folk hero was to prove a major symbolic setback for
the Timorese.39 Caroline Hughes notes that this period marked a shift
in resistance tactics: with major Indonesian assaults being stepped up
against the ground it held, FRETILIN yielded its territorial control and
FALINTIL units moved to secret mountain hideouts from where they
initiated a new strategy of insurgent attacks on the Indonesian army.40
Communication was essentially cut off between the guerrilla leaders
in East Timor, their FRETILIN colleagues in exile in Mozambique,
and the Timorese diaspora in Australia and Indonesia. The group of
FRETILIN leaders in Mozambique, who came to be known as the
“Maputo clique,” held on to the original radical beliefs and motiva-
tions established during the movement’s formation. The guerrilla lead-
ers on the island,meanwhile, adapted their beliefs and objectives to the
exigencies of continuing the insurgency and caring for the population
still behind their lines.
José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão – later East Timor’s first presi-
dent, and then two-term prime minister for seven and a half years –
assumed command of FALINTIL and the domestic mantle of
FRETILIN leadership over the course of a two-year period from 1979
39 Lobato was found and killed by an Indonesian special forces unit led by
Prabowo Subianto, later President Suharto’s son-in-law and the narrowly
defeated presidential candidate in 2014.
40 Hughes 2009a: 35.
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to 1981. He took deliberate steps to move the group’s political tactics
away from radicalism and toward non-ideological policies intended to
appeal to all Timorese. He formed the National Council of Maubere
Resistance (CNRM) – later renamed the National Council for Timo-
rese Resistance (CNRT) – which was intended to serve as an umbrella
national resistance movement with a broader political appeal than
FRETILIN. In so doing, he and other key guerrilla leaders embraced
the ideology of Mauberism, identifying the Timorese nation with the
Maubere mountain peasants and their traditions and idealizing the
relationship between the FALINTIL guerrillas and the mountain peo-
ple in a bond that remains politically symbolic to the present day.41
In this manner the urban elite core of FRETILIN and the rural poor
Maubere majority were joined together in a newly fashioned contem-
porary Timorese nationalist identity – a central plank upon which
today’s political order rests.
From 1982 onward, Gusmão was able to establish communica-
tions with FRETILIN leaders abroad, particularly those who had been
orchestrating the party’s political organization and objectives from
exile in Mozambique and, in the 1990s, the Timorese diaspora in Aus-
tralia. FALINTIL’s strength in terms of the number of fighters and its
overall military capability declined from themid-1980s onward but the
CNRM built and maintained an extensive network of popular support
in the towns and villages of East Timor. Its survival and success as a
resistance front depended on this grassroots network. Gusmão under-
took what became a legendary walk from village to village across the
interior of the country, asking the people whether FALINTIL should
continue the resistance and generating an enormous groundswell of
support.42 During this time he was given the title “brother of the
roots,” orMaun Bo’t, by the people and, together with the FALINTIL
troops he led, attained a heroic status among the Timorese population,
serving as a symbol of their resilience as a nation and a reminder that
Indonesian occupation was neither complete nor final. Gusmão was
arrested in 1992, but continued to command FALINTIL from prison in
41 Niner 2009. Hughes 2009a: 36–37, notes that FALINTIL leaders began
participating in indigenous animist rituals and taking on Timorese names, with
Gusmão adopting the name Kay Rala and Francisco Guterres, another key
FALINTIL commander, taking on the name Lú-Olo.
42 Author interview with a donor official; Dili, East Timor, April 2005. Also
Niner 2009.
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Jakarta. Over the course of the next decade, he became a key interlocu-
tor between UN and other negotiators and the FRETILIN leadership,
cementing his role as the key veto player in Timorese politics.
Over the course of the latter half of the occupation, other elements of
the Timorese political landscape began to take shape as various groups
of political actors gained in importance. The Catholic Church assumed
a growing political role in East Timor, with later Nobel Peace laureate
Bishop Carlos Belo arriving on the scene in 1983. In addition, political
activism blossomed among the Timorese youth. They were products of
an Indonesian education system that was intended to make them more
sympathetic to integration. Yet, speaking the Bahasa language in which
they were educated, they formed a new front against integration with
Indonesia, having equally experienced – or at least witnessed among
their families – the brutality, oppression, and human rights abuses
that resulted from the occupation. As the guerrilla movement neared
exhaustion in the late 1980s, the student movement became crucial in
the final years of the fight for freedom, as well as in the political set-
tlement that was to come with independence. From 1995 onward, the
UN convened an annual meeting of East Timorese leadership, known
as the All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue, which drew dele-
gates from both inside and outside the country. This event was signif-
icant in bringing together the disparate strands of the Timorese lead-
ership, although the representatives from inside East Timor tended to
lean toward Indonesia and Gusmão himself was not present.43
The conflict lasted through 1999, with particularly heavy loss of life
in its vicious early years. Estimates of the number of Timorese who died
as a result of the independence struggle, including from the famine and
disease that came with massive population displacement, range as high
as 200,000; the Indonesian authorities themselves acknowledge up to
tens of thousands of deaths.44 The human rights violations committed
by the Indonesian army against FRETILIN cadres and their support-
ers were extreme. Indonesian missions behind guerrilla lines deliber-
ately destroyed food crops to create conditions of destitution. In the
43 Gunn 1997.
44 Martin 2001: 17. Kiernan 2003, in a scrutiny of population and death
estimates, calculates that the early 1975–1980 death toll alone in East Timor
was approximately 170,000, or 24 to 26 percent of East Timor’s 1975
population. He notes that, at one-fifth of the population, this is proportionately
comparable to the Cambodian genocide toll of the same time period.
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infamous “fence of legs” campaign, the Indonesian army forced thou-
sands of East Timorese villagers to march in human chains ahead of
Indonesian troops to comb the interior of the island for FRETILIN
and FALINTIL members. Dunn reports that in a second “fence of
legs” campaign in 1985, thousands of Timorese chose to go to the
hills to avoid conscription, resulting in famine conditions, torture, and
executions.45 The brutality of the Indonesian troops against the guer-
rillas intensified the local population’s hostility toward the occupiers,
even turning Timorese youths into faithful FALINTIL recruits.
These human rights violations received little attention abroad until
November 1991, when Indonesian armed forces opened fire on a pro-
independence assembly of mourners at Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili,
killing at least 50 and possibly up to 200 people. The television images
and journalist reports from the scene had a dramatic impact on the
international community, raising East Timor’s profile in the global con-
sciousness. In 1992, Xanana Gusmão’s own profile, and that of the
movement he led,was elevatedwhen hewas captured and subsequently
continued his activism from prison. Then, in 1996, the Nobel Peace
Prize was awarded to Dili’s Bishop Belo, who, among other things,
had played a crucial role in exposing the Santa Cruz massacre, and José
Ramos-Horta, FRETILIN’s exiled foreignminister and leading interna-
tional spokesman, “for their work towards a just and peaceful solution
to the conflict in East Timor.”46
The United Nations had remained essentially a bystander during
the course of the occupation.47 The Security Council adopted reso-
lutions in December 1975 and April 1976 that affirmed the right of
the East Timorese to self-determination and called on Indonesia to
withdraw. Through 1981, the General Assembly passed annual res-
olutions expressing concern over the suffering of the East Timorese
population and reaffirming their right to self-determination.Direct dis-
cussions between Portugal and Indonesia were initiated under the aus-
pices of the Secretary-General in 1983, yet they failed to achieve any
progress. Indonesia maintained that the Timorese had decided on their
fate in 1976; Portugal, however, insisted on a legitimate act of self-
determination in East Timor, thereby keeping the issue alive. Tripartite
45 Dunn 2003: 296.
46 The Norwegian Nobel Committee, press release on the Nobel Peace Prize
1996, as quoted in Martin 2001: 17.
47 Martin 2001: 17–18.
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talks were revitalized and the UN role became more proactive when
Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a Personal Representative for
East Timor in February 1997.
The East Timor Independence Referendum
The Indonesian occupation of East Timor was finally brought to an
end by internal changes in Indonesia, beginning with the fall of Suharto
in May 1998. The following month President B. J. Habibie, Suharto’s
successor, floated an offer of autonomy to East Timor, which was
still under integrated status. The Indonesian military was staunchly
opposed to any concessions that could lead East Timor down the road
to independence. Special forces officers based there began setting up an
extensive paramilitary organization made up of pro-integration Timo-
rese, intended to frustrate a possible referendum. The Indonesian mil-
itary paid, trained, and armed militia members and organized their
operations against pro-independence groups.Militia violence – includ-
ing seizures of independence activists, torture, killings, and the destruc-
tion of homes – began in October 1998 and escalated in early 1999.
By that point, FALINTIL troops had moved into cantonment in the
mountaintop town of Aileu and followed the still imprisonedGusmão’s
order not to engage either Indonesian or paramilitary units, so as not
to allow any further civil war pretext for continued Indonesian occu-
pation. The decision was followed with agonized restraint at the time
as FALINTIL troops watched their countrymen being murdered; it has
since been credited as a crucial strategic move that facilitated a faster
and more inclusive national healing process.48
Gusmão and other Timorese leaders remained firm on their demand
for an eventual referendum on independence but were amenable in
early 1999 to an extended period of transitional autonomy, in which
Indonesia would play an active role, before a vote.49 Yet Indonesian
officials in Jakarta objected to the transitional autonomy approach,
believing that a majority of Timorese would choose to remain in
48 Author interviews with donor officials and civil society leaders; Dili, East
Timor, April 2005. Also Cristalis 2002.
49 Gusmão spoke a number of times in early 1999 about creating an environment
in which the Indonesian military would not feel defeated and of the need to
create the basis for friendly relations between East Timor and its large
neighbor. Martin 2001: 23.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
The East Timor Independence Referendum 91
Indonesia and advancing the sentiment that they would rather with-
draw entirely if the Timorese chose independence. Indonesia, Portu-
gal, and the UN finally reached agreement, on May 5, 1999, to hold
a referendum on whether the people of East Timor accepted Indone-
sia’s integration-with-autonomy proposal. Although the independence
option was not specifically on the ballot, it was clearly the alternative
in the Yes–No vote; Habibie declared that if the Timorese voted against
autonomy, he would call on the Indonesian parliament to grant them
independence.
The UN moved quickly to organize the plebiscite, with the Secu-
rity Council establishing the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET) on June 11, 1999, to manage the voting process. The UN
had a little over two months to organize a free and fair vote – including
the registration of eligible voters, the organization of the vote itself, and
the establishment of a secure environment. This latter security concern
was paramount – yet Indonesia refused to accept international peace-
keepers, insisting that it alone must remain responsible for ensuring
security during and after what it called the “popular consultation.”
Pro-integration militias directed by the Indonesian military ratcheted
up their violent campaign, focusing on districts adjacent to the border
with West Timor and forcing thousands of East Timorese to flee their
homes and cross the border.
On August 30, 1999, in the midst of that intimidation, East Timorese
voted in a national referendum – known as the Popular Consultation in
East Timor – overwhelmingly against a special autonomy relationship
with Indonesia and hence in favor of independence.50 The country had
finally been allowed the act of self-determination it had been promised
in 1974 by a withdrawing Portuguese colonial administration. Just
hours after the results of the referendum were announced, pro-special
autonomy militias – still organized, armed, and assisted by the retreat-
ing Indonesian military forces – conducted a pre-planned, systematic
“scorched earth” campaign intended to leave the small country both
depopulated and in ruins.51 Some three-quarters of buildings in the
country were gutted by fire and demolished in the retreat. An estimated
50 The vote was 21.5 percent in favor of and 78.5 percent against the proposed
special autonomy relationship, with 98 percent of 451,792 registered voters
(out of a population of about 800,000) participating.
51 UN Security Council Document No. S/1999/976, Annex, Para. 1, 14 September
1999. See also Martin 2001: 24–26 and Dunn 2003, especially pp. 348–359.
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80 percent of the nation’s 800,000 people fled their homes to escape
the violence, with about a quarter of a million displaced persons flee-
ing and being forcibly deported into neighboring West Timor, where
it is estimated that around half of them remain today. Estimates of
how many were killed are unreliable, varying from hundreds into the
thousands; some mass graves remain unexamined, reports abound of
bodies being dumped at sea, and many who fled toWest Timor are sub-
sequently unaccounted for. Gusmão’s orders to FALINTIL to remain
disengaged were tested to the limit as the fleeing East Timorese flocked
to the FALINTIL cantonments with accounts of violence, yet they
remained firm and were obeyed. The head of UNAMET, Ian Martin,
later observed that the UN’s planning around the aftermath of the ref-
erendum had been “on the basis of a best-case scenario that the UN
hoped could be realized with a high degree of international attention
and pressure but that was never realistic.”52
Following two weeks of concerted international pressure, on
September 12, 1999, Indonesia finally and reluctantly agreed to the
presence of UN troops to help restore security. A multinational blue
helmet force (INTERFET), headed by Australia, arrived in Dili on
September 20, 1999, in one of the swiftest responses in the history of
UN peacekeeping. Within two weeks the Indonesian troops had with-
drawn totally and on October 20, 1999, the Indonesian parliament
annulled its 1976 annexation of East Timor, bringing the occupation
to a formal end.53 Just five days later, on October 25, the UN Secu-
rity Council authorized a mandate for the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET),54 which became the gov-
erning authority of the territory for a transitional period that would
culminate in national elections and the writing of a constitution. As
UNAMET and then UNTAET were constituted, responsibility for East
Timor within the United Nations shifted from the Department of Polit-
ical Affairs, which had handled the ongoing dialogue since the 1980s,
to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Critics later pointed
to this switch in assessing the UN’s role and actions in East Timor,
arguing that the basic peacekeeping-oriented structure of the mission
hindered it from achieving its mandate, which required the mission to
52 Martin 2001: 126.
53 Gusmão came home to East Timor and to a hero’s welcome on October 22,
1999.
54 UNTAET was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1272 on
October 25, 1999.
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govern the country as well as put in place the foundations for political,
institutional, and economic development.55
East Timor was thought by many at the UN and in wider interna-
tional intervention circles to be a tabula rasa upon which to prove the
effectiveness of internationally assisted peacebuilding and reconstruc-
tion initiatives. In many respects, the country appeared the perfect envi-
ronment for success: violence was effectively over after the Indonesian
withdrawal and there was remarkable political accord and goodwill
within the country, with no real dissent over appropriate leadership.
Yet UNTAET has subsequently been heavily criticized for the manner
in which the political timetable and process was implemented.56 The
peacebuilding challenge in East Timor was viewed as very different
from that in either Cambodia or Afghanistan. Unlike in most other
UN peacekeeping missions, the main political challenge in this case was
not to mediate between factions that had been at war. Anthony Gold-
stone captures the thinking at the time with the observation that the
political adjudication process had already occurred with the national
referendum in August 1999; so that “Instead, the political task was the
relatively straightforward one of working through a political timetable
that had the uncontested goal of independence as the final end point.”57
A set of interrelated challenges arose over the course of this pro-
cess, however, that proved problematic for subsequent state capacity-
building and democratic consolidation: UNTAET’s slow incorporation
of East Timorese participation into both the administrative and polit-
ical arenas; the clear dominance of one party as political participation
was increased; and the overall timing and sequencing of the political
process in relation to the statebuilding dimension of transitional gov-
ernance. Furthermore, it has become apparent with the advantage of
hindsight that the international community misinterpreted the domes-
tic political situation, in particular overestimating the degree of elite
political accord and the extent to which the returned FRETILIN lead-
ership spoke for their fellow political leaders.
The Afghan Civil War
By the time the Afghan Northern Alliance and the US military drove
the Taliban out of Kabul in November 2001, Afghanistan had suffered
55 Chesterman 2002; and Suhrke 2001.
56 Chopra 2002; Goldstone 2004; and Suhrke 2001. 57 Goldstone 2004: 85.
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over two decades of war. Often labeled the last proxy battleground
of the Cold War, the country saw its anti-imperialist war against the
Soviet Union morph into a civil war among mujahideen (or freedom
fighter) factions,many supported by external patrons, that combined in
rapidly shifting alliances. The conflict continued into 2001 even as the
Taliban, one of those factions, had consolidated power over most of the
country. Afghanistan in 2001 was considered the quintessential failed
state, an institutional vacuum in which societal anarchy persisted and
in which state-sponsored terrorism could flourish. The country was
characterized by severely fragmented social and political structures and
a nonexistent central state infrastructure. It was trapped in a regional
conflict complex – centered around the drug, gem, and transit trades –
with entrenched subnational and transnational social linkages that
perpetuated the country’s internal fragmentation and chaotic conflict
patterns.58
Afghanistan has for centuries been victim to conflict emanating from
both within and without – its territory being fought over in fierce tribal
power battles as well as serving as a buffer between empires and con-
tested ground for their expansionist ambitions. Modern Afghanistan
was founded in the mid-eighteenth century when Ahmad Shah Dur-
rani united the Pashtun tribes and established a political order strong
enough to be the basis for territorial expansion. Yet this stability,
and Afghanistan’s subsequent independence, proved fragile in the face
of the century-long battle between Britain and Russia for conquest
of Central Asia and Afghanistan, dubbed the “Great Game.” The
nation was finally consolidated in the late nineteenth century, when
Abdul Rahman Khan, also of the Durrani chiefly clan, reigned over a
period in which external interests over the country were balanced, the
Afghan tribes were consolidated, and the country’s bureaucracy was
reorganized into what can be regarded as the modern Afghan state.
He achieved this consolidation at a great cost in terms of violence,
albeit couched in a nationalist narrative, advancing a process of what
Louis Dupree called “internal imperialism” to crush different claims
to authority across the country and reward followers with government
posts and the spoils attached to them.59
Establishing central government over the diverse, tribal, and
independent-minded Afghan people has remained an ongoing
58 Rubin 2000. 59 Barfield 2010; Dupree 1973; and Gregorian 1969.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
The Afghan Civil War 95
challenge for successive rulers. One particular defining cleavage in
Afghan politics has been the tension between a reformist, moderniz-
ing urban elite and a more conservative, traditional rural majority. The
Pashtun monarchy was long at the fault line of this tension, claiming
its legitimacy from its tribal chiefly roots but also embarking upon cau-
tious modernization programs. It was finally abolished in 1973 when
the last king,Zahir Shah,who had reigned for four decades,was ousted
by his cousin and former prime minister Mohammed Daoud Khan.
Daoud established rule as president of the Republic of Afghanistan
and with his coup the pendulum of power in the republic swung in
favor of Kabul-centric elite politics to the extent that the regime was
faulted for not incorporating leaders from outside the immediate circle
surrounding Daoud. Barnett Rubin labels this era of Afghan politics a
“rentier regime,” in the sense that these Kabul elites were resourced
by and beholden to external patrons.60 As a result, they were moti-
vated more by external forces than by internal ones and the capac-
ity of the Afghan state to govern the country withered away under
the control of these elites. Daoud, in turn, was killed by the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) when it seized power in April
1978. The PDPA, the principal communist organization in the coun-
try, was aligned with and aided by the Soviet Union and represented
the first group of Afghan intelligentsia to come to power in the coun-
try. The radical reforms that they introduced in the countryside under-
mined traditional authority and social structures.61 At the same time,
the Afghan state rapidly developed a unilateral independence on the
Soviets, while aid from other sources began to flow to the various
Afghan resistance groups.
In December 1979, Moscow, dissatisfied with its indirect lever-
age over the destabilizing government in Kabul, sent troops into
Afghanistan to install a more pliable government that would allow
it to assert more direct control. In response, a rural resistance move-
ment comprising various Afghan militias, or mujahideen factions, and
backed by foreign support, united in order to drive out the invaders.
After ten costly years of a war of attrition it found itself unable to win,
the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan between May
1988 and February 1989. Without the unifying jihadi and national-
ist impulse of driving out the invaders, the mujahideen alliance soon
60 Rubin 2002: 81–105. 61 Giustozzi 2009.
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fractured back into its separate political and military structures with
their own objectives and strategies, competing for power in a coun-
try where the national institutional infrastructure had been shattered.
Local divisions re-emerged and the preferences of international sup-
porters diverged, preventing themujahideen groups from consolidating
into a plausible political alternative to the Soviet-installed Najibullah
puppet regime in Kabul. Local militia commanders began to make the
necessary practical deals with their opponents and foreign funders to
assert their own autonomy and power. They were once again able to
levy tribute payments on road transport across their territories and,
often forming Potemkin shuras or village councils, received increas-
ing amounts of foreign aid directly rather than through their umbrella
parties.62 While some attempted to forge independent political strate-
gies, most emerged as local strongmen, reabsorbed into traditional
social and political structures but increasingly emphasizing Islamism
and establishing ties with religious parties. Various sources of foreign
aid empowered warlords and strengthened their patronage networks,
in turn further undermining traditional patterns of life and disrupting
tribal social codes in the countryside.63 The overall result was fertile
ground for warlordism to flourish.64
As conflict widened over territory and control of the Afghan state
itself, broader regional coalitions formed where social control was rel-
atively more cohesive, often along tribal or loosely ethnic lines. The
fierce political competition enabled elites to make ethnicity salient
as a political resource; this was a context in which conflict became
partially ethnicized, rather than being provoked by ethnic tensions.
Armed forces and ethnic groups were pulled back into the country’s
ethnoregional power networks, and a strong degree of regional auton-
omy developed in the face of national turmoil.65 Rubin observes that
the extent to which regional commanders could marshal autonomous
political and bureaucratic organizations marked the differences among
regions in the country.66 The Pashtun areas in the South and East
remained fragmented, although in the East the army of the Pashtun
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, supported by Pakistan, remained powerful. In
other parts of the country regional strongmen consolidated their power
62 Rubin 2002: 256–257. 63 Marten 2012. 64 Giustozzi 2009.
65 Thier and Chopra 2002: 895.
66 Rubin 2002: 258–264. This section draws heavily on this authoritative work.
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in patterns that have lasted into contemporary Afghan politics. In the
Northeast, Ahmad ShahMassoud, bolstered by the legitimacy of being
a national resistance hero, commanded a regional capital and substan-
tial contiguous territory along with the social network that formed
the basis of Tajik power. In the North, the Uzbek Rashid Dostum
still commanded over 40,000 militiamen, more than triple those led
by Massoud, with whom he was still loosely allied.67 Ismail Khan’s
Persian-dominated organization in the West, centered in the city of
Herat, allowed him over the next decade to function essentially as an
independent emir earning revenue from tolls and providing some pub-
lic services to the population.
In the meantime, the Pashtun-dominated central state, still nomi-
nally under the control of Najibullah, disintegrated as the external aid
that had held it together dried up. Rubin observes that the more clien-
telist and locally rooted tribal Pashtun culture was not well equipped to
compete in the struggle for power, with the exception of Hekmatyar’s
organization, to which other Pashtuns turned for leadership.68 A series
of battles for control of Kabul followed – for control of the central
state, indeed control over the very definition of Afghanistan – in which
alliances formed around the most extensive and mobile organizations,
again largely in ethnoregional patterns. These new political formations
superficially evoked traditional social structure but, in reality, the tra-
ditional “micro-societies” of Afghanistan, built on tribal, ethnic, and
linguistic lines, had fractured in the chaos that beset the country –
in some cases actively undermined by manipulative regional power-
holders – and reconstituted into new sources of power for opportunis-
tic warlords.69 Sarah Chayes evokes this disintegration of order in
her portrait of Afghanistan, vividly relaying the contemporary conse-
quences of the traditional concept of yaghestan, the chaotic age that
befalls Afghanistan in cycles of rebirth and destruction.70 The consol-
idation of national institutions proved ephemeral in the face of the
constant realignment of interests; instead, patrimonialism has served
as the basis of authority.
In April 1992, the Northern warlords Massoud and Dostum took
control of Kabul.An interim government composed ofmujahideen par-
ties was assembled, but the state was a hollow one. All of the major
67 Rubin 2002: 270. 68 Ibid.: 265. 69 Saikal 2005.
70 Chayes 2006.
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revenue sources were controlled by regional councils that retained
the income for their own purposes. Militias roamed the streets of the
capital fighting, looting, and raping. Paradoxically, the arrival of the
interim government did nothing but intensify the competition for
power. Long-standing rivalries among the parties quickly escalated
into a new civil war. In particular, Hekmatyar refused to recognize the
agreement since it made Massoud defense minister and effectively rec-
ognized that Kabul was controlled by the northern coalition. Rubin
argues that this mutual animosity quickly took on the character and
dimensions of a Pashtun versus non-Pashtun battle for the control of
Afghanistan, once again reinforcing the ethnicized character of post-
Soviet Afghan political conflict, which had “come to be dominated by
four ethnically identified armed forces:”71 Uzbeks under Dostum, the
Shia alliance Hizb-e-Wahdat including the Hazara and Ismail Khan,
Pashtuns under Hekmatyar, and Tajiks under Massoud. Yet neither
the strategic objectives of these factions nor the discourse around them
were explicitly ethnic. Alliances were not dictated by ethnicity – coop-
eration between the various commanders shifted quickly and unpre-
dictably in a cycle of continuous fighting for control of Kabul. Hek-
matyar, for example, soon successfully isolated Massoud by joining
with the latter’s erstwhile allies, Dostum and the Shia Hizb-e-Wahdat.
Interethnic atrocities mounted as the militias fought each other for con-
trol of the capital by neighborhood, shattering the city’s infrastructure.
Kabul still bears the scars of its physical devastation in clearly visible
layers that, in 2002, residents could wearily identify with the various
successive conflicts that had wreaked damage on their city.72
At the same time, regional centers of power continued to play a dom-
inant role in the social and political structure of the country. Particu-
larly in the non-Pashtun areas of the North, Northeast, and West, state
apparatuses and armed forces remained in place – albeit now under
the control of regional strongmen rather than that of Kabul and thus
forming the basis of power for the non-Pashtun groups who for the
most part focused on asserting their regional autonomy.73 The Haz-
aras enjoyed a great deal of independence in the central highlands terri-
tory known as Hazarajat. In the North, Rashid Dostummaintained his
71 Rubin 2002: 273. 72 Personal conversations; Kabul,Afghanistan, June 2002.
73 Rubin 2002: 274–278.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
The Afghan Civil War 99
powerful political niche; having amassed armed forces of 120,000 men
he guaranteed the security of the northern capital of Mazar-i Sharif,
where the UN and other diplomatic missions moved their headquar-
ters during this period. Ahmad Shah Massoud retained control over
most of the Northeast, including the famed Panjshir Valley. In theWest,
Ismail Khan turned Herat into a relatively peaceful center of economic
and cultural revival.
Into this fragmented sociopolitical structure stepped the Taliban in
late 1994.According to the founding legend, a group ofmadrasa teach-
ers and students led by Mullah Mohammed Omar formed the move-
ment in order to end the power of the warlords, regain security in the
face of the chronic anarchy, violence, and extortion that persisted under
the local militias, and establish a pure Islamic regime.74 The Taliban
thus stepped into a political and institutional space that had emerged
as a result of the preceding twenty years: the inter-elite battles, in which
modernizing intelligentsia destroyed itself; and the collapse of state
institutions after the Russian invasion and the onset of themujahideen
battles. In this space, madrasa networks became increasingly salient
among a new elite while other institutional ties were being destroyed.
The Taliban received significant levels of initial popular support in
Pashtun-dominated areas by presenting themselves as an Islamic solu-
tion to state failure, and by establishing authority and strict order
through sharia law. In so doing, the Taliban echoed the rationale of
earlier Islamist parties in Afghanistan. This same rationale has, in turn,
over the past decade enabled the Taliban to reassert some legitimacy in
the southern parts of Afghanistan where the international community
has failed to restore order and security.
Rubin points out that had the Taliban stopped at bringing order to
the Pashtun areas of southern Afghanistan, “they might have joined
about five other ethnoregional coalitions that existed at that time in
negotiating a decentralized form of Afghan statehood.”75 But they
transformed their movement into a political and administrative orga-
nization and were backed by large amounts of military and tactical aid
from Pakistan, which saw the Taliban as a new ally in place of its for-
mer Pashtun surrogate, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had failed to hold
onto power. From their stronghold in Kandahar province, the Taliban
74 Rubin 2002: xii. 75 Ibid.: xiii.
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rapidly conquered territory and political power, capturing Kabul in
September 1996. The mujahideen groups, having failed to establish a
stable government in the face of their infighting, abandoned the capital
almost without a fight. By August 1998, the Taliban controlled about
90 percent of the country’s territory, thereby achieving a broader reach
of authority across the country than any previous administration had
been able to establish.
Within a month, however, those groups that had lost to the Tal-
iban met in northern Afghanistan to form what became known as
the Northern Alliance. This group continued to hold Afghanistan’s
UN seat. It was initially dominated by the Tajiks aligned with Ahmed
Shah Massoud – who served as its de facto military and political
leader – but also included Uzbek and Hazara groups, and even some
Pashtuns. Yet with political power embedded in local strongmen and
their various armed groups rather than unified a state apparatus, it
had no effective organizational counterpart to the Taliban’s admin-
istrative structure and could not mobilize foreign fighters as could
the Taliban.76 Afghanistan remained divided between the Taliban-
controlled south and capital city and the Northern Alliance-controlled
northern part of the country, into which the Taliban continued to make
advances. The Taliban’s rhetoric, objectives, and alliances became
increasingly pan-Islamic rather than nationalist, particularly in the face
of growing ostracization by the international community. Al-Qaeda,
the global jihadist terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden,
became increasingly integrated into the Taliban organization through
the personal relationship of the two leaders and the military alliance
between the two groups.
These patterns persisted until October 7, 2001, when the United
States began its bombing campaign in Afghanistan to root out Al-
Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in response to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001. In strategic partnership with the Northern
Alliance on the ground, the United States helped to quickly rout the Tal-
iban, liberating Mazar-i-Sharif on November 9 and Kabul on Novem-
ber 13. The Taliban abandoned even their stronghold in Kandahar on
December 6, one day after the selection of Hamid Karzai, a Durrani
tribal chief and former mujahideen leader, as chairman of the Afghan
Interim Administration under the Bonn Agreement.
76 Ibid.: xix.
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The Afghanistan Bonn Agreement
The speed of Operation Enduring Freedom, the US military campaign
in Afghanistan, forced a diplomatic scramble to bring together the
country’s non-Taliban leadership. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
named Lakhdar Brahimi as his special representative to shepherd the
process and negotiations. Events on the groundmoved quickly, precipi-
tating political responses. The day after the Northern Alliance marched
into Kabul, the UN Security Council passed a resolution affirming
the UN’s central role in supporting Afghanistan’s political transition
efforts and calling for a new government that would be “broad-based,
multi-ethnic and fully representative of all the Afghan people.”77 The
intense combined diplomacy of the United Nations and the United
States got the main Afghan political parties to agree to convene in Bonn
to choose an interim government and map out the political transition
process.78 Representatives from four key groups were present: the var-
ious factions of the Northern Alliance; supporters of the former king,
Zahir Shah; Pashtun mujahideen, tribal, and religious leaders based in
Pakistan; and a mixture of Shia factions with ties to Iran. As the Bonn
Agreement acknowledged in its preamble, the grouping was not fully
representative. Brahimi is reported to have stressed repeatedly in Bonn
that few would remember that the meeting had been unrepresentative
if those there successfully fashioned a process resulting in legitimate
and representative government79 – an assertion that appears mistaken
in retrospect. Afghan civil society groups held a tandem forum near
Bonn, in an attempt to have alternative voices heard in the political
process. Most obviously, the Taliban was not included – nor was their
loose ally, the Hezb-i-Islami faction led by the Pashtun Islamist Gul-
buddin Hekmatyar. The lack of representation of such spoiler groups
meant later that the “Bonn process was ill designed to cope with their
resurgence through political means.”80
The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 – officially, the Agree-
ment on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions – was not a
ceasefire agreement between belligerents. Rather, it represents a dif-
ferent type of peace settlement, providing the framework for further
negotiations about how peace would be achieved in Afghanistan. It
77 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1378, November 14, 2001.
78 Thier 2004. 79 Rubin 2004: 7. 80 Ponzio 2011: 183.
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left for future resolution through the transitional governance process
many major and contentious decisions, including, for example, ques-
tions of political power-sharing – both at the central level and between
the center and the provinces – and the very nature of the Afghan state
and its constitution. Nonetheless, the agreement established a series
of milestones to which parties would have to adhere when the time
came. The Afghan factions and the diaspora political leadership meet-
ing in Bonn agreed, under the supervision of the UN, to the creation
of an Interim Administration, endowed with Afghan sovereignty. This
Interim Administration would be the main counterpart of the UN and
other peacebuilding and reconstruction partners during the course of
the transitional governance period. In recognition of the not fully rep-
resentative agreement, the Interim Administration was to last only
six months before the selection of a Transitional Administration. The
Bonn Agreement also stipulated a two-year window for a new con-
stitution to be drafted. The chairman of the interim and transitional
administrations was endowed with the power to make law by decree
with his cabinet’s agreement.
The composition of the Interim Administration was agreed at the
conference: Hamid Karzai was named chairman, and the rest of its
members represented a carefully assembled mosaic of different ethnic
and tribal leaders. Rubin observes that the Bonn Agreement reflected
the distribution of political power at the time, which in turn was a
result of the US strategy to oust the Taliban.81 The composition of the
Interim Administration was widely viewed as lopsided, at best. It had
a high – critics would say too high – representation of Tajiks from
the Northern Alliance in control of the most powerful ministries. The
three key ministerial portfolios of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and the
Interior were allocated to the three Panjshiri leaders who had served
as Ahmed Shah Massoud’s lieutenants – Mohammed Fahim, Abdullah
Abdullah, and Yunus Qanooni, respectively.82 Triumphant and resur-
gent warlords such as Ismail Khan and Rashid Dostum, who had par-
ticipated in the fighting against the Taliban, regained control in their
regions through their appointment to governorships. As is the fate of
most losers in civil war, the Taliban stood no chance of being included
81 Rubin 2002: xxxii. See also Goodson 2003 and Chayes 2006 on how the US
military strategy produced longer-term political ramifications in Afghanistan.
82 Massoud himself had been assassinated by suicide attackers on September 9,
2001.
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in a power-sharing arrangement – but it remained a force with consid-
erable support and organizational strength in the Pashtun-dominated
southern parts of the country. In the Taliban home base of Kandahar
province, the governorship was given to another warlord, the Pakistan-
affiliated Gul Agha Shirzai. Independent militias continued to receive
funding and weapons from coalition forces that sustained the fight
against the Taliban instead of disbanding and becoming part of a new
civil society. Some factions reignited old internecine conflicts quickly
after the Bonn conference, vying for power and the control of terri-
tory and toll revenue.83 On the other hand, no widespread threat to
the security and stability of the country emerged immediately, nor any
major challenge or threat to the Bonn process itself.
Elite Settlements in Comparative Perspective
Although violent conflicts in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan
were all sparked in some way by decolonization and Cold War politics
and each lasted for just over two decades, this chapter has demon-
strated that the three violent struggles had distinct motivations and
features that are crucial to understanding the peacebuilding record that
followed (Table 3.1).
Notwithstanding these important differences, the international com-
munity sought to pursue sustainable peace in each country by man-
dating a UN peace operation to implement the peace settlement,
governing in partnership with domestic counterparts while pursuing
simultaneous statebuilding and democratization. Chapter 4 picks up
this story, examining how competing domestic and international inter-
ests and visions of political order played out over the implementation
of those interventions. It demonstrates that the peace agreements are
indeed best viewed as the momentary manifestation of an ongoing
power struggle among elites, one that continues after the ink is dry.
This dynamic is not restricted to the countries considered here. Ana-
lysts have noted, for example, that while outside actors viewed peace
deals in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sudan
as binding commitments among belligerent groups, the parties to con-
flict saw these settlements in more instrumental terms, such that they
83 The militias had an estimated 200,000 soldiers, while the newly constituted
Afghan National Army remained small and relatively weak.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
104 From Violent Conflict to Elite Settlement
Table 3.1 The Cambodian, East Timorese, and Afghan conflicts and
settlements in comparative perspective
Country Cases Antecedent Conflict Peace Settlement
Cambodia Twenty-one-year civil war
(1970–1991) between
three major, coherent




during the Cold War.
1991 Paris Peace
Agreement: the outcome
of a mutually hurting
stalemate between still
hostile groups, ushering
in an attempt at
power-sharing
governance.
East Timor Twenty-four-year resistance
struggle (1975–1999)
against Indonesian
occupation waged by a





final end to occupation,
with the umbrella
revolutionary front seeing


















continually adapted their actions to the evolving context in ways that
served their own conceptions of political order and adversely affected
subsequent peacebuilding efforts in these countries.84
The political bargains represented by brokered peace deals typically
obsolesce over time in post-conflict countries instead of representing a
stable elite political settlement. How quickly and to what extent that
obsolescence occurs depends in large part on the degree of credible
commitment among parties to the deal, an issue this chapter has char-
acterized. Also significant is which parties, if any, are marked as victors,
84 On Congo, see Lemarchand 2012; on Liberia, see Reno 2004; and, on Sudan,
see Srinivasan 2012.
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and the power realignment that starts to take place in response. The
Cambodian parties to the Paris Peace Agreement viewed their obliga-
tions as particularly limited because there was no credible sanction for
any one group if it failed to follow through on its commitment. The
ability of the different groups to enforce each other’s agreement was
especially asymmetrical in the Cambodian case: the weaker parties to
the bargain had little leverage to penalize the State of Cambodia,which
could rely on its grip on the government apparatus to act as it chose.
The power-sharing compromise embodied in the Supreme National
Council very quickly proved pyrrhic. In East Timor, by contrast, the
settlement that ended the war was an independence vote achieved by
domestic elites loosely united under the umbrella resistance front of the
National Council for Timorese Resistance. There, elite factions did not
have to conclude a brokered peace deal per se; instead they had to come
together to govern the country with the UN-mandated transitional
authority. At the outset, the Timorese elite factions were thus relatively
united against more empowered international peacebuilders and the
higher degree of international assistance acted as a check against any
of the Timorese factions reneging from the settlement. Yet, there, too,
as the peace operation unfolded, the distinct elite factional interests
evident during East Timor’s initial civil war at the time of Portuguese
decolonization began to assert themselves with lasting consequences.
The Afghan parties to the Bonn Agreement demonstrated a moderate
degree of commitment to it, facilitated in part by a series of political
deals or side-payments that ensured that different interests were served.
The relatively dispersed power among different Afghan elites, with no
one faction enjoying a high degree of asymmetrical power, also con-
tributed to a relatively stable early peace process. The formal Bonn
process, however, was increasingly compromised over the course of its
implementation as the informal sources of power and conflict in the
country began to reassert themselves.
In general, internationally brokered peace settlements appear better
at conferring international legitimacy upon domestic elites who have
a tenuous hold on domestic legitimacy than in achieving true compro-
mise among competing elites. This is also a finding not restricted to
the three countries considered here. Devon Curtis observes that the
Arusha peace process of 1998–2000 that established Burundi’s peace-
building trajectory, similarly “conferred legitimacy on individuals and
parties who otherwise had no popular support, leading to the charge
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that the Arusha process had international and regional, but not pop-
ular legitimacy.”85 Many of the most contentious issues in the Arusha
peace process were in fact left explicitly for the parties to the agree-
ment to negotiate during the transitional phase.86 Like in Cambodia,
the final power-sharing agreements in Burundi were the result of office
trading among elites focused on sharing the spoils of power, in many
cases the very individuals who had fostered conflict and who threat-
ened continued violence when their interests were not met.
These elite settlements mark the first critical juncture on the peace-
building pathway. The notion of path dependence rests on the insight
that political and institutional dynamics are often self-reinforcing: the
choices made at critical junctures – in this case the elite settlement as the
terms upon which a peace operation is predicated – have a long-lasting
effect on the political landscape. Pierson points to the “enduring conse-
quences that often stem from the emergence of particular institutional
arrangements.”87 In particular, power inequalities that are relatively
modest to begin with can be reinforced and amplified over time in a
feedback loop. Agreed upon institutional arrangements, in turn, can
be manipulated and subverted by elites in various ways. The following
two chapters illustrate how these processes play out over the remain-
ing phases of the peacebuilding pathway – the transitional governance
phase of an international intervention and its aftermath.
85 Curtis 2013: 85. 86 Campbell and Uvin 2015; and Curtis 2007.
87 Pierson 2004: 11.
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4 International Intervention
and Elite Incentives
Peacebuilding became a signature undertaking of the international
community in the post-Cold War era. As the number of United
Nations-led peace operations proliferated globally, so, too, did study
of these interventions, which developed along three major avenues of
analysis. First, there are numerous case study-based assessments of
specific peacebuilding attempts. These are extremely rich in empiri-
cal detail, many penned by peacebuilding scholar-practitioners reflect-
ing on their experiences in different countries.1 The best of these
accounts provide fascinating narratives of how domestic elites inter-
acted with peacebuilders during implementation of particular inter-
ventions; however, they do not typically attempt to reach any broader
generalizations about the patterns of peacebuilding. A second body of
work focuses more on the machinery and mechanisms of peacebuild-
ing approaches themselves, offering detailed interpretation of oper-
ational mandates that focus on how the specifics of intervention –
such as mission scope, size, multidimensionality, mechanisms of imple-
mentation, and so on – affect outcomes.2 These studies tend to be
geared toward identifying the technocratic challenges associated with
peacebuilding and thereby generating targeted and informed mea-
sures for improving practice. The third body of scholarly work on
peacebuilding has focused on more theoretically motivated analyses
of international interventions.Within this strand of writing, both case-
oriented and quantitative empirical studies have aimed to offer gener-
alized insights on the way in which specific components of interven-
tions – such as the degree and scope of the mandate, often termed the
“footprint” – and some consideration of the broader conditions under
which they are implemented affect the relative success of peacebuilding
1 Examples of such studies on the countries examined here include Doyle 1995
and Ratner 1995 on Cambodia; Martin 2001 and Smith 2003 on East Timor;
and Ponzio 2011 on Afghanistan.
2 For example, Caplan 2005; and Chesterman 2004.
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interventions. The standard analytical approach is thus evaluative and
variable-centered, based on a probabilistic logic – delving into what
mission parameters and contextual factors condition the likelihood of
success.3
Collectively, the scholarship treats peacebuilding interventions, in
effect, as exogenous processes that are applied in post-conflict coun-
tries and thus measures governance outcomes in these countries against
the yardstick of the modern political order that is sought through
peacebuilding. The UN’s transitional governance approach to trans-
formative peacebuilding structures the pursuit of rule-bound, effective,
and legitimate governance by guiding domestic political elites through
a series of choices about institutional architecture. This process, as
it is designed, results in new administrative structures and constitu-
tional arrangements that are tailored to local contexts and aspire to
the highest international standards of democratic governance. Accord-
ingly, peace operations are extolled as relative successes if they endwith
some degree of effective and legitimate governance being successfully
transplanted into their host countries via this method of institutional
engineering.
Yet, in one post-conflict country after another, initial euphoria at
the successful holding of elections and design of the formal institu-
tions for democratic governance has turned over time into relative
dismay at the poor governance outcomes that arise in the aftermath
of intervention. The transitional governance approach achieves some
important successes in establishing the formal institutional infrastruc-
ture of legitimate and effective governance. The part of the story that
has been missing is that the domestic political dynamics set in motion
by the peace operation itself hamper the meaningful longer-term con-
solidation of governance outcomes in specific patterns. This chapter,
like other work before it, focuses squarely on the peacebuilding inter-
ventions implemented by the United Nations in tandem with domestic
counterparts. It does so, however, through a historical institutionalist
lens that identifies the patterns in how domestic political elites inter-
act with peacebuilding interventions to iteratively reshape the transi-
tional governance process and actively engage in building neopatrimo-
nial instead of modern political order. The case-centered, conjunctural
3 Exemplars of this type of approach include Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Howard
2008; Paris 2004; and Zürcher et al. 2013.
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logic helps to better identify the causal mechanisms that contribute to
longer term governance outcomes.
Moreover, this chapter’s focus on the transitional governance expe-
riences of the three countries demonstrates the significance of temporal
sequence. The manner in which peacebuilding contributes to the build-
ing of political order is shown to be path-dependent. The phenomenon
of increasing returns is clearly on display, such that previously avail-
able options and strategies – for both domestic elites and international
actors – recede once certain choices are made. In turn, political actors
can be seen to be reorganizing their strategies around the path taken.
The fact that temporal location – when certain things occur or choices
are made, relative to others – matters is also made especially clear in
terms of the significance of the early selection of specific counterparts
for the transitional governance process.4 In short, this chapter high-
lights how decisions made for the sake of expedience and practicality
have long-term political consequences. Foregone alternatives that may
have been more desirable become increasingly difficult to reach as time
passes and countries move along the peacebuilding pathway.
Peacebuilding through transitional governance rests upon two dis-
tinct characteristics that contribute to unintended governance con-
sequences in post-conflict countries. Underpinning the transforma-
tive model, first, is the implicit assumption that statebuilding and
democracy-building are mutually reinforcing processes that can be
advanced fruitfully in post-conflict countries through external peace
operations. Second, the transitional element of the intervention, by
which the United Nations takes on some degree of executive state
function for a two-to-three-year period to ensure basic governance
needs are met, requires the identification of a domestic counterpart
with which the UN can govern in tandem. This chapter demonstrates,
through an examination of the interventions in Cambodia, East Timor,
and Afghanistan, how the interplay between these two hallmarks of
the transitional governance approach undermine the basic objective
of transformative peacebuilding, which is establishing the basis for
rule-bound, effective, and legitimate political order. The three cases
illustrate how the transitional governance experience itself empow-
ers specific domestic elites, conferring legitimate authority upon them
and offering them financial resources and sources of patronage. The
4 Thelen and Mahoney 2015: 20–24 discuss these features of temporal analysis.
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elections that mark the end point of international interventions, in turn,
empower these elites to occupy the legitimate political space even as
they offer a focal point for the consolidation of hierarchical patron–
client networks.
This dynamic becomes evident over the course of transitional gov-
ernance, as the series of facilitated decisions it embodies alter the post-
conflict political order in subtle, yet lasting ways. This chapter illus-
trates how the principles underpinning transformative peacebuilding
are more deeply flawed because they also fail to take into account how
domestic political elites will use the resources bestowed by the inter-
national community in their pursuit of forging neopatrimonial polit-
ical order. It focuses on the international peacebuilding interventions
in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan, splitting the analysis of
each case into two sections. First, the transitional governance period
is portrayed as, at heart, a process of institutional engineering, where
the interaction between domestic elites and international peacebuilders
takes place, in many respects, as a series of negotiations around these
institutions. Second, the first post-conflict election in each country is
discussed. Serving as the end point of intervention, these elections are
crucial, externally imposed moments of open political contestation –
and their results confer lasting political advantages to those elites who
claim victory in them.5
The historical institutionalist lens offers a fruitful perspective to help
make sense of what occurs over the course of these interventions.
James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen advance a theory of institutional
change whereby actors motivated to change outcomes use different
strategies to exploit the ambiguity in the interpretation of rules to
their advantage by redeploying the rules to suit their own purposes or
changing those rules outright.6 “Insurrectionaries” take the most obvi-
ous and visible route to change institutions, actively mobilizing against
them.But three other sets of strategies offer fine characterizations of the
myriad more subtle and yet equally effective ways in which elites can
and do operate within the neopatrimonial hybrid between patrimonial
and legal-rational forms of authority. “Subversive” actors conform in
the short run to the current system, while biding their time to achieve
5 Pierson 2015: 133 points to the value of anchoring analysis around such
moments of political contestation.
6 Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 22–29.
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their longer-term change goals. “Parasitic” actors exploit the current
set of institutions even as they depend on those institutions to achieve
gain. “Opportunistic” actors thrive in conditions of institutional ambi-
guity, successfully exploiting the numerous possibilities within the pre-
vailing system to advance their goals. This chapter illustrates how the
winning elites in the three cases considered here have used all of these
institutional change agent strategies in obtaining their preferred form
of political order.
Transitional Governance in Cambodia
The Cambodian transitional governance experience was the first of its
kind, with the UN being responsible for holding a national election
as well as governing the country in collaboration with counterparts.7
With an outlay of $2.3 billion over five years and 22,000 people
deployed to themission, it dwarfed spending on any previous UNpeace
operation.8 Two issues are evident when analyzing the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). First, the principle of
power-sharing among the four Cambodian factions that was embod-
ied in the Paris Peace Agreement and re-emphasized in UNTAC’s man-
date proved a red herring, since the various Cambodian factions were
not truly reconciled to the agreement and refused to cooperate with
UNTAC’s attempts to implement its principles. Second, as a result, one
particular faction – the State of Cambodia (SOC) governing regime, led
by Hun Sen – was allowed to maintain its grip on the state apparatus.
Thus entrenched, even defeat in the first election was not enough to dis-
lodge this regime’s hold on power. The UNTAC experience illustrates
vividly the basic tension between statebuilding and democratization
embodied in the transitional governance approach. The need to con-
tinue governing the country meant the UN had to rely on the SOC. The
SOC, in turn, was able to parlay its control over the state into a set of
political resources that enabled it to perform better than expected in
the election and its immediate aftermath.
7 The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployed in Namibia from
1989–1990 was responsible for some elements of election supervision and
implementation – but under UNTAG the UN did not assume any dimension of
host country sovereignty or share civil administrative responsibilities with the
Namibian government.
8 Zürcher et al. 2013: 60.
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The Paris Peace Agreement signed by the four Cambodian factions
in October 1991 established the two major features of the peace settle-
ment. First, the agreement was the genesis of UNTAC, the peacebuild-
ing operation mandated several months later to implement the peace
settlement.9 UNTAC’s wide-rangingmandate gave the UN a brand new
role and scope of action in a peacebuilding intervention. Second, the
Paris accords also mandated a particular role for the SupremeNational
Council (SNC). This quadripartite body was created in the run-up to
the final peace agreement to achieve binding consensus among the four
Cambodian parties. With the peace settlement concluded, the SNC
became the ongoing institutional manifestation of that temporary con-
sensus. It comprised a membership of 13 individuals representing each
of the four parties, with Prince Sihanouk named as the supposedly
neutral president of the group; the six SOC delegates were loyal to
Hun Sen’s clique within the regime.10 It was endowed with Cambo-
dian sovereignty and authority and it would govern the country as
UNTAC’s parallel domestic counterpart, acting as an advisory body in
the transitional governance period before elections were held. Doyle
notes that the Security Council’s endorsement of the SNC helped, in
turn, to legitimize its delegation of authority for administrative and
electoral affairs to UNTAC.11
UNTAC represented a new, transformative approach to peacebuild-
ing. It was the first UN peace operation to be mandated with the orga-
nization and supervision of an electoral process from start to finish. Its
roles on this front included promulgating electoral laws, organizing the
polling and monitoring, educating Cambodians about their new elec-
toral rights, and certifying the elections as free and fair. Along with its
other responsibilities – including the civil administration component,
discussed below; a military component monitoring the ceasefire and
demobilization of the factions’ armed wings; a civilian police compo-
nent; a refugee repatriation component; and a human rights compo-
nent – the electoral component made UNTAC larger than any previ-
ous peacekeeping operation and the most intrusive operation yet in the
internal affairs of a member state.12
9 UNTAC was established by UN Security Council Resolution 745 on February
28, 1992.
10 Strangio 2014: 47. 11 Doyle 1995.
12 Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 213–217.
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UNTAC also assumed an unprecedented degree of transitional
administrative authority in Cambodia, granted with the formal con-
sent of the four factions in the Paris Agreement in an attempt to ensure
a neutral political environment for the conduct of the first elections.
UNTAC’s central mandate was to help control the governance of Cam-
bodia in the transitional period. The large Civil Administration Com-
ponent of the operation handled this dimension of the peacebuilding
strategy bymonitoring and supervising existing bureaucratic structures
in five designated key areas of civil administration – defense, public
security, finance, information, and foreign affairs.13 This combination
of administrative and electoral organization functions makes Cambo-
dia the first post-conflict country in which the UN implemented a strat-
egy of peacebuilding through transitional governance.
As UNTAC worked to implement its mandate, it became clear that
the peacebuilding process was compromised by the competing con-
ceptions among the four Cambodian parties as to the nature of the
intervention. The true consent from each of those parties to the peace
settlement and the intervention was tenuous at best. Those inconsistent
commitments translated directly into problems for the institutional
mechanisms of transitional governance in Cambodia. Each of the par-
ties to peace, for example, viewed the relationship between UNTAC
and the SNC in a different way.14 A major point of contention was
the role envisioned for Hun Sen’s State of Cambodia (SOC) and how
it would interact with UNTAC and the SNC in which it represented
just one of the four distinct sets of Cambodian preferences. The SOC
itself, relying on its control over the apparatus of both central and
subnational government, essentially continued to emphasize its own
domestic governing authority. By treaty, however, it was the SNC that
officially embodied Cambodian sovereignty. For the Khmer Rouge, the
KPNLF, and FUNCINPEC, the SNC – with their participation – was
the only legitimate source of political power in Cambodia. In their con-
ception, UNTAC would act on behalf of the SNC, thereby rendering
Hun Sen’s SOC relatively powerless. Prince Sihanouk was given special
authority in the SNC under the peace accords in the hope that he could
bolster UNTAC’s stance and help push the factions toward compliance.
13 Doyle 1995: 37–40 describes the manner in which UNTAC exerted this control
function over these five key administrative areas, as well as monitoring and
supervision of national and provincial administration.
14 Ratner 1995: 159–160.
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Yet he turned out to be mostly detrimental to the process, hesitating
to break deadlocks but insisting that the UN defer to him. UNTAC, in
line with the Permanent Five’s initial design of the arrangement, envi-
sioned the SNC as an important reconciliation body that would help it
make and implement important decisions. When it was proven wrong
on that front, UNTAC had to assume more of the responsibility itself.
These competing visions of how transitional governance would
unfold meant that the concerned parties never reached agreement on
how to implement the peacebuilding process as envisioned by the Paris
Peace Agreement. Frederick Brown andDavid Timberman observe that
UNTAC had essentially been “charged with the task of enforcing an
extraordinarily complex, time-phased scenario predicated on an envi-
ronment of conciliation and compromise among the Khmer parties
that did not, in fact, exist.”15 Many have argued, in addition, that the
Permanent Five did not give UNTAC the necessary teeth to achieve
its objectives, especially in the realm of day-to-day administration.
UNTAC was supposed to ensure a neutral political environment by
supervising the five designated key areas of civil administration and
thereby preventing any of the factions – particularly the SOC – from
using government resources to influence the elections. The mandate
was to “control”Cambodia and the four factions through supervision,
rather than actually govern the country. Yet the framers of the Paris
Peace Agreement and the UNTAC mandate did not specify how this
should be done, leaving it to the discretion of UNTAC’s command, led
by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Yasushi
Akashi. Many in the United Nations felt that pushing the incumbent
SOC regime too far on the issue of political neutrality would derail
the peace process. In turn, the SOC refused to relinquish its control of
the state – in practice, it “simply administered around UNTAC.”16 An
UNTAC progress report found, for example, that high-ranking SOC
officials gave the ministries and provincial administrations instructions
in how not to cooperate with UNTAC.17 This failure to pry away the
SOC’s grip on the state apparatus later fed into today’s relatively poor
governance outcomes in Cambodia. It became apparent closer to the
elections that UNTAC’s control over the other three factions was neg-
ligible as well.
15 Brown and Timberman 1998: 17. 16 Doyle 1995: 35.
17 Cited in Doyle 1995: 44.
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The Cambodian Elections of 1993
In the face of these challenges with regard to transitional governance,
UNTAC essentially abandoned its attempts to implement the compre-
hensive Paris peace settlement. Midway through the peace operation
toward the end of 1992, supported by a series of UN Security Council
resolutions, it reformulated its mandate to focus on the election and
create a legitimate Cambodian government. UNTAC did indeed suc-
cessfully hold Cambodia’s first democratic national election in May
1993. Analysts assessing UNTAC close to the end of its tenure in 1993
concluded that of all its various dimensions its Electoral Component
was probably the most successful.18 Today it is clearer that while this
may have been true in a technical sense – in terms of registering voters
and holding a relatively conflict-free, high-turnout election, even in the
face of a high degree of voter intimidation and harassment by the SOC
and the Khmer Rouge – UNTAC failed, to a large degree, in reaching
the objective of creating legitimate government as a central component
of modern political order.
Subsequent problems of statebuilding and democratic consolidation
can be traced back to conditions at the time of the first election and the
fact that the effort dedicated to the electoral process masked the deep
antagonisms in the Cambodian polity. In early 1993, the Khmer Rouge
withdrew entirely from the electoral and peacebuilding process, leaving
the capital city, refusing to disarm and demobilize as agreed, and pre-
venting UNTAC from entering the zones of the country it controlled.19
It mounted a campaign of obstruction against the other Cambodian
parties and UNTAC and succeeded in generating an atmosphere of
instability and violence around the electoral process. Perversely, the
SOC’s political fortunes rose as there was an increase in Khmer Rouge-
perpetrated electoral violence – in a context of political instability,
it was seen as the only party with the armed forces capable of con-
taining the Khmer Rouge and maintaining political order. Indeed, it
18 Doyle 1995; and Shawcross 1994.
19 Early in the UN’s tenure in May 1992, an UNTAC convoy carrying both its
chief administrator and military commander traveling near the Khmer Rouge
stronghold of Pailin came across a roadblock marked by a thin bamboo pole
laid across the road – and simply turned around upon being refused access by
the callow Khmer Rouge guards (Strangio 2014: 53–54). This widely reported
incident was seen to represent the UN’s capitulation to the Khmer Rouge and
its broader unwillingness to press on the more difficult parts of its mandate.
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used this reason to delay demobilizing its own armed forces. At the
same time, however, popular resentment about the SOC’s corrupt prac-
tices was brewing.20 The Khmer Rouge’s suspicion of the SOC – their
expressed reason for reneging on the Paris Peace Agreement – was not
entirely unreasonable, considering the trajectory taken by the CPP and
Hun Sen to their later levels of political hegemony. At the time, how-
ever, UNTAC, and particularly Akashi, viewed the Khmer Rouge as
the one true threat to the peace process, and proceeded to systemati-
cally marginalize the radical party from the elections to prevent it from
derailing the entire peace.21
A successful election became Akashi’s single-minded priority in the
desire to be able to claim the UNTAC mandate had been achieved,
especially in light of the relative failure to demobilize and adequately
supervise the Cambodian factions.22 Despite warnings from UNTAC
officials and others, Akashi did not perceive the SOC as a potential
spoiler and he was therefore caught entirely off-guard when it explic-
itly began undermining the peace process immediately after the first
elections.23 The SOC’s participation in the elections was crucial to
UNTAC’s success as Akashi came to define it. Yet that meant that he
failed to use the leverage granted to UNTAC in the Paris Peace Agree-
ment to reduce the SOC’s grip on the administrative organs of state,
in retrospect the most intractable future impediment to legitimate gov-
ernance in the country. The head of UNTAC’s administration, Gerald
Porcell, lamented as he resigned in protest in February 1993 that as
long as UNTAC lacked “the political will to apply the peace accords,
its control cannot but be ineffective.”24
In effect, Akashi’s strategy for dealing with the Khmer Rouge
strengthened the hand of the SOC, making it by far the strongest
faction on the Cambodian political scene, militarily, politically,
20 Strangio 2014: 51–52.
21 Stedman 1997 argues that Akashi used the elections effectively in managing
the Khmer Rouge’s spoiler behavior. This observation was corroborated in
author interviews with donor officials and civil society leaders; Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, May 2005.
22 UNTAC also facilitated the opening of civic space for what began as a vibrant
and promising NGO sector in Cambodia and oversaw the repatriation of some
360,000 Cambodians from the Thai border camps and their reintegration into
Cambodian society. Strangio 2014: 60.
23 Greenhill and Major 2007; Peou 2002; and Stedman 1997.
24 Quoted in Stedman 1997: 33–34.
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and administratively. As the UNTAC Commander John Sanderson
observed, “it was not the Khmer Rouge, but rather the SOC,which had
the capacity to undermine the election or to overturn the verdict of the
people.”25 Even before the 1993 election, the SOC had manipulated
the terms of the peace agreement to its own advantage: the separation
of the State of Cambodia (SOC) and its political party, the Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP), was in name only and hardly enforceable. Dur-
ing this period, the SOC made continuous efforts to interfere with the
campaigning of other parties and practiced widespread voter intimi-
dation and buyoffs, as well as violence in the run-up to the elections
that included the killing of political activists from the other parties.26
UNTAC found it impossible to separate the government’s resources, in
the hands of the SOC, from the funds used by the Cambodian Peo-
ple’s Party (CPP), the political party that the governing regime formed
in 1991 just before the peace accords were signed. UNTAC investiga-
tions found that the SOC state apparatus was often used to campaign
on behalf of the CPP, for example.27 To those who controlled the State
of Cambodia and the apparatus of government, defeat in the country’s
first election was unimaginable and they did everything they could to
ensure victory.
The elections, held from May 23–28, 1993, although hardly held in
a “neutral political environment,” were successful in terms of the 90
percent voter turnout and were declared free and fair by UNTAC and
other international observers.28 The results were surprising and unam-
biguous: FUNCINPEC won 45 percent of the vote and the CPP came
second with 38 percent, translating into 58 and 51 seats, respectively,
in the 120-member constituent assembly that was to draft and adopt a
new constitution before evolving into the national legislature. FUNC-
INPEC’s leader, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was Sihanouk’s son and
the heir to his political power base, and many observers attributed
FUNCINPEC’s victory to a nostalgic, nationalist vote for the monar-
chy. What followed immediately after the elections was extraordinary
and yet a characteristic marker of the future direction of the Cam-
bodian political scene – as well as a fascinating illustration of what
25 Quoted in Greenhill and Major 2007: 34. 26 Heder and Ledgerwood 1996.
27 Doyle 1995: 41.
28 UNTAC’s radio broadcasts and civic education program are credited with
convincing voters to ignore intimidation and come to the polls, with the
secrecy of their ballots guaranteed. Shawcross 1994; and Strangio 2014.
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happens when there is an imbalance between the formal writ of
power and its informal, or actual, exercise. The CPP simply refused to
acknowledge FUNCINPEC’s electoral victory and actively subverted it.
It took an elaborate series of steps to instead entrench itself in power,
including accusing the UN of massive fraud, roping in Sihanouk, and
blackmailing the opposition with a short-lived secession and increased
violence. As Ranariddh realized that the CPP would never hand over
full administrative power FUNCINPECwas forced to compromise and
agreed, in a deal brokered by Sihanouk, to share power equally with
the CPP in the new interim government. UNTAC was left a bystander
in these domestic political maneuverings and, subsequently, the CPP’s
heightened powermade UNTAC helpless to block its bid for hegemony.
Akashi supported the power-sharing solution, believing at the time that
failure to compromise would undermine the triumph of having held the
election. Indeed, he believed the “practical wisdom” combined FUNC-
INPEC’s political power and victory with the administrative power and
experience of the CPP.29
While many, Cambodians and international officials alike, were dis-
mayed that the final arrangement did not truly reflect FUNCINPEC’s
electoral victory, there was little question that “the compromise aptly
reflected the administrative, military, and even financial muscle of the
CPP.”30 Sihanouk and Ranariddh even agreed to the CPP’s stipulation
that all votes in the new Assembly be passed by a two-thirds major-
ity, which ensured that the CPP’s consent would be needed in any
legislation and hence enabled it to continue to dominate the business
of government. In practice, moreover, the CPP retained control of all
the provinces, even those it had lost in the election. In many central
ministries, the personnel and policies remained unchanged from those
of the SOC. Although the process of army consolidation began, the
CPP retained control over the police. The SOC/CPP regime thus main-
tained its stranglehold on the state apparatus and would soon lever-
age this essential arena of strength into an outright power grab. The
Khmer Rouge, by this point completely marginalized in the political
process, refused to accept the new government. Cambodia’s new com-
bined army attacked Khmer Rouge positions all over the country and
29 Yasushi Akashi, 1993, “The Challenge of Peace-keeping in Cambodia: Lessons
to be Learned.” Paper presented at the School of International and Public
Affairs, Columbia University, New York, November 29, 1993.
30 Shawcross 1994: 29.
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the government appealed to Khmer Rouge soldiers to lay down their
arms,whichmany did.Although a rumpKhmer Rouge insurgency con-
tinued for a few more years, its campaign for power was effectively
ended with the 1993 electoral process.
The Paris Peace Agreement and the transitional process they initiated
themselves shaped the consolidated governance outcomes to ensue in
Cambodia. From the beginning, the international community seemed
resigned to allowing the State of Cambodia regime to retain its con-
trol of the country. In the words of Brown and Timberman: “The
implicit quid pro quo of the Paris Accords in 1991 . . . had been that
the incumbent CPP would have a fair shot at political dominance if
it would go along with the rules of the game of UNTAC and abide
by the results of the election.”31 Even when the CPP did not win, how-
ever, its lukewarm and inconsistent participation in the UN transitional
governance process was enough to convey upon it the stamp of legit-
imacy it had lacked during its previous period of rule. In turn, as the
next chapter demonstrates, the convoluted power-sharing arrangement
that resulted from the election created two separate governments led by
Ranariddh and Hun Sen who had been named first and second prime
ministers.
The CPP’s push to restore its political dominance and subvert the
unstable power-sharing arrangement became the defining characteris-
tic of political jockeying in Cambodia over the next decade. Several
Cambodia experts warned in the mid-1990s of the CPP’s and Hun
Sen’s “creeping coup,”32 which later proved prescient. Brown and Tim-
berman blame the international community for “retreat[ing] from its
commitment to establishing a genuinely legitimate government when
it acquiesced to Hun Sen’s demands for power sharing” after the 1993
election.33 They go on to observe that by effectively allowing Hun Sen,
with Sihanouk’s complicity, to override the electoral results, the inter-
national community became party to an act that broadcasted the mes-
sage that power politics would continue to prevail in Cambodia over
the rule of law and the electoral process. Yet, at the time, the CPP–
FUNCINPEC coalition seemed to many to be the only option in an
environment in which FUNCINPEC had electoral legitimacy but the
CPP had institutional and military strength.
31 Brown and Timberman 1998: 19. 32 For example, Doyle 1996.
33 Brown and Timberman 1998: 27.
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A Constituent Assembly committee drafted a constitution in almost
total secrecy,with barely any consultation with either UNTAC or Cam-
bodian civil society groups, resulting in a document that was written
and favored by the CPP, albeit one that was liberal in spirit.34 The new
permanent government would include two co-prime ministers and the
two-thirds voting majority was also retained, both at the demand of
the CPP and against FUNCINPEC’s wishes. Ministerial posts and gov-
ernorships were divided among the two parties. In reality, however,
the CPP’s continued control over the bureaucracy, army, and police
was a locus of political power that simply outweighed FUNCINPEC’s
electoral victory. In terms of democratic consolidation and how power
was distributed across the political system, the elite bargaining over
the interim and then permanent arrangements was far more important
than the elections themselves. The CPP, having used its leverage to get
a power-sharing compromise and stack the institutional architecture
in its favor, waited for its chance to seize power outright.
Transitional Governance in East Timor
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET) represents the high-water mark of the transitional gover-
nance approach and its transformative peacebuilding aspirations. The
international community spent $2 billion on the first five years of the
Timorese peace operation and deployedmore than 10,000military and
civilian personnel there; extraordinary figures for a country of fewer
than one million people.35 UNTAET was designated as the repository
of East Timorese sovereignty until the country was made fully inde-
pendent, in a mandate that represents the greatest degree of executive,
legislative, and judicial authority a UNmission has exercised in a post-
conflict nation to date.36 The Cambodian experience represented the
34 Author interviews with Cambodian opposition legislators, donor officials, and
civil society leaders; Phnom Penh, Cambodia, May 2005. Also, Marks 2010.
35 Zürcher et al. 2013: 60. According to Zürcher et al.’s estimates, per capita
spending on peacebuilding in East Timor was about ten times more than in
Cambodia and Afghanistan.
36 UNTAET, alone among UN peacebuilding missions, was even granted effective
treaty-making powers, which it exercised in signing an assistance agreement
with the International Development Association (World Bank) and in initiating
talks on dividing the Timor Gap seabed oil and gas reserves with Australia.
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dire difficulties associated with pursuing effective and legitimate gov-
ernance in a country where the parties were not truly reconciled. East
Timor represents the more subtle and yet equally real complexities of
attempting to transplant modern political order in a context of appar-
ent elite consensus and a relative alignment with the objectives of the
international community.
The Security Council mandate for UNTAET instructed the peace
operation to guide East Timor to a state ready for independence.37 Yet
it provided no roadmap – along the lines of the Paris Peace Agreement
for Cambodia, for example – for how to proceed or how to incor-
porate East Timorese participation during the process. UNTAET first
addressed the governance of East Timor by directly assuming the bulk
of administrative and executive functions, moving only in mid-2000
to begin the process of sharing and passing on authority to its Timo-
rese counterparts.38 UNTAET defenders have argued in retrospect that
the transitional governance exercise adopted gradually increasing lev-
els of East Timorese participation in decision-making processes over
time. Yet the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG),
Sergio Vieira deMello, himself acknowledged that increasing Timorese
participation in the governance of the country was a process of “false
starts and hard-won political accommodations.”39
UNTAET’s strategy was to emphasize regular consultations with
a small group of core leaders from the National Council for Timo-
rese Resistance (CNRT) – including, in particular, Xanana Gusmão,
Bishop Carlos Belo, José Ramos-Horta, Mari Alkatiri (the leader of
the FRETILIN cadre returned from exile in Mozambique), and Mario
Carrascalão (a leading Timorese businessman who had served as gov-
ernor of East Timor under the Indonesian authorities but was widely
seen to have worked on behalf of the Timorese population during his
governorship). These CNRT leaders were viewed by the UN as the
authentic representatives of the people of East Timor and Gusmão
was the undisputed first among equals. The head of the earlier UN
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), Ian Martin, wrote that the UN
believed that Gusmão’s direct participation was crucial: UN represen-
tatives saw that progress in the negotiations before the referendumwas
37 UNTAET was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1272 on
October 25, 1999.
38 Center on International Cooperation 2006. 39 Goldstone 2004: 86.
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made only when Gusmão was present and the UN itself took big steps
forward only after consulting him in his Jakarta prison cell.40 Vieira
de Mello later acknowledged that this elite consultation system, albeit
well intentioned, did not go far enough and that its Timorese part-
ners should have been brought on board earlier and should have been
consulted more thoroughly and substantively on matters of policy for-
mulation and implementation.41 In contrast, for example, the World
Bank was seen as rather more successful at including Timorese in both
needs assessment and policy formulation, most notably in the Joint
Assessment Mission that took place in October and November 1999
immediately after the referendum violence was ended in order to iden-
tify reconstruction and development priorities.42
The timing and sequencing of the transitional governance process
created some immediate challenges for future statebuilding and democ-
ratization prospects. Most observers agree that the slow pace of incor-
porating Timorese views and participation in government – a process
that came to be called “Timorization” – was the most problem-
atic aspect of the experiment, proving extremely troublesome for
UNTAET’s ability to govern and orchestrate a transition.43 Here I con-
tend, furthermore, that UNTAET’s handling of the problem – espe-
cially the manner in which it chose its main counterparts – allowed the
entrenchment of particular institutions and a certain pattern of politi-
cal behavior that subsequently had adverse effects on democratic con-
solidation and governability in East Timor. Sue Ingrammakes a similar
argument, going so far as to contend that, in its lack of attention to
forging a political settlement among Timorese elites, “UNTAET built
the wrong peace.”44 From this perspective, two things went wrong:
not enough Timorese participation in government; and, when Timo-
rization occurred, too much emphasis on just the CNRT and its elites,
which prejudiced the political process in favor of FRETILIN leaders.
Furthermore, a third dynamic emerged that is at the core of the tension
between state- and democracy-building: the East Timorese elites’ near
40 Martin 2001. 41 Cited in Caplan 2005: 118.
42 Author interviews with World Bank, East Timorese, and NGO officials; Dili,
East Timor, April 2005. Caplan 2005: 168–169 concurs.
43 Chesterman 2002; Chopra 2000; Goldstone 2004; and Suhrke 2001. This
sentiment was also confirmed in author interviews with UN and other donor
officials; Dili, East Timor, April 2005.
44 Ingram 2012: 4.
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obsession with participation in the political arena meant that both they
and UNTAET failed to emphasize the Timorization and renewal of the
eviscerated state and administrative infrastructure.
No formal structures were built into UNTAET for East Timorese
official or civil society participation – either in the electoral component
or on the administrative side of the mission itself. The paradox sur-
rounding participation was built into the very mandate of UNTAET.45
Resolution 1272 stressed the need for UNTAET to “consult and coop-
erate closely with the East Timorese people”;46 yet only after first vest-
ing full sovereign powers in UNTAET and the Transitional Adminis-
trator, who was “empowered to exercise all legislative and executive
authority; including the administration of justice.”47 This formal con-
tradiction could certainly have been resolved in practice, if Vieira de
Mello and UNTAET had moved to build channels of participation into
the mission – the mandate itself had given the Transitional Admin-
istrator the freedom to develop whatever necessary mechanisms for
political consultation and even to move toward a dual-structure gov-
ernment. But Caroline Hughes notes that UNTAET’s actions spoke for
themselves when it acted first to organize itself and only then “reluc-
tantly conceded the need to admit the Timorese elite to the circle of
power,” much later moving to incorporate political actors from the
grassroots.48
UNTAET was thus originally extremely reluctant to incorporate
East Timorese participation.49 On the one hand, many UN and other
expatriates working in East Timor came to the country believing the
political system was a tabula rasa, and managed their dealings with the
Timorese accordingly.This perception hardly did justice to the nuanced
and freighted contemporary Timorese political landscape.On the other
hand, there was a pervasive fear among UNTAET officials that by
working too closely with specific Timorese political actors, they would
prejudice the results of the all-important first election by privileging
a particular group over others. In part due to the guiding principles
45 Chesterman 2002: 64 makes a similar point in discussing the problems of
Timorese consultation.
46 UNSC Resolution 1272 (1999): para. 8.
47 Ibid.: paras. 1 and 6. 48 Hughes 2009a: 96.
49 Ingram 2012 and Suhrke 2001 note that the Security Council deliberately
made no express provision to include the Timorese in administrative or
executive decision-making.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
124 International Intervention and Elite Incentives
and institutional culture of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
ations, UNTAET emphasized impartiality with respect to local con-
tending factions over building local participation. On the ground, this
translated into a great deal of ambivalence on UNTAET’s part over its
relationship with the CNRT and how deeply to include its participa-
tion in governing the country – in some instances UNTAET treated the
CNRT as a political faction, in others as a vehicle for inclusive Timo-
rese political participation.50
The UN Department of Political Affairs, which had originally man-
aged the Timorese peace process, had planned to include more specific
provisions for Timorese participation by giving the Timorese political
authority while the UN assumed legal and administrative authority and
served in an advisory role.51 This system would have matched more
closely the relationship between UNTAC and the Supreme National
Council in Cambodia. The Department of Political Affairs even pro-
posed a fully dual-structure administration along with a specific
electoral timetable to emphasize the transitional nature of the admin-
istration. But the final Department of Peacekeeping Operations pro-
posal sent to the UN Security Council included neither the dual-state
structure nor the timetable; instead, only consultative principles with
unspecified mechanisms made it into the UNTAET mandate.
The mission was hence launched as a fully UN-staffed operation
with no formal counterpart. Yet UNTAET found, upon its arrival, a
natural group to act as its local counterpart. The CNRT had acted as
the umbrella pro-independence organization during the course of the
decades-long resistance, enjoyed considerable legitimacy from its sym-
bolic role at the head of a popular and successful national resistance
front, and had been the organizational driving force behind the pro-
independence victory in the referendum.Xanana Gusmão continued to
lead the CNRT, endowing it with his charisma and popular support –
although FRETILIN leaders within the organization increasingly chal-
lenged his claim to speak for a unified CNRT. It also benefited from
the extensive non-military network that was developed throughout the
towns and villages of East Timor during the course of the resistance.
The survival of CNRT and FRETILIN had depended on this network,
which now translated into a formidable organizational presence that
reached throughout the country. UNTAET could not hope to meet this
de facto control in the field, even though it had de jure authority at the
50 Suhrke 2001. 51 Ibid.: 9.
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center. After Indonesian provincial administrators left East Timor in
the wake of the referendum, the CNRT was the one organization with
nationwide political reach in an eviscerated institutional state structure
and acted in many areas as a de facto governmental authority over the
country.52
Furthermore, there was a natural political affinity between UNTAET
and a major wing of the CNRT, in that both favored a “national unity”
approach to politics and government that reflected their nervousness
about open political competition.53 CNRT elites, in particular, opposed
political party development, fearing a return to the brief but violent
civil war of 1975, which followed a period of nascent party develop-
ment in East Timor and provided a pretext for Indonesia’s invasion.
Karol Soltan, the Deputy Director of UNTAET’s Department of Polit-
ical, Constitutional, and Electoral Affairs, remarked that he came to
think of the fear of 1975 “as the greatest enemy of democracy in East
Timor.”54 The CNRT was predisposed toward a transitional arrange-
ment before full independence: in the mid-1990s it had proposed as
a political compromise a UN-supervised transition to independence
as long as 11–13 years. Even in the wake of the August 1999 refer-
endum, some CNRT leaders, including Gusmão himself, were still in
favor of a relatively long, five-year UN-assisted transition to indepen-
dence, and other East Timorese leaders were amenable to the final two-
to three-year solution as designed.55 Yet while the CNRT did become
UNTAET’s de facto interlocutor in a number of different ways, the
relationship was a complicated one and was never formalized. My
interpretation is that UNTAET in fact did rely heavily on the CNRT
for Timorese political participation. It proved such an attractive ini-
tial counterpart precisely because it was an umbrella Timorese orga-
nization that was explicitly not a political party; in other words, the
fear of unduly influencing political outcomes led UNTAET to rely on
the CNRT. In the longer run, however, this reliance on an umbrella
organization masked the lack of consensus about what the institu-
tional arrangements of the new country should look like.56 It also had
52 Author interviews with East Timorese, UN, and other donor officials; Dili and
Viqueque, East Timor, April 2005.
53 Goldstone 2004: 89. 54 Soltan 2002.
55 Author interviews with East Timorese and donor officials; Dili, East Timor,
April 2005.
56 Ingram 2012. She argues that the CNRT’s national unity message masked deep
and long-standing disagreements among the Timorese political elite.
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precisely the effect UNTAET feared, both by empowering FRETILIN
leaders within the CNRT and by compounding the resistance-era, eli-
tist nature of Timorese politics.
From the start, nevertheless, UNTAET attempted to avoid the politi-
cization of the administration. Collaboration came initially through
the newly created National Consultative Council, a small body with
an East Timorese majority and a handful of senior UNTAET staff.
In response to complaints about the delay in consulting the Timorese
about political options for transition to self-governance, this morphed
in July 2000 into the larger and entirely Timorese National Coun-
cil, which comprised members of the CNRT as well as the Catholic
Church and other civil society organizations. The National Council
was intended to operate as a national legislature but it was appointed
rather than elected, its members received little support in the way of
financial or human resources, and Vieira de Mello retained absolute
executive powers, including a veto.57 At the same time, a coalition
cabinet of transitional government was created, the East Timor Tran-
sitional Administration (ETTA). ETTA introduced Timorese proto-
ministerial counterparts for the core UNTAET executive staff and the
eight main cabinet posts were split – with four posts assigned to Tim-
orese elites (Internal Administration, Infrastructure, Economic Affairs,
and Social Affairs) and four to international staff (Police and Emer-
gency Services, Political Affairs, Justice, and Finance).58 Many believed
that Gusmão himself chose the four Timorese cabinet members – two
from FRETILIN, one from the more conservative Timorese Demo-
cratic Union (UDT), and one from the Catholic Church – reflecting
UNTAET’s reliance on CNRT in general and on Gusmão in partic-
ular, as well as the continued importance of Timorese political alle-
giances dating to 1975.59 Together, the coalition government and the
National Council were intended to provide “democratic institutions
before democracy that could be the setting of democratic learning-by-
doing at the national level.”60
Yet these compromises on Timorization were too little and too late.
By this time, Timorese elites were unsatisfied with even the National
57 Author interviews with donor officials; Dili, East Timor, April 2005.
58 The National Council and coalition cabinet were established by regulation on
July 14, 2000. Another Timorese leader, José Ramos-Horta, was sworn in as
Cabinet member for Foreign Affairs in October 2000.
59 Chesterman 2002: 66. 60 Soltan 2002.
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Council and ETTA co-governmental arrangements. The flawed rela-
tionship between UNTAET and ETTA was indicative of a fundamen-
tal transitional governance problem: the tension inherent in the UN’s
dual role as both government and transitional peace operation. ETTA,
which was to assume the responsibility to deliver essential public ser-
vices from UNTAET, was resource-starved in comparison. Interna-
tional cabinet members enjoyed a great deal of infrastructural support
and much higher salaries, for example, than their East Timorese col-
leagues. Richard Caplan notes that the result of such inequities was
“resentment and compromised effectiveness on the part of East Timo-
rese administrators, who were already executing their responsibilities
with serious handicaps.”61 The UN’s role as government compromised
the institutional and human capacity-building necessary to construct
an effective state infrastructure to take over at transition.
By 2001 Timorese elites had reached the consensus that the rela-
tionship with UNTAET was counterproductive and should be ended
as soon as possible. In December 2000, the Timorese Cabinet members
threatened to resign, using one of the few measures actually available
to them in the absence of genuine political power, as Simon Chester-
man observes, in “an attempt to challenge UNTAET’s legitimacy by
threatening its consultative mechanisms.”62 They expressed their frus-
tration in a letter to Vieira de Mello: “The East Timorese Cabinet
ministers are caricatures of ministers in a government of a banana
republic. They have no power, no duties, nor resources to function
adequately.”63 Xanana Gusmão expressed his and the CNRT’s dis-
appointments with UNTAET in his New Year address of December
31, 2000, echoing, in particular, the East Timorese leadership’s irri-
tation over their lack of political participation. In turn, the Timorese
leadership’s frustration over their exclusion from decision-making in
the political arena meant that they fixated on political participation,
rather than broadening their desire to govern into also calling for Tim-
orization of the state apparatus and emphasizing capacity-building in
that arena. Indeed, when offered the choice by UNTAET in mid-2000
between a “technocratic” solution that would accelerate Timorization
of the state administration and a “political” solution to more quickly
transfer political power to the Timorese, the country’s leaders opted for
61 Caplan 2005: 103. 62 Chesterman 2002: 68.
63 Cited in Beauvais 2001: 1130, fn. 111.
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the latter.64 This had the effect, parallel to the dynamic in Cambodia,
of failing to bolster the state as a countervailing center of governing
authority.
While a process of Timorization was at least attempted at the
national political level, the development of parallel community
empowerment through political institutions at the district level fal-
tered. International staff continued to dominate governance at the sub-
national level: even as late as March 2001, only 2 of the country’s 13
District Administrators were Timorese. Caplan argues that one rea-
son UNTAET was so hesitant to devolve authority to the subnational
units was because of the lesson from the Kosovo experience, brought
to East Timor by Vieira de Mello and some of his deputies, that it
was essential to establish unchallenged authority over the entire ter-
ritory. Yet the circumstances were different in East Timor, where the
local leadership was at first entirely supportive of the UN’s aims and
the mission itself, and could have been entrusted with more authority
much sooner. The other issue was that District Administrators were
constrained in performing their jobs because of excessive centraliza-
tion in Dili. UNTAET’s head of the Office of District Administration,
Jarat Chopra, resigned very publicly in March 2000 and a month later
all 13 District Administrators signed a memo to protest the centraliz-
ing tendencies of UNTAET.65 The one exception to the lack of Timo-
rization within UNTAET was the Division of Health Services, which
had a dual international–Timorese authority structure from the begin-
ning and was very successful in delivering essential public services as
a result. This cooperation was made possible by the existence of an
organized cadre of Timorese health professionals along with senior
UN health officials who understood and believed in the importance
of working together with their domestic counterparts.66
Other international organizations operating in East Timor had a
very different position on Timorization and state capacity-building.
Suhrke argues that the United Nations Development Program
approach was based on the alternative assumptions that there were
East Timorese with valuable administrative skills to be mobilized from
64 Goldstone 2012.
65 Caplan 2005: 119; also Beauvais 2001; and Chopra 2000.
66 Author interviews with former UNTAET health officials, donor officials, and
current East Timorese officials; Dili, East Timor, April 2005. See also Anderson
2014a.
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the outset and that transition to an independent government would
require the incorporation of Timorese into important positions.67
The World Bank, in contrast to UNTAET, had early in the process
attempted to conduct a skills inventory to identify those Timorese who
could be brought into the transitional process.68 It included East Tim-
orese from the start in its November 1999 Joint Assessment Mission,
rejecting UNTAET’s view of a skills vacuum in East Timor.
UNTAET’s slow moves toward the Timorization of government at
the national level were matched by its reluctance to foster political
participation at the subnational level, a pattern that was reinforced
by the view of politics held among the Timorese elite. The story of
the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP)
is telling in this respect.69 The CEP was the first joint project between
the World Bank and UNTAET as the sovereign government of East
Timor. It was intended to support the creation of elected village and
subdistrict councils so that block grants could be provided to the sub-
districts, which would then decide on development priorities by adju-
dicating among village proposals. The project was designed to promote
local-level participation in development and reconstruction decisions,
and was intended in part to be an introduction to democratic and
accountable governance. Many have observed that although the CEP
was ambitious, it fit within the decentralized design of district adminis-
tration that UNTAET and theWorld Bank had planned for East Timor.
Yet UNTAET balked at the basic concept of the project proposed by the
World Bank, arguing that local participation and formal recognition of
local authorities by UNTAET could come only after formal elections.
The CEP thus confirmed “the worst suspicions of the East Timorese:
that the UN has no inclination to share power with them during the
transition, or to include them in any decision-making beyond perfunc-
tory consultation.”70 UNTAET officials’ opposition to the CEP in early
67 Suhrke 2001: 15.
68 Author interviews with World Bank and other donor officials; Dili, East Timor,
April 2005.
69 The following discussion of the CEP draws on author interviews with East
Timorese, World Bank, and other donor and NGO officials; Dili, East Timor,
April 2005. For further details on the contentious CEP experience see also
Chopra 2000: 30–31; Suhrke 2001: 16; and Mark Dodd, 2000, “UN staff
battle over East Timor independence policy,” Sydney Morning Herald,
March 13.
70 Chopra 2000: 31.
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2000 placed a severe strain on their relations with senior Timorese
leaders, including Gusmão, and evenwith other international organiza-
tions andNGOs.The inter-agency rivalry over the project also revealed
the different approaches to Timorization during the process, highlight-
ing that there were other possible avenues toward increasing political
and administrative participation that UNTAET simply did not take.
UNTAET was not the only organization to have trouble broad-
ening political consultation. The CNRT itself was criticized by ele-
ments of Timorese civil society for failing to be inclusive, relying too
much on past political currencies and traditional elites, and not pay-
ing enough attention to the current landscape of East Timorese pol-
itics and society. Timorese NGOs, for example, were dismayed at
Gusmão’s December 2000 suggestion that the CNRT would prepare a
draft of the constitution that the elected Constituent Assembly would
only need to “fine-tune” before its passage71 – this was hardly the
genuine participatory constitution-writing process that the UN had
promised. Gusmão later favored the idea of deeper popular consulta-
tion but the idea of a national constitutional commission was rejected
by the National Council.
The East Timorese Elections of 2001
As UNTAET moved slowly toward further Timorization, the CNRT
umbrella was beginning to fracture in the face of differing elite view-
points and objectives and FRETILIN re-emerged as the dominant
party on the Timorese political scene. This core element of the CNRT
was dominated by members of the East Timorese diaspora who had
remained active in the resistance movement from afar – from Mozam-
bique, in particular. They decided after returning to East Timor in 1999
that they would seek to be the party of government on their own and
FRETILIN began the dissolution of the CNRT when it withdrew in
August 2000. It thereby freed itself from the agreement among the par-
ties that formed the umbrella organization not to set up branches below
the district level and immediately began rebuilding its formidable orga-
nizational structure at the village level, a feat the other parties simply
71 Gusmão used this language in his New Year’s Eve speech of December 31,
2000.
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could not match.Gusmão spoke bitterly against this political mobiliza-
tion and the fracturing of the identity of national unity underpinning
the CNRT.72
Political fragmentation increased as all the parties began to gear up
for the Constituent Assembly elections of August 2001 – what one
donor official called the “checkered flag” for political parties to start
forming.73 The guerrilla resistance leaders of FRETILIN’s armed fac-
tion FALINTIL saw themselves as marginalized by the FRETILIN lead-
ers who had returned from exile, whom the FALINTIL forces viewed
as having sat out the long and arduous guerrilla battle in relative com-
fort. Gusmão remained unaffiliated with a political party, projecting an
image of himself as above factional politics. A handful of small political
parties formed: some appealed to labels and affiliations from the era of
party formation in 1975, such as the Timorese Democratic Union; and
others channeled newer voices on the Timorese political scene, such as
the Democratic Party representing Timorese youth,many of whom had
studied abroad and had become increasingly resentful of the old-guard
politicians and their resistance-era governing plans.
FRETILIN was indisputably the most powerful and best-resourced
party and it advocated early elections in the knowledge that it would
triumph handsomely. It had governed East Timor briefly in 1975 and
established a deep bondwith the Timorese people over the course of the
Indonesian occupation and the guerrilla insurgency it led. It had served
as the organizational backbone behind the CNRT’s ability to step
into the institutional vacuum created by the attenuation of political
and institutional development under Indonesian rule, during which no
political, administrative, or professional class was allowed to emerge
in East Timor. FRETILIN, however inaccurately, self-consciously took
on the CNRT’s mantle as a political umbrella organization. As East
Timorese independence drew near, it shared some characteristics with
other independence movements that morphed into political parties,
such as India’s Congress Party or South Africa’s African National
Congress. Perhaps most significantly, these umbrella political fronts
tend to begin their elected political careers by attempting to mediate
national sociopolitical cleavages internally rather than allowing them
to play out in an electoral arena.
72 Ingram 2012: 9.
73 Author interview with donor official; Dili, East Timor, April 2005.
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Reflecting their concern not to bestow undue legitimacy on any
one party, many UNTAET officials feared that FRETILIN would win
an overwhelming majority of the vote in the first elections and lead
the country toward becoming a one-party state. They encouraged the
Timorese to adopt a mixed voting system – combining first-past-
the-post district representation and national party-list proportional
representation – hoping that this would give smaller parties more
representation.74 FRETILIN nevertheless scored a large victory in the
Constituent Assembly elections of August 2001, winning 55 of the
available 88 seats. Although it won 57 percent of the overall vote,
it secured 63 percent representation in the assembly by also winning
12 of the 13 district seats. The Constituent Assembly replaced the
National Council; and a new Transitional Government, with a fully
Timorized cabinet, was chosen. Although this cabinet was selected to
present an image of national unity, FRETILIN’s victory was reflected
unambiguously in its hold over the most important and powerful cab-
inet positions.75
Partnering with a small like-minded party, FRETILIN had the votes
necessary to push through its draft constitution for approval with no
need for compromise. It had been working on the task since first com-
ing to government in 1975, while the other parties had not even begun
to tackle the issue; furthermore, FRETILIN paid minimal attention to
the results of the popular consultation conducted.76 An Asia Founda-
tion survey in 2004 reported that the Timorese citizenry was divided
over whether genuine public participation had taken place: 44 percent
responded that it did compared to 41 percent who felt that it did not.
The FRETILIN-controlled proto-legislature thus defined the scope of
its own powers, particularly vis-à-vis the other organs of government.
Although numerous CNRT leaders favoured a pure presidential system
for East Timor, the Maputo clique within FRETILIN that oversaw the
design of the constitution explicitly subordinated the president to the
government in a move that observers believe was intended to marginal-
ize Gusmão on the political scene.77 The final constitutional arrange-
ments essentially neutralized the non-affiliated Gusmão’s overwhelm-
ing mandate, over 82 percent of the vote, in winning the presidency in
74 Chesterman 2002: 69. 75 Ingram 2012: 9.
76 Author interviews with East Timorese legislators and donor officials; Dili, East
Timor, April 2005; Baltazar 2004.
77 Chesterman 2002: 69.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Transitional Governance in Afghanistan 133
April 2002.78 Ingram observes that, in effect, two rival centers of power
were created – with the prime minister and government empowered to
make policy, while the president retained enormous moral authority
with the population – thus setting the scene for “fierce political con-
test over the following years.”79 Finally, at the end of the transitional
period, FRETILIN was also instrumental in transforming the Con-
stituent Assembly into the National Parliament on independence, obvi-
ating the intended second election that other parties had anticipated
would increase their own showing in the legislature.80 The clique of
returned FRETILIN diaspora leaders formed the core of East Timor’s
first Council of Ministers. It was not long before the political dom-
inance of this group, with its uncompromising governance style and
unilateral set of political priorities, was challenged as the new political
landscape of East Timor evolved and matured.
Transitional Governance in Afghanistan
The transitional governance challenge in Afghanistan was very differ-
ent from both the lack of consent involved in the peace settlement in
Cambodia and the increasingly heated demands for local participation
in East Timor. In Afghanistan, a dilemma shaped the political land-
scape and dominated the immediate peacebuilding challenge. On the
one hand, governing the country required, as it had for centuries,
the centralization of authority in Kabul. On the other hand, stabilizing
the country in the aftermath of the civil war and the rout of the Taliban
required the distribution of power to regional strongmen.
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
became operational in early 2002 to support the implementation of
the peace framework as laid out in the Bonn Agreement.81 Over the
first five years, an estimated $8 billion was spent on the peacebuild-
ing operation in Afghanistan, with almost 30,000 military and civil-
ian personnel deployed to assist the effort.82 UNAMA was similar to
78 Author interviews with donor representatives and civil society leaders; Dili,
East Timor, April 2005. Also, Aucoin and Brandt 2010.
79 Ingram 2012: 18.
80 Author interviews with East Timorese legislators and journalists; Dili, East
Timor, April 2005.
81 UNAMA was established by UN Security Council Resolution 1401 on March
28, 2002.
82 Zürcher et al. 2013: 60.
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UNTAC in that it was established to assist with a peace settlement, but
it is telling that UNAMA was not designated a transitional authority
by the Security Council; rather, it is a “special political mission” and
is led by the UN’s Department of Political Affairs, in contrast to the
more traditional peacebuilding operations led by the UN’s Department
of Peacekeeping Operations.83 The Security Council mandate did not
explicitly endow UNAMA with any dimension of the Afghan govern-
ment’s sovereignty or executive authority, as it had the UNTAC and
UNTAET mandates in Cambodia and East Timor, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the United States was heavily involved in the Afghan politi-
cal transition, particularly through its influential ambassador, Zalmay
Khalilzad, who had Hamid Karzai’s ear and served as one of his most
trusted advisors.
UNAMA, however, was the focal point of the international com-
munity’s assistance in the process of peacebuilding through transi-
tional governance in Afghanistan. Indeed, although the Bonn frame-
work envisioned the international community playing an “assistance”
role, UNAMA in practice took on much more of a “partnership” role
in governing with counterparts in the Afghan Interim and Transitional
Administrations.84 Entrusted with the bulk of donor reconstruction
funds, instead of the interim government,UNAMA effectively operated
for some time as a parallel administration, hence it qualifies as a transi-
tional governance vehicle as defined in this book. It was responsible for
many of the same state- and democracy-building activities as were the
more formal transitional authorities (such as UNTAC and UNTAET),
including particularly capacity-building and governing assistance for
the Afghan Interim and Transitional Administrations. It also assisted
the process by which the Transitional Administration was selected, fol-
lowed by a constitution-drafting process and the holding of elections
at the end of the transitional governance period.
UNAMA was explicitly intended to be a swing of the pendu-
lum away from the broadly expanded scope of the two immediately
preceding UN peacebuilding missions in Kosovo and East Timor.85
Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
83 Other such UN special political missions operate currently in Iraq and Libya,
for example.
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for Afghanistan, was extremely influential in determining the mechan-
ics and substance of the Afghan political transition. Indeed, the design
of UNAMA was based on the recommendations of a review of UN
peacekeeping operations that came to be known as “the Brahimi
report” after its chair.86 Brahimi articulated the need for a “light foot-
print” in Afghanistan in terms of the UN and international presence
in order to emphasize Afghan ownership of the process.87 In practice,
however, UNAMA was “arguably the most institutionally and norma-
tively advanced integrated mission fielded by the United Nations in one
of its most high-profile interventions.”88 The international community,
led by UNAMA,was intimately involved in both the transitional politi-
cal process and day-to-day governance and state functions. In turn, it is
evident that the Afghan Interim and Transitional Administrations, and
later the elected government, derived their legitimacy from the UN-led
transitional governance process originating in the Bonn Agreement and
culminating in elections.
The Bonn Agreement provided a roadmap, complete with mile-
stones, for a process of further negotiations among Afghans about
political transformation and state reconstruction in their country. The
Interim Administration and the UN adhered to the timetable stipu-
lated in the Bonn Agreement to hold an Emergency Loya Jirga in
June 2002, within six months of the peace settlement. The use of the
grand council meeting, a centuries-old, traditional Pashtun consensus-
building and conflict resolution mechanism, was considered an effec-
tive way to incorporate traditional forms of governance and thereby
build domestic legitimacy into the political process. Loya jirgas had
in the past made key governance decisions during periods of turmoil
when no legitimate ruler was recognized by all Afghans, and the North-
ern Alliance agreed to a UN-monitored Emergency Loya Jirga as “the
legitimating device for the process of building a more representative
government.”89 The key output of the forum was to decide on “a
broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such
time as a fully representative government can be elected through free
86 Brahimi 2000; also Thakur 2001.
87 UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan briefing to
the UN Security Council, February 6, 2002.
88 Donini, Niland, and Wermester 2004: 4. See also Donini 2004: 136–139; and
Freeman 2007: 1.
89 Rubin 2004: 7.
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and fair elections to be held no later than two years from the date
of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga.”90 In a general atmo-
sphere of optimism about the future of their country, the assembled
leaders reached agreement on the Afghan Transitional Administration
(ATA) that would lead the country and its reconstruction.
The realities of constructing political order in post-conflict
Afghanistan became more apparent, however, as the process of deter-
mining the composition of the ATA began to reflect the political chal-
lenges ahead. In effect, the Loya Jirga was hampered in fulfilling its
mandate seriously because of the many unresolved power struggles
going into the conference – and its outcomes perpetuated these con-
flicts rather than tackling them directly. According to the Bonn Agree-
ment, the central objective of the Emergency Loya Jirgawas to approve
the key personnel who would govern the country as part of the ATA.
Hamid Karzai was named the Transitional President, as expected. The
composition of the rest of the ATA was not debated within the Loya
Jirga forum, however. It was decided upon by key power-brokers after
intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations over key portfolios, in a con-
tentious debate that kept the delegates waiting in Kabul beyond the
planned timeframe. The ATA slate was finally presented to the dele-
gates as a fait accompli on the last day of the meeting, when Karzai
announced the names of key cabinet members without providing a
written slate or opportunity for discussion, let alone asking for a for-
mal vote. There had been a widespread expectation among the dele-
gates that the Loya Jirga would provide the chance to correct the fac-
tional and ethnic imbalances created at the Bonn conference.91 But the
composition of the cabinet remained much the same as in the Interim
Administration, continuing to reflect the exigencies of informal power-
sharing in an ethnically fragmented and centrifugal country: Tajiks
retained the most powerful portfolios, including defense and foreign
affairs, while Pashtun representation was increased slightly.
In short, many of the decisions made ostensibly by the Loya Jirga
were reached behind the scenes in the interests of short-term stabil-
ity and power considerations rather than for the longer-term purposes
of strengthening the central state or boosting democratic participation
and legitimacy and weakening traditional, unaccountable strongmen.
Simon Chesterman observes: “Few people deluded themselves into
90 Afghanistan Bonn Agreement 2001. 91 Thier 2004: 54.
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thinking that the Loya Jirga was meaningful popular consultation –
the aim was to encourage those who wielded power in Afghanistan
to exercise it through politics rather than through the barrel of a
gun.”92 Critics of the Emergency Loya Jirga argued that it represented
a missed opportunity to instill democratic practices in Afghan political
culture, especially failing to assert civilian leadership and draw power
away from the warlords.93 Widespread reports surfaced immediately
after the Loya Jirga of a series of backroom deals, outright intimi-
dation, debate-stifling, and vote-packing on the floor that combined
to prevent elected delegates from exercising their full authority and
decision-making power as representatives of the people.94 Many of the
most notoriousmujahideen leaders were treated with deference, sitting
in the front row of the Loya Jirga and displaying full opportunistic
behavior in exploiting the evolving political landscape to continue to
suit their own ends. The most powerful were elevated into roles as
vice presidents and provincial governors: Marshal Mohammed Qasim
Fahim,who became leader of the Northern Alliance in September 2001
after Ahmed Shah Massoud was assassinated, served as Defense Min-
ister and Vice President; Ismail Khan was made provincial governor
of his stronghold of Herat; Haji Mohammed Mohaqeq, the former
mujahideen leader of the Shia Hazaras became Minister of Planning;
Gul Agha Shirzai, strongman in the south, was made governor of Kan-
dahar. Karzai and his foreign backers thus demonstrated their intent to
pursue a co-optation strategy that ignored past transgressions, a strat-
egy that many human rights advocates criticized.
The tensions at the heart of constructing a workable political order
in Afghanistan, so clearly on display in the outcomes of the Emergency
Loya Jirga of 2002, continued to manifest themselves as UNAMA
worked with the new ATA to implement a process of peacebuilding
through transitional governance. Richard Ponzio describes how the
international community struggled to reconcile divergent elements of
92 Chesterman 2004: 92.
93 For example, Goodson 2003; International Crisis Group 2002; and Thier 2004.
94 In a particularly egregious example of behind-the-scenes orchestration, the US
Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, announced that the former king, Zahir Shah,
would not seek election as head of state but would support Hamid Karzai’s
candidacy – prior to the announcement made on behalf of the king himself.
Many Pashtuns were incensed by what appeared to be a combination of
Northern Alliance strong-arm tactics and foreign interference. International
Crisis Group 2002.
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authority in the country, observing that the need to incorporate tradi-
tionally legitimate sources of authority was often at odds with liberal
democratization ideals.95 At the heart of the peacebuilding challenge
was “competing interpretations of what constitutes legitimate politi-
cal authority.”96 The clash of these distinct visions of political order
is represented by Afghan warlords who, in continuing to assert their
traditional forms of authority, have remained a serious obstacle to the
consolidation of effective and legitimate government in Afghanistan.
During the transitional governance period, large areas of the country
remained dominated by private militias under the control of various
anti-Taliban commanders, particularly those of the Northern Alliance.
Many of the warlords and local strongmen assigned key posts in central
and regional government resisted the demobilization of their personal
forces and continued to enrich themselves with customs revenues and
illegal financial flows. Karzai tried, from the Interim Administration
period onward, to neutralize their independent power by incorporating
them into his cabinet and provincial government structure, a strategy
that worked with some (such as Ismail Khan and Mohammed Fahim)
and less with others (such as Rashid Dostum and Gul Agha Shirzai).
Each of these strongmen pledged their allegiance to the government,
but their willingness to submit to the authority of the central govern-
ment was not truly tested during the transitional governance process.97
These political realities met with mixed reactions from the Afghan peo-
ple. Most understand that building post-conflict political order by co-
opting some warlords was better than the instability that would be
generated by excluding them – but these strongmen continued to be
seen with blood on their hands. Ponzio’s focus group of Afghan citi-
zens revealed warlords and militia leaders to be among the least trusted
groups in Afghan society, in contrast to tribal elders, who are viewed
highly.98 The political reality was simple, however: having accommo-
dated and co-opted these regional power-holders into the new political
95 Ponzio 2011: 164–169. 96 Ibid.: 165.
97 Karzai removed Ismail Khan as governor of Herat in late 2004, appointing him
Minister of Energy and Water in Kabul. In early 2006, however, Khan was sent
to Herat to help calm Sunni–Shia clashes there, which some believe were
stoked by Khan himself to demonstrate his power in Herat. After running for
president against Karzai and losing, Rashid Dostum was appointed Karzai’s
top military advisor; at the time Dostum ostensibly “resigned” as head of his
armed faction. Katzman 2007.
98 Ponzio 2011: 172–173.
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order, it became increasingly difficult to diffuse the extent to which they
were able to retain their political advantage and manipulate outcomes
in their favor.
As with the other two cases, the transitional governance process
in Afghanistan suffered from a mismatch between the realities of the
domestic political scene and the international community’s governance
and statebuilding objectives. The milestones established by the Bonn
process, as well as UNAMA’s mandate and light footprint, meant that
the international community was preoccupied mostly with the cen-
tral government. This bias was exacerbated by the poor security sit-
uation outside Kabul, which hamstrung institution building activities,
let alone any meaningful civic engagement, at the subnational level.
The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an exception that proves the
rule: it was created by the ATA in 2003 as an integrated rural devel-
opment and community empowerment program to improve develop-
ment outcomes at the community level and thereby enhance the Afghan
state’s legitimacy across the country. Through the elected community
development councils that are created to select and implement small-
scale development projects, the NSP has proven perhaps the most suc-
cessful way of building linkages between the government and Afghan
society.99 Ironically, it relies essentially on nongovernmental organiza-
tions for implementation.
The ATA faced its own problems in consolidating its authority out-
side Kabul. Alexander Thier points out both failures and relative suc-
cesses on this front.100 On the security side, the government remained
a factional entity among other armed factions; it could not assert its
monopoly over violence in the territory. On the executive front, by
contrast, Karzai was quite successful, with the backing of UNAMA
and the international community, at inserting into positions of author-
ity in the ATA a group of technocrats who were few but relatively
powerful. Ashraf Ghani, who became Afghanistan’s president in 2014,
was one of these key technocrats, serving as Karzai’s Finance Minister
in the ATA. One difficult yet effective strategy for demonstrating the
authority of the central state as an alternative to traditional strongmen
was an attempt to tie back to the center the cadres of provincial civil
servants who were functioning in surviving subnational government
bureaucracies and remained loyal to the concept of a central state.
99 Nagl, Exum, and Humayun 2009. 100Thier 2004.
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Yet UNAMA’s substantial international presence in Kabul and deep
involvement with the business of the central government faded quickly
outside the capital, as did the authority of the central government. Dur-
ing the transitional governance period, regional leaders continued to
assert their own authority in the provinces, often with resources sup-
plied to them by foreign patrons – aid agencies often carried out their
own agendas in the provinces with little consultation with either cen-
tral or provincial governments.101 A World Bank survey team found
in 2002–03 that subnational administrative structures were surpris-
ingly robust and cautioned that the central government would have
to act immediately to ensure that particular source of state strength
was not quickly eroded.102 Yet the ATA found it difficult to truly con-
nect with the provinces – for example, it had trouble disbursing even
meager funds and, in turn, subnational administrations received small
budgetary allocations and remained extremely weak.103
In short, while the political dimension of reconstruction was
progressing along the Bonn milestones, state capacity-building was
foundering in the absence of a robust, functioning Afghan administra-
tive apparatus to guide reconstruction work.104 On the statebuilding
front, a telling dispute developed between the United Nations agen-
cies coordinated through UNAMA on the one hand, and the Afghan
Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) – the government’s coor-
dinating representative to the donor community – on the other. The
Interim Administration had created AACA by executive decree almost
immediately after the Bonn Conference in order to orient interna-
tional aid through a nationally owned program that prioritized direct
assistance to the state. In parallel, the government wrote a National
Development Framework (NDF) for the first donor conference to take
place inside Afghanistan in April 2002, a comprehensive and integrated
framework of development and reconstruction priorities. The NDF
101 Donini 2004: 138. 102 World Bank 2004.
103 Author interviews with government officials and World Bank, UNDP, and
other donor officials (Kabul, Afghanistan, June 2002) indicated that this was a
serious problem that was clearly recognized as a major statebuilding challenge
in 2002; very little progress has been made in remedying the issue to date. See
also Rubin 2006: 26.
104 Author interviews with officials of the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination
Authority (AACA), the United Nations Development Program, and the World
Bank; Kabul, Afghanistan, June 2002.
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was widely viewed by donors as a strong statement of the govern-
ment’s vision as well as a structure to direct aid programming in the
country. Yet many donors were skeptical that the government could
effectively and cleanly execute direct budgetary support, with partic-
ular concerns being raised about the lack of functional administrative
connection between the center and provinces. As a result, the interna-
tional community continued to channel its financial assistance through
the UN agencies and other external actors instead of directly to the
government.105 AACA officials, led by Ghani who oversaw the writ-
ing of the NDF, wanted a single channel of aid financing, through the
government budget, and struggled against what they saw as the UN
agencies’ attempts to undermine government ownership and stream-
lined statebuilding processes.106
Responding to the increasingly contested transitional governance
environment, UNAMA established an integrated coordination struc-
ture in mid-2002 to bring UN programs more in line with the gov-
ernment’s capacity-building and reconstruction priorities. UN agencies
were assigned to work as “secretariats” within ministries, providing
personnel and technical assistance in support of the government’s pro-
gram, and UN programs became increasing embedded with those of
the state.107 For example, the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) was the lead agency assigned to work with the Ministry of
Finance and the Office of Administrative Affairs to manage the civil
service payroll and establish new human resource management pro-
cedures; the UNDP then coordinated other donors’ work in this area.
This more integrated system was beneficial in that it kept the Bonn
process moving forward, especially facilitating the necessary dimen-
sion of international engagement in governance and capacity-building.
The drawback, however, was that UNAMA became involved in inter-
nal debates over aid allocation authority and, as a result, coordina-
tion between UNAMA and the government was placed under con-
stant strain. Alexander Costy observes that what became clear from
such debates was that the UN had still not developed a strategy for
incorporating greater national control over the management of aid
105 Costy 2004.
106 Author interviews with AACA, UN, and World Bank officials; Kabul,
Afghanistan, June 2002.
107 Author interviews with UNDP and World Bank officials; Kabul, Afghanistan,
June 2002.
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resources as part of a peacebuilding operation.108 This issue remained
contentious in Afghanistan, resulting, after the transitional governance
period, in the Afghanistan Compact, a renewed commitment to coordi-
nated assistance under a government program negotiated between the
Karzai administration and international donors in London in Decem-
ber 2006.
The Afghan Elections of 2004 and 2005
The political timeline established in the Bonn Agreement, including
some of the mechanisms of informal power-sharing, worked toward
a measure of democratic consolidation in Afghanistan. The ATA was
to govern the country, in tandem with UNAMA, until a new con-
stitution was adopted within 18 months, followed by national elec-
tions. A Constitutional Loya Jirgamet in December 2003 and January
2004, as planned, to draft and ratify a new Afghan constitution.109
Some degree of popular consultation took place: the drafting commis-
sion consulted Afghans in every province in the country and in the
refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran. Yet the government and the
UN also decided to keep the substance of deliberations confidential
and chose not to publish the text of the proposed constitution even
during the public consultation phase. As a result, behind the scenes
maneuvering among power-brokers bore more responsibility for the
final result than any genuine consultation.110 The final draft was pub-
lished only a month before the scheduled opening of the Constitutional
Loya Jirga and featured extensive executive-made revisions to the doc-
ument completed by the Constitutional Review Commission. Rubin
concludes that the constitution “reflected to a considerable extent the
agenda shared by Karzai and those cabinet members who considered
themselves ‘reformers.’”111 The government even had an active lob-
bying team on the floor of the Loya Jirga and successfully defused
108 Costy 2004: 156.
109 The loya jirga institution featured, albeit with varying degrees of
independence, in the creation of each of the country’s five previous
constitutions. Rubin 2004: 7. Details on the process of constitution-drafting
and consultation are from International Crisis Group 2003; Rubin 2004; and
Thier 2010.
110 Thier 2010.
111 Rubin 2004: 10; also International Crisis Group 2003; and Thier 2010.
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many of the competing requests emanating from various groups
there.112
There were two particularly salient issues during the constitution-
drafting process – presidentialism and the status of Islam.113 The draft-
ing commission originally envisioned a semi-presidential system, in
which a prime minister would share power with the president. The
intention was that this would institutionalize ethnic power-sharing
between a Pashtun president (expected to be Karzai) and a non-
Pashtun prime minister (likely to be a Panjshiri Tajik).114 The decision
to move to a fully presidential system came late in the game, at the
stage of joint review of the proposed constitution by the drafting com-
mittee and the government’s National Security Council. Karzai and his
allies in Kabul had a strong desire for the establishment of a purely
presidential system and, although this had been strenuously resisted
by the drafting commission, they prevailed over the Northern Alliance
bloc, which had begun to see splits among its leaders in the cabinet.
The debate about the role of Islam explicitly involved balancing the
domestic demands of Islamic parties and clerics with the desire of
international actors on standards of governance – the latter made it
clear that they did not want any reference to sharia law although they
accepted that the constitution would declare Afghanistan an Islamic
state.
Both the presidential election of October 2004, which returned
Hamid Karzai to the head of government and the parliamentary elec-
tions of September 2005 were held successfully and were declared to
be free and fair by the international community. There was, neverthe-
less, significant criticism of the choice of the single non-transferable
vote (SNTV) electoral system for the September 2005 parliamentary
elections and the primary outcome to which it led – a fragmented par-
liament full of non-aligned legislators at the expense of established
parties.115 A brief discussion of why and how the SNTV system was
chosen in Afghanistan and its consequences illustrates sharply how
112 Rubin 2004: 16. 113 Ibid.: 12–14.
114 This outcome is what transpired, de facto, after the 2014 presidential election,
where the victorious Ashraf Ghani, a Pashtun, agreed to create a new chief
executive officer post to govern in collaboration (at least in theory) with the
runner-up, the Tajik Abdullah Abdullah.
115 Reynolds 2006.
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governance choices made for the sake of expediency and advancing
the entrenched elite’s own interests hampered the establishment of
the effective and legitimate political order sought by the international
community. The norm for the electoral system chosen in most post-
conflict countries since 1989 has been list-based proportional repre-
sentation (PR). The many advisors and constitutional experts con-
sulted in the Afghan case favored a PR system there too. Most of them
believed that the right way to deal with the factionalized nature of
Afghan politics would be to give all major power contenders a stake
in the system and therefore concluded that some form of geographi-
cally rooted proportionality was the means to achieve that goal.116 The
major benefit of a list-based PR system is that it supports the building
of political parties and encourages the articulation of programmatic
platforms, elevating policy discourse over the attributes of individual
politicians.
Under the SNTV system, by contrast, voters cast ballots for a
single individual rather than choosing from a party-determined list
and candidates are elected by winning the greatest number of votes
instead of through proportionality. Andrew Reynolds explains that
the main intended benefit of the SNTV system is to promote repre-
sentation and accountability: it enables voters to select independent
candidates whom they know and trust, rather than favoring members
of nascent parties with undefined platforms.117 On the other hand,
analysts believe the system loses its attractiveness when the districts
are too large because it tends to fragment the vote, even creating a
lottery-like effect among independents and minority party candidates
in larger districts – and Afghan districts had, on average, a high num-
ber of seats. An SNTV system also creates a difficult strategic problem
for parties, since there can be a large disproportionality between votes
cast for party members and actual seats won by these candidates.118
116 For example, Johnson et al. 2003; and Reynolds and Wilder 2004.
117 Reynolds 2006: 105.
118 Under SNTV, a party can win the majority of votes in a district and yet not
necessarily win the majority of seats. For example, if a voting district has five
seats, it is simply the top five vote-getters who win those seats. If the top
candidate from Party A wins 80 percent of the vote and the next four
candidates from Party B win 20 percent of the vote among them, Party A gets
one seat in the assembly while Party B gets four. A PR system would assign
Party A four out of five seats in this example.
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Overall, an SNTV system can result in a confusing ballot for vot-
ers and lead them to wonder where their vote led in terms of actual
representation. These disadvantages are particularly problematic in
post-conflict environments, where it is arguably essential for buy-in
to a new democratic system that votes cast are clearly translated into
seats won.
The constitution ratified by the Loya Jirga in January 2004 did not
explicitly describe the voting system to be used for the national legis-
lature, but an appendix noted that a decision had been reached to use
some form of list-based PR. The Transitional Administration, together
with the Joint Election Management Body (JEMB) and UNAMA, orig-
inally worked out the details of the system, agreeing on a closed-list PR
systemwithmulti-member districts, allowing party leaders to decide on
candidates and their ordering on the ballot. Yet this proposal faltered
when, as Reynolds reports, Karzai’s legal advisor gave a confused pre-
sentation of the system to the transitional government cabinet, opening
the way for critics to argue that the system was far too complicated for
Afghan voters to understand.119 Criticism was fueled by a generalized
distrust of political parties, based on the chaotic multiparty period of
the 1960s and subsequent Communist and Soviet rule.120 Faced with
these objections, Karzai asked for other alternatives that would allow
Afghans to vote for individuals rather than parties. The SNTV system
simply emerged as the least bad alternative.
Yet there was widespread concern about the choice of SNTV in
Afghanistan, with lobbying efforts persisting even after President
Karzai signed the SNTV electoral law. Three of Karzai’s main chal-
lengers – Rashid Dostum, Yunus Qanooni, and Haji Mohammed
Mohaqeq – stated that they supported PR and not SNTV for the elec-
toral system, as did UNAMA officials, international organizations, and
emerging Afghan progressive political and civil society activists.121 Zal-
may Khalilzad, the US ambassador and close confidant of Karzai, was
one notable exception: it was reported that he had pushed for a firm
decision to allow elections to proceed quickly above all else and that
119 Reynolds 2006: 106–107.
120 A similar distrust of political parties existed in post-conflict East Timor, also
stemming from a chaotic earlier party-based period that had ended in civil war.
121 Reynolds 2006: 110.
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he did not believe the electoral system to be particularly important.122
What finally tipped the decision was that a new objection to list-based
PR had emerged from Karzai’s co-ethnic Pashtun allies in his cabinet:
they feared that a list system would benefit non-Pashtun leaders and
would lead to fewer Pashtun supporters for Karzai in the legislature.
Reynolds concludes, “without much theoretical basis, the president
and his advisers determined that SNTV was the system that would
best serve their interests.”123
Things did not turn out the way the Karzai clique hoped. The SNTV
system splintered the Pashtun base and turned what was Karzai’s abso-
lute majority in the presidential election into a disjointed supporting
bloc in the national assembly, holding less than one-third of the seats.
The fragmentation was more general, with more than thirty differ-
ent parties and factions winning seats, few of them on the basis of
any identifiable platform. Almost half of those elected had fought as
mujahideen and parliamentary alliances started to form on the basis
of alliances with traditional power-holders and strongmen.124 Thus,
the electoral system led to a parliamentary outcome that made it even
more challenging to govern the country. Karzai found it increasingly
difficult to cobble together ad hoc coalitions to support his programs.
Reynolds reported in 2006 that the new legislature had “already shown
itself to be a place of wheeling and dealing, of clientelism and shift-
ing alliances, where men with tainted pasts hold significant sway over
the future of Afghan democracy.”125 This dynamic is made possible
since the legislature in its nascent stages lacks a formal role for politi-
cal parties that could mediate intra-assembly tensions. Without such
organized blocs – their absence a result of the SNTV system and
Karzai’s attempts tomarginalize those parties that do exist – traditional
power-brokers have tried to dominate proceedings.126 Finally, it was
the case, as expected, that the SNTV system would prove unsatisfying
to Afghan citizens searching for true representation and accountabil-
ity: only about one-third of the six million votes cast were for win-
ning candidates, with two-thirds cast for candidates who lost. The
SNTV decision reflects, in microcosm, how choices made for elite
122 A similar push for quick elections in Cambodia led Special Representative of
the Secretary-General Akashi to make a series of decisions regarding the
Khmer Rouge that also had unforeseen long-term consequences.
123 Reynolds 2006: 111. 124 Ibid.: 111–112.
125 Ibid.: 116. 126 International Crisis Group 2006.
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political expediency in Afghanistan set the country on a path along
which the major governance challenges of a hamstrung central govern-
ment and fragmented political power were compounded rather than
resolved.
Transitional Governance in Comparative Perspective
Post-conflict Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan – the differ-
ences in the nature of their conflicts, brokered peace settlements, and
evolving political landscapes notwithstanding – underwent remark-
ably similar transitional governance attempts at peacebuilding led by
the United Nations. The sequence of formal institutional choices engi-
neered by the transitional governance process and the core milestones
obtained in each country are captured in Table 4.1.
Over the course of this sequence of interventions, the pendulum
swung back and forth with regard to the perception of the “right”
degree of UN peacebuilding presence. After UNTAC’s experience in
Cambodia, observers concluded that UN peace operations typically
had less than satisfactory impact because they were underresourced,
in both financial and personnel terms, because their mandates were
too circumscribed and failed to give them enough teeth to change the
game on the ground, and because they were not coordinated appropri-
ately. Responding to early critiques that UNTACwas not given enough
of a mandate or resources in Cambodia, UN peace operations in East
Timor (and Kosovo) a few years later were much larger, more com-
prehensive in terms of mandate remit, and even more encroaching on
the sovereignty of their host countries. A few years later, however,
responding to criticisms of heavy-handedness in East Timor, the UN
elevated the importance of “country ownership” in preparing for the
reconstruction process in Afghanistan and rolled out a “light foot-
print” UN presence that did not impinge so directly on the coun-
try’s sovereignty.127 At UN headquarters, reforms since the turn of the
century have attempted to remedy earlier pathologies created by the
organizational make-up of the various departments involved in peace
127 In a similar vein, UN transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor
did not establish a timeline to exit at the outset of those missions because
senior peacebuilding officials believed that the explicit timetable of the
ongoing Bosnian peace operation led to adverse consequences that eventually,
and paradoxically, delayed exit. Zaum 2012: 147.
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Table 4.1 Transitional governance milestones in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan
Milestone Cambodia East Timor Afghanistan
Peace Settlement Paris Peace Agreement Independence referendum Bonn Agreement





Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
UNSC Resolution 745
February 28, 1992













Quadripartite arrangement to share
Cambodian sovereignty between
the four factions to the conflict.
Established in 1990, leading to
the Paris Accords; became
UNTAC’s sovereign counterpart.
National Consultative Council (CNRT
leaders + senior UNTAET staff)
Followed in July 2000 by East Timor
Transitional Administration
(international–domestic coalition cabinet)






Selected at Emergency Loya Jirga
June 10–21, 2002
Presidential election N/A April 14, 2002
Xanana Gusmão 83 percent
October 9, 2004
Hamid Karzai 55 percent
Parliamentary elections May 23–28, 1993
FUNCINPEC 58 seats
CPP 51 seats
Other opposition 10 seats
Power-sharing compromise reached
between CPP and FUNCINCPEC
August 30, 2001
FRETILIN 55 seats
Democratic Party 7 seats
Other opposition 16 seats
September and November 2005
High degree of fragmentation
(>30 parties and factions) but
three roughly equal blocs:
pro-government; opposition
supporters; unaligned
Constitutional assembly Cambodia constituent assembly
June–September 1993
East Timor constituent assembly
Approved constitution on March 22,
2002
Afghan Constitutional Loya Jirga
December 14, 2003–January 4,
2004
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operations, establishing in 2005 a new intergovernmental UN Peace-
building Commission to exercise strategic oversight across hitherto
bureaucratically separated peacebuilding functions.128 Overall, the
effect of these reforms has been limited.
The evidence examined in this chapter should be taken as a firm
warning that this type of attention to mandate scope and implementa-
tion as the route to improving peacebuilding is blinkered at best and,
more likely, dangerously misguided. The cases examined here illustrate
that none of the attempted policy shifts or nuances in the precise type
or degree of transitional governance really mattered. In reality, it is
the fact of transitional governance itself and its two hallmark char-
acteristics – joint international–domestic governance and the simulta-
neous pursuit of statebuilding and democratization – that yields the
perverse outcomes we see in practice. Interestingly, the latter feature
is problematic even in cases where executive governance remains in
the hands of domestic elites. René Lemarchand argues, for example,
that the results of UN peace operations in Burundi, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Rwanda also illustrate the “con-
tradictions between statebuilding and democracy promotion, the two
principal goals of peacemaking.”129 Transitional regimes in Burundi
and DRC – brokered and designed by outside actors but without an
element of international governance – shared power among domes-
tic elites, in interim arrangements preceding elections. Devon Curtis
echoes the dynamics identified in this chapter in demonstrating how
these transitional arrangements led to the entrenchment of certain
actors and their consequent ability to develop an elite-centered system
to share the political–economic spoils of power.130
The characteristics of peacebuilding through transitional gover-
nance enabled the winning elites in all three cases considered here to
use (and continue to use, as the next chapter demonstrates) the full suite
of institutional change agent strategies identified at the beginning of the
chapter – insurrection, subversion, parasitism, and opportunism131 –
in obtaining their preferred form of political order. I do not wish to
imply an instrumental rationalist logic to the process of institutional
128 United Nations 2004; UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1645, 20
December 2005; and UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/80, 30
December 2005.
129 Lemarchand 2012: 228. 130 Curtis 2007.
131 Mahoney and Thelen 2010.
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change. It does not necessarily have to be intentional; it can come as the
unintended consequence of distributional struggles in which no actor
sought the transformation that actually occurs. The balance of author-
ity between the international operation and its domestic counterparts is
a crucial piece of the institutional change story – and that balance shifts
over the course of a transformative peacebuilding intervention. From
the moment a transitional governance mandate is signed, it becomes
an obsolescing bargain: as soon as the intervention begins, the bal-
ance shifts so that the UN becomes dependent on its domestic counter-
parts for success and the bargaining power of the latter increases.132 At
the outset of an intervention, the ability of international peacebuilders
to impose and enforce a particular set of institutional rules is rela-
tively high; in turn, domestic elites have less discretion in interpret-
ing those rules. As the intervention progresses, its ability to enforce
a particular set of institutions – formal rules, policy structures, and
norms – wanes quite quickly. At the same time, the discretion of domes-
tic elites increases in making formal institutional choices and in devel-
oping informal strategies for operating within existing institutions. In
the aftermath of interventions, those who advanced the rules and insti-
tutions in the first place – the international community through the
peace operation – are left able only to turn a blind eye as long as the
rules are not being opposed outright.
The international community’s model of peacebuilding through
transitional governance has achieved only limited success because of
a lack of systematic attention to the domestic political games in which
it unfolds. A critical analysis of the transitional governance approach
demonstrates that it transforms the political landscape in unintended
ways, especially by making state- and democracy-building an elite
project and thereby serving elite interests. Joint international–domestic
governance and the simultaneous pursuit of statebuilding and democ-
ratization result in a domestic political dynamic that co-opts the peace-
building intervention and systematically thwarts the consolidation of
legitimate and effective governance. The following chapter extends this
narrative by demonstrating how this dynamic continues to play out in
the aftermath of intervention. In essence, the state becomes a pawn in
the struggle for political power as domestic elites use their resources
132 Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 309; and Vernon 1971.
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as patronage to cement their preferred neopatrimonial political order
in place – with the result that state effectiveness is hampered and legit-
imate authority compromised. Governance outcomes come to reflect
not the modern political order sought by international interventions
but neopatrimonial political order instead.
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5 Neopatrimonial Post-Conflict
Political Order
Patrimonialism has been the prevailing form of political order that
must be overcome in constructing rule-bound, effective, and legitimate
government. Post-conflict countries are no exception to this pattern.
In Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan, international interven-
tions that sought to establish one particular conception of political
order found themselves in competition with the neopatrimonial prac-
tices preferred by domestic elites. The dynamic contest between these
two visions of political order is especially apparent in the aftermath
of a peacebuilding presence, when domestic elites and their support-
ers reassert patrimonial forms of politics that undermine the formal
institutions of governance transplanted by interventions. As a result, a
decade andmore after the transformative peacebuilding missions in the
three countries considered here, what is apparent is that patrimonial
and rational–legal authority coexist in a quintessential neopatrimonial
hybrid form – with personalized politics practiced within the institu-
tional trappings of Weberian bureaucratic effectiveness and electoral
democratic legitimacy.
Neopatrimonial political order operates through a system of rent-
seeking and rent distribution through patronage.1 Patron–client rela-
tionships form and persist on the basis of these distributional strategies,
which bind elites to each other as well as to their social sources of sup-
port. In the liberal ideal associated with modern political order, by con-
trast, elites endowed with legitimate authority through the vote should
1 Fukuyama 2011: 336–343, explains that the term “rent” derives from ancien
régime France, where in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, the monarchy grew
strong by co-opting elites. It did so by offering them the ability to purchase
small pieces of the state or public assets, such as the right to collect specific
types of taxes, that would generate a continuous stream of revenue and that
could be handed down to descendants. The monarchy gave local power-holders
these various privileges in return for cash (“rente”), thereby mortgaging itself to
these power-holders who, in turn, served as a concerted bloc defending the
status quo and preventing reform. See also Ertman 1997: 98–99.
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use the rationalized bureaucracy to deliver programmatic public poli-
cies and collectively oriented goods and services. It is apparent from
the experiences in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan that post-
conflict elites, like their counterparts across the contemporary devel-
oping world, find that it is both easier and more profitable for them to
focus, for the most part, on distributing narrowly targeted public rents
and patronage goods to their clients in exchange for political support.
One major insight of historical institutionalist theory is that actors use
a variety of strategies to achieve change in political outcomes “beneath
the veneer of apparent institutional stability.”2 One such process is that
of “conversion,” whereby actors can reshape institutions and policies
to achieve objectives very different from the purposes for which they
were originally created.3 Thus, the characteristically hybrid nature of
neopatrimonialism suits their ends very well: they perform their major
functions in the formal institutional realms of state administration and
electoral politics while maneuvering inmore hidden and less risky ways
to represent their own interests and those of their major client groups.
Analytical approaches that rely on more short-term measures of
peacebuilding success and evaluate interventions as exogenous treat-
ments are unfortunately restricted in seeing these gradual and endoge-
nous processes of institutional change that continue to unfold. This
chapter addresses this blind spot by tying international interventions
to their aftermath, viewing the creation of post-conflict institutions as
the beginning of the next phase of political contestation. It thus devotes
further attention to the consequences of the institutional decisions
made during the transitional governance process and the unfolding
domestic political dynamics, as I assess the degree of state capacity and
democratic consolidation in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan.
Hewing to the historical institutionalist perspective, I examine how
governance power shifts and settles through the institutional system,
paying particular attention to the manner in which domestic elites use
the institutional infrastructure to their advantage in consolidating their
own grip on power. Two core elements of the nature of neopatrimo-
nial political order in the three cases are highlighted. First, I emphasize
that the effects of the transitional governance strategy last into the final
phase of the peacebuilding pathway. Political elites thus continue to use
2 Thelen and Mahoney 2015: 23.
3 Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2015: 185–186.
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the strategies of institutional change on display during the transitional
governance period as they work to consolidate their preferred neopat-
rimonial political order in the aftermath of intervention. Second, the
chapter recognizes that post-intervention Cambodia, East Timor, and
Afghanistan vary in the extent to which they can be characterized as
peaceful, democratic, and well-governed. The governance qualities of
the specific hybrid order that forms in each country rest on the partic-
ular system of rent extraction and distribution that emerges in each,
which results, in turn, from how transitional governance interventions
interacted with antecedent conditions in each case. The consequences
of these peacebuilding attempts can only truly be understood when
they are viewed as pivotal points in time.
Power dynamics evolve in ways that can be hidden unless enough
time has elapsed to view their outcomes, especially when path-
dependent feedback loops are involved.4 The previous chapter empha-
sized that because UN peace operations must govern, they asym-
metrically empower one group of domestic elites to dominate the
transformative peace process and its aftermath. This has lasting conse-
quences. Paul Pierson identifies five mechanisms through which power
can beget power: the transfer of a stock of resources to victors; their
subsequent access to a stream of resources over time; the signal that
political victory sends about relative political strength and capability
and the alignment of other actors to these signals; shifts in political and
social discourse, or the cultural power to change society’s preferences;
and the inducement of preference changes that benefit those in power
through targeted investments, institutions, and policies.5 The evidence
presented in this chapter shows that these mechanisms apply as much
to those elites conferred power by the international community as to
those who win it under their own steam.
Post-Intervention Cambodia: Exclusionary Neopatrimonialism
and the Threat of Violence
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia declared vic-
tory and left the country having held free and fair elections in May
1993 and having overseen the process of constitution-drafting in the
months that followed. On the ground, however, the power-sharing
4 Pierson 2015. 5 Ibid.: 134–141.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Post-Intervention Cambodia 155
coalition between FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People’s Party
that resulted from the 1993 elections created legislative and execu-
tive gridlock. The CPP continued to hold power across the organs
of government and to administer the country just as it had before
the elections, as the State of Cambodia, and, before UNTAC itself, as
the Vietnam-installed regime known as the People’s Republic of Kam-
puchea. The co-governing arrangement between Ranariddh and Hun
Sen, nominally the first and second prime ministers respectively, was a
fiction from start to finish. The latter wielded true power while the
prince spent much of his time enjoying the perks of office and the
two men intensified their competition to win power outright for their
factions. Formal institutions and arenas of political contestation were
stripped of meaning as they were used by Cambodian elites to do noth-
ing more than mask the real political competition under the surface.
The power-sharing agreement concerned the top strata of govern-
ment and, in practice, FUNCINPEC’s authority was restricted to the
cabinet level while the CPP retained its monopoly on administrative
power exercised through the state hierarchy. In the ministries, FUNC-
INPEC found itself in a weak position – although it appointed many
party functionaries to senior ministry and provincial positions, it sim-
ply lacked the bureaucratic capacity to have the necessary presence
further down the hierarchy. Until 1993, FUNCINPEC had been a resis-
tance movement rather than a political party and it proved unable to
quickly develop any deeper institutional strength. In the provinces,
FUNCINPEC-appointed governors and senior officials found that
rank-and-file bureaucrats simply ignored their bidding and followed
the instructions of their CPP leaders instead. Finally, the security appa-
ratus was brought entirely under the control of the CPP and, increas-
ingly, Hun Sen’s faction within it – who portrayed the incorporation
of the other Cambodian factions into political life as a threat to the
nation.6 Overall, the government bureaucracy and the military, osten-
sibly two organs of the state, became organs of the party. The CPP
achieved this result by extending and strengthening the patron–client
network within and among the state, party, and military apparatuses.
Continuing bureaucratic factionalism has prevented the develop-
ment of national institutional capacity to this day. Institutions such as a
neutral and effective bureaucracy, a nonpartisan army, an independent
6 Hughes 2009a.
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judiciary – let alone precedents for peaceful power transfer – have not
taken root in Cambodia. A promising sign under UNTAC and imme-
diately after the first election was the flourishing of NGOs and media
outlets, and growing subnational political participation. UNTAC was
innovative in helping to establish Cambodian NGOs dealing with
human rights, democracy, and development, even giving them start-up
advice and funding.7 But these advances could not amount to much in
the broader political environment.
In effect, it had already become clear by 1995–96 that the Cam-
bodian political system fell far short of the pluralist, representative,
accountable, and efficient government envisioned by the framers of the
Paris Peace Agreement and the UNTACmandate. Institutional capacity
aside, Ashley points out that Cambodia’s post-electoral power-sharing
system did not emerge from, nor contribute to, the desire for reconcil-
iation on the part of the country’s elites and thus, unsurprisingly, did
not lead to a political transformation of the type sought by the inter-
national community.8 Not only did the power-sharing system fail to
foster reconciliation among the factions and build a new political sys-
tem based on compromise and inclusion.Worse still, the power-sharing
system created dual governments as FUNCINPEC brought its sup-
porters into the already bloated state structure. This deadlocked effec-
tive decision-making and governance and perpetuated parallel crony-
based political networks. Having failed to secure electoral legitimacy
or an administrative power base, FUNCINPEC leaders instead mim-
icked the CPP in rent extraction and distribution networks, entering
into “a tenuous compact among competing patronage systems.”9 The
power-sharing system thus failed to foster true reconciliation among
the factions. More perversely, it served in replacing outright elite con-
flict with a dual system of rent-seeking and predation. Operating both
within and outside the state, these “[h]ierarchical patron–client net-
works . . . have expanded and subsumed the formal state structure.”10
These patronage conditions have underpinned an ever-expanding
dynamic of elite rent-seeking and rent distribution that undermines
democracy and state capacity. The CPP and FUNCINPEC were united
in their desire to protect their patronage resources and sought to ensure
7 Author interviews with donor officials and civil society leaders; Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, May 2005.
8 Ashley 1998. 9 Gottesman 2003: 353. 10 Ashley 1998: 55.
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that their interests were not threatened through reforms. Both parties,
for example, were anxious to ensure that their own supporters sur-
vived a process of civil service reform, which prevented a necessary
retrenchment program; and attempts to modernize the public finan-
cial management system and increase state revenues also stalled since
they were seen as a threat to the ability of the two patronage net-
works to extract off-budget rents.11 The consensus principle of the
coalition government endowed the CPP in particular, with its control
of the state, de facto veto power over any reforms that threatened its
political, financial, or institutional interests. The capacity of the state
to deliver public goods and services had been weak under the State of
Cambodia. Post-UNTAC administrative reforms became increasingly
unlikely. The state had no nonpartisan, technocratic constituency to
support institutional reform and the building of state capacity and to
defend itself against the elite’s desire to cement the patron–client net-
works upon which its popular support depended. UNTAC, in empha-
sizing elections over statebuilding, missed the window of opportunity
to build that coalition for the reform and strengthening of the state,
which, in turn, has hampered the international community’s efforts to
build state capacity and improve Cambodian governance into today.12
Caroline Hughes observes that the government has, in particular, pre-
vented development partners from having any real influence over the
civil service, judiciary, and natural resource sectors in order to main-
tain these core elements of the administrative apparatus as “a sphere of
discretionary political action and an instrument of political control.”13
Measures of government effectiveness in Cambodia demonstrate that
while state capacity may have improved slightly in the late 1990s, it has
since declined and has stagnated at a relatively low level in comparison
to its per capita income peers.14
11 Author interviews with donor officials and civil society leaders; Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, May 2005. See also Nunberg et al. 2010; Nunberg and Taliercio
2012; Turner 2013.
12 Author interviews with donor officials; Phnom Penh, Cambodia, May 2005
and October 2005.
13 Hughes 2009a: 139.
14 Such measures include, for example, the World Bank’s Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) public sector management and institutions
cluster score for government effectiveness, as well as the “government
effectiveness” measure in the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset.
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010.
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The capture of the state apparatus, a hallmark feature of neopatri-
monial political order, doomed Cambodia to an inevitable backslide in
terms of democratic consolidation and it also hampered statebuilding.
UNTAC’s failure to move the CPP toward depoliticizing the state struc-
ture was its true legacy for post-1993 Cambodia, having much more
of an impact on the country’s later course than UNTAC’s success in
holding elections. The international community lost the opportunity to
build a countervailing locus of authority in the Cambodian state appa-
ratus that could potentially prevail against a corrupt, violent, and cyn-
ical political elite and form the basis for a genuine political settlement
to come out of peacebuilding through transitional governance. The
power-sharing coalition, viewed by the international community as
an encouraging move toward legitimate governance, was a mismatch
for Cambodia’s zero-sum, “winner-takes-all political culture.”15 The
consolidation of two parallel patron–client networks embedded in the
state also affected internal party dynamics, concentrating power in the
hands of Hun Sen and Ranariddh. The two leaders managed to work
together for the first three years of their coalition government, avoid-
ing contentious issues and pursuing enough economic liberalization
to satisfy foreign reform demands. Indeed, Cambodia scholars have
argued that the privatization and marketization reforms introduced in
the country in 1989 made the expansion of dual party-based clientelist
networks easier and more profitable.16 In this regard, too, the inter-
national community’s policy preferences enabled post-conflict elites to
achieve their own objectives more effectively.
Yet, even as they cooperated in rent extraction and distribution,Hun
Sen and Ranariddh continued to jockey for absolute power in the still-
evolving political context. Tensions quickly mounted between the two
leaders; by 1996, Ranariddh began to complain vocally about inequal-
ity in the coalition and the imbalance between the two prime ministers
and their parties became increasingly obvious. The Khmer Rouge still
managed to exert an influence on governance in the country even as a
spent military and political force, when Ieng Sary, one of the faction’s
top leaders, announced that he would defect to the government and
bring with him both a large proportion of Khmer Rouge troops and
the resource-rich territory around his stronghold of Pailin. Hun Sen
and Ranariddh, each eager to decisively tip the power balance their
15 Chandler 1998: 43. 16 Hughes 2009a; and Springer 2009.
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way, both offered large sums of money and the promise of future rent
streams to entice Ieng Sary to join their respective sides. In the end, this
was another political battle won by Hun Sen.17
Anticipation of the 1998 national elections set off a series of events
through which Hun Sen and the CPP were able to consolidate their
political power. The three main opposition parties – FUNCINPEC, the
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, and the new reformist Sam Rainsy
Party (SRP) – formed a coalition to contest the elections and challenge
the CPP’s grip on power. In turn, the CPP became increasingly con-
cerned about the increased attractiveness to voters of the opposition
coalition. Violence erupted in the charged political atmosphere when
an opposition rally led by Sam Rainsy was bombed in March 1997.
In July of the same year, troops loyal to Hun Sen and the CPP staged
a coup d’état, bringing tanks onto the streets of Phnom Penh, skir-
mishing with and defeating royalist troops, and forcing Ranariddh,
Sam Rainsy, and other non-CPP politicians into exile. Hun Sen’s pre-
text for this move to oust Ranariddh from the political scene was
the oft-invoked specter of renewed civil conflict, based on the accu-
sation that Ranariddh was about to strike a reintegration deal with
the Khmer Rouge. This coup marked the breakdown of the attempt
to share power between elite groups and the emergence of a de facto
one-party system led by the hegemonic CPP.18
More broadly, the 1997 coup and the series of elections that have fol-
lowed represent a sequence that has returned Cambodia to the often-
violent, inherently undemocratic, and traditionally clientelist manner
of asserting political order in the country. The expanding and tighten-
ing grip on Cambodia’s administrative and political systems exerted by
the CPP and Hun Sen has thwarted any meaningful progress in either
state capacity-building or democratic consolidation. A new election
was held in 1998 with the exiled politicians returning to Cambodia to
participate after almost a year of post-coup negotiations and pressure
from the international community. Yet FUNCINPEC and the SRP did
not have the deep party roots at the subnational level that were neces-
sary to challenge the CPP’s organizational strength and claim to state
authority across the country. In the announced election results, decreed
free and fair by international observers, the CPP won a plurality, while
17 Strangio 2014: 75–76.
18 Barma 2006; Brown and Timberman 1998; Croissant 2007; and Roberts 2009.
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FUNCINPEC and the SRP split the majority. (Official electoral results
from 1998–2013 are presented in Table 5.1.) It was common knowl-
edge that the CPP controlled this election, dominating new oversight
institutions such as the National Election Committee and restricting
opposition politicians’ access to the media.19 In another ostensibly
power-sharing arrangement,Hun Sen was renamed prime minister and
Ranariddh was made the president of the National Assembly. Some
space for the representation of opposition parties was made at subna-
tional levels of governance, but the CPP continued its entrenched hold
on the structures of the state. In practical terms, little changed “the
view that FUNCINPEC and SRP representatives took part in govern-
ment essentially on the sufferance of the CPP.”20
This familiar pattern was repeated in the July 2003 elections: after
an electoral process marked by voting fraud and violence, the CPP won
over half the seats in the national assembly, although it did fall short
of the two-thirds majority needed to form a government. One year
of stalemate followed, with negotiations to form a government begin-
ning in July 2004 and culminating in yet another deal on paper with
FUNCINPEC. In practice, the control exercised by the CPP and Hun
Sen on the country’s levers of power simply becamemore concentrated,
even as the CPP continued to gain a veneer of international legitimacy
from these elections, which it has prided itself in organizing efficiently.
Although international observers have certified all of Cambodia’s series
of post-conflict elections as free and fair, the CPP’s electoral strategy is
19 Gottesman 2003; Hughes 2003. 20 Hughes 2009b: 55.
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common knowledge: in 2003, its guidance to party representatives was
to offer clear voting instructions and easy poll access for their support-
ers, combined with misdirection for other parties’ supporters.21
Within a decade of UNTAC’s withdrawal, the formal institutional
and electoral space was simply no longer the true arena of political
contestation. As he further consolidated political power, Hun Sen con-
tinued to strengthen the CPP’s control over the state and its lucra-
tive patronage networks. The CPP-dominated Royal Government of
Cambodia has created and reinforced a system of resource generation
and distribution for paying off rivals and supporters that runs par-
allel to the formal trappings of government through access to large
off-budget “slush funds.” What should be public goods and services
for the rural population – such as schools, health clinics, roads, and
bridges – are branded as targeted “gifts” provided by the CPP and its
senior leaders to the population, instead of being presented as program-
matically delivered government outputs.22 Villages across the country
thus receive “Hun Sen schools” and health centers bearing the names
of Hun Sen’s wife and other prominent CPP elites. From 1998 onward,
this particularist approach was a pillar of the CPP’s electoral strategy
and proved crucial in their increasing vote share in the 1998 and 2003
national elections and the 2002 and 2007 local elections. Through its
clientelist strategy, the CPP has claimed for itself the mantle of being the
only party that could effectively deliver public services – notwithstand-
ing the need to rely on personal networks or bribes to access these ser-
vices. In 2003, for example, the CPP’s electoral message was, “We are
the party that gets things done; don’t bite the hand that feeds you.”23
The patronage machine has also been indispensable to the processes
of elite accommodation within the country – and has, in turn, freed
the government and party elites, to a great extent, from the need to be
accountable to the Cambodian population. With the CPP hegemonic,
a “shadow state” system developed, with elites focusing on develop-
ing predatory and exclusive control over high-rent economic activity,
thereby assuring their hold on power.24 The army and police have been
complicit in the patronage system, relying upon the valuable resource
21 Ibid.: 51–53.
22 Author interviews with donor officials, Cambodian analysts, and civil society
leaders; Phnom Penh, Cambodia, October 2014.
23 Hughes 2009b: 50. 24 Barma 2012a; Hughes 2009a; and Le Billon 2000.
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concessions they have been granted by the political elite to enrich indi-
vidual officials and strengthen their bureaucratic power through an
array of illegal and predatory activities.25
Cambodia’s political elites have expanded their patronage networks
both vertically, to accumulate uncontested power at the subnational
level, and horizontally, to include wealthy business interests and mil-
itary leaders, who control, together with politicians in mutually ben-
eficial arrangements, access to most of the country’s lucrative natural
resources, including timber and now oil.26 An elite strata of Cambo-
dian businessmen accrue rents in partnership with government and
party officials, through channels such as preferred access to govern-
ment procurement contracts and government-brokered land grabs in
anticipation of lucrative development projects. Cambodian newspa-
pers are filled with reports of protests about evictions in Phnom Penh
and other towns.27 Rural areas are also affected by this phenomenon:
Hughes reports that what was a fairly egalitarian land-holding system
in the countryside in 1989 was transformed into a highly unequal one
by 2006,where 70 percent of the land was owned by the richest 20 per-
cent of the population, resulting in a considerable “dispossession of the
poor” in the context of the rural subsistence economy.28 Overall, a pro-
cess of privatization of state assets – forestry, fisheries, minerals, water,
petroleum, and land – has generated revenues for the government to
distribute as clientelist payments for political support; and has forti-
fied a mutually symbiotic relationship between Cambodia’s political
and economic elites.
As these predatory patterns have increasingly permeated the coun-
try’s political economy, the role of violence and intimidation in influ-
encing election results gave way, for over two decades, to an increasing
reliance on patronage distribution aimed toward uncontested political
dominance. In this way, elite predation has replaced outright conflict
25 Hendrickson 2001: 72. 26 Barma 2012b.
27 The notorious Boueng Kak Lake development is one such example. What used
to be a major freshwater lake in central Phnom Penh that served as a source of
food and income generation for about 4,000 households living in the villages
around the lake, as well as an important element of the urban ecology, was
granted in a concession to a CPP senator in 2007. In a joint venture with a
Chinese property developer, his company began filling in the lake and evicting
residents, offering them minimal compensation, in order to prepare the land for
a luxury development. See Kent 2016.
28 Hughes 2009a: 158.
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as the main avenue through which Cambodians experience insecurity
and vulnerability in everyday life – but “the threat of violence [remains]
an ever present prop to the system.”29 In addition to patronage distri-
bution, the CPP’s other core electoral strategy has been the mantra
that it alone can ensure security and order in the country and prevent
it from descending again into conflict; when, ironically, the only real
insecurity in Cambodia emerges from within the CPP and as a result of
its tactics. Hun Sen and other party leaders regularly raise the specter
of renewed civil war in the event that the CPP’s governing legitimacy
were to be challenged. Yet the opposition persists – in the elections
of 2013, even in the face of the typical widespread enticements for
CPP voters and the intimidation of opposition supporters, Cambodian
voters delivered surprising gains at the polls to opposition parties on
the back of high levels of expressed discontent with poor government
services, corruption, land grabs, and poor economic opportunity. Still
dominating oversight and executive functions within government, the
CPP persuaded Sam Rainsy and his new opposition party, the Cam-
bodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), to end a boycott of parliament
and enter into a working relationship with the governing regime. By
late 2015, what appeared to be a promising rapprochement had ended,
with a bitter stand-off between Hun Sen and a newly self-exiled Sam
Rainsy in full force. Opposition leader Kem Sokha marked the twenty-
fourth anniversary of the Paris Peace Agreement in October 2015 by
denouncing the CPP government for having failed to deliver on the
promises set out in the peace deal.30 Hun Sen, in turn, reverted to his
dire warnings of the return of civil strife and violent conflict if voters
fail to support the CPP.31
It may be the case that the logic underpinning the neopatrimonial
political order provided by the CPP in post-conflict Cambodia is in
the process of changing from one of enforcing internal security to one
in which the regime will need to deliver a greater measure of public
services and some level of collective goods in order to retain political
support for itself. The 2013 election results were viewed as a water-
shed in this respect, especially since the basis for the regime’s legitimacy
29 Hughes 2009a: 156; also Hughes 2003; and Un 2005.
30 Kuch Naren. 2015. “CNRP Says Peace Accords Not Yet Fully Implemented.”
The Cambodia Daily, October 24.
31 Alex Willemyns. 2015. “Hun Sen, Pondering Defeat, Has War on Mind.” The
Cambodia Daily, October 26.
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appears to be shifting as an older generation scarred by the civil war
and genocide becomes superseded politically by a new generation with
little direct memory of war and more modern demands of government.
In 2014, it seemed that the CPP regime recognized that it would have
to start doing something differently or else be at real risk of being voted
out.32 Perhaps, twenty-five years after the end of the Cambodian civil
war, post-conflict incentives are finally being truly reoriented. In the
immediate post-conflict environment, it was apparent that the time
horizons were extremely short, orienting the country’s elites toward
high levels of extractive behavior – and even collusion if necessary, as
evidenced in the CPP’s and FUNCINPEC’s dual rent networks. Now,
with some degree of demand for accountability, government perfor-
mance in terms of service delivery, and renewed attention to electoral
legitimacy, the time horizon may finally be lengthening – and it appears
likely that the CPP will have to better deliver some measure of public
goods in order to get the minimal level of public support necessary to
stay in power legitimately. If this were to become true, it will not have
been the international peacebuilding intervention that achieved these
results; the changes will have been the outcome of a more organic pro-
cess of evolution in governance.
Post-Intervention East Timor: Inclusionary Neopatrimonialism
and Latent Conflict
After East Timor attained independence, the UN designated two suc-
cessive missions, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET, 2002–2005) and the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL,
2005–2006), to assist with the program of continued reconstruction.
The central dimension of both those mandates was to provide con-
tinued capacity-building assistance to the East Timorese administra-
tion. Although by September 2001, UNTAET had established the East
Timor Public Administration as part of an all-Timorese transitional
government, this embryonic civil service had only a very limited capac-
ity. The civil administration was highly dependent on international
assistance to make up for a low level of professional skills, particularly
in the central government functions of human resources and public
32 Author interviews with donor officials, Cambodian analysts, and civil society
leaders; Phnom Penh, Cambodia, October 2014.
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financial management.33 Timorese political leaders’ emphasis on polit-
ical incorporation had meant that little attention was paid to the state-
strengthening dimension of the peacebuilding program. Measures of
government effectiveness in East Timor demonstrate that state capac-
ity did not much improve after the transition to independence and has
remained at low levels.34
FRETILIN’s domination of the political process after the transitional
period – facilitated by UNTAET’s slow moves to incorporate broader
political participation and the sequencing of the Timorization of gov-
ernment – proved problematic for the strengthening of the state and
the longer-term consolidation of democracy in East Timor. FRETILIN,
in essence, “placed the new National Parliament in clear subordina-
tion to a government intent on using its majority to push through its
ambitious legislative program.”35 It also quickly began to consolidate
its patronage networks throughout the country by politicizing civil ser-
vice hiring in district administration, ensuring positions were filled by
FRETILIN cadres.36 By mid-2005 it became apparent that, notwith-
standing its grassroots support and dominating organizational pres-
ence throughout the country, the population at large did not necessarily
share FRETILIN’s goals for the country.
The FRETILIN leadership’s particular history and contemporary
policymaking style and content increasingly compromised the party’s
political legitimacy. The party compounded a pattern of Timorese eli-
tist political behavior that threatened true democratic consolidation. In
an oft-cited example of what was viewed as the FRETILIN leadership’s
political tone-deafness and elitist orientation, it chose Portuguese as
the official national language, marginalizing the Indonesian-educated
33 Author interviews with East Timorese government officials in civil service
human resources management and public financial management; Dili, East
Timor, April 2005.
34 Such measures include, for example, the World Bank’s Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) public sector management and institutions
cluster score for government effectiveness, as well as the “government
effectiveness” measure in the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset.
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010.
35 Goldstone 2004: 84.
36 Author interviews with academics, East Timorese provincial officials, and
donor officials; Dili, East Timor, 2005. One Timorese official reported that
FRETILIN was the only party that had a presence in his (relatively large)
province.
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and Bahasa-speaking urban youth who were in the process of form-
ing their own increasingly significant political constituency. Timorese
civil society representatives have criticized the country’s hierarchical
and closed political culture, pointing out that although it may have
contributed to the success of a national resistance movement it has
since been detrimental to democracy.37 The opposition began to mobi-
lize – the Catholic Church, for example, began to take on a more
activist and populist role, opposing the government over certain pieces
of legislation.38
Politically motivated violence erupted in April 2006, reflecting deep
and long-standing political animosities among the elite, emerging state
capture and competing patterns of patronage behavior, and an absence
of elite efforts to engage with community and customary forms of
governance.39 This conflict turned violent as FRETILIN proved unable
to assert legitimate control over armed groups – the breakdown in
authority resulted in an episode of arson and looting in Dili and its
environs. Over the course of several months of severe political insta-
bility, 38 people were killed and 69 wounded, 1,500 houses were
destroyed, and 150,000 people were internally displaced.40 Eventu-
ally, the majority of the population had their wishes fulfilled when
FRETILIN Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri was forced out of office at
the behest of Xanana Gusmão and other revolutionary leaders.
The 2006 conflict marked the onset of internal strife and politi-
cal instability, distinct from both the decades-long resistance and the
1999 conflict associated with the independence vote. It revealed deep-
seated social tensions in East Timor and some saw it as an out-
come of UNTAET’s failure to broker a domestic political settlement
at independence.41 The “crisis,” as it became known, was triggered by
rising tension between factions in the armed forces and police. There
was some truth to the notion that this dispute reflected long-standing
37 Author interviews with East Timorese NGO representatives and journalists;
Dili, East Timor, April 2005. At the time, Gusmão escaped criticism of elitist
political decision-making. Also, Bowles and Chopra 2008.
38 In April 2005, the Catholic Church trucked in tens of thousands of
unemployed youth from the provinces to Dili in order to stage a demonstration
against the government’s plan to make religious education in schools optional
rather than mandatory.
39 Boyle 2009; Brown 2009; and Scambary 2009.
40 Figures from Hughes 2009a: 154. 41 For example, Ingram 2012.
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animosities between theWestern and Eastern factions within the armed
forces – more Western commanders were killed during the Indone-
sian occupation and Western soldiers complained that their treatment
under mostly Eastern commanders was unfair. The tension was a con-
crete manifestation of decisions made during the transitional gover-
nance period: when the East Timor Defense Force was created at inde-
pendence, the first of its two battalions was recruited from the ranks
of the FALINTIL guerrilla fighters in a process that disproportion-
ately favored Gusmão loyalists and troops from the eastern districts of
the country.42 Some of this tension was also the outcome of political
intrigue: the Minister of the Interior Rogério Lobato, with the implicit
consent of Alkatiri, established loyalist groups inside the armed forces
as a counterweight to those troops loyal to Gusmão. A UN Security
Council assessment mission found that Lobato also supplied an irreg-
ular paramilitary group involved in the violence with arms intended
for the police and that he instructed the group to use the weapons
against political opponents.43 Yet the crisis quickly spiraled to encom-
pass a number of sociopolitical grievances and dimensions – escalat-
ing because it became a vehicle for key groups, particularly resistance
veterans and Dili residents, to rally against the unpopular Alkatiri
government.44
Overlaid on the political scene was the fact that during this period
East Timor had rapidly become one of the most petroleum-dependent
countries in the world, with oil and natural gas revenues providing
about 90 percent of government revenues, on average, since petroleum
production commenced in 2004. In retrospect, observers point to the
role played by petroleum revenues in lubricating the 2006 civil con-
flict and political fight.45 At the time of independence the FRETILIN
government had to operate with a very small budget and refused
to borrow to finance more spending. As the country began to reap
its first hydrocarbon revenues in 2004, the opposition disapproved
of the continued austerity measures in the face of this windfall. By
2005–06 FRETILIN’s decision not to spend the country’s petroleum
42 Ingram 2012: 11. See also Rees 2004.
43 United Nations Security Council 2006.
44 Scambary 2009 provides a detailed examination of this crisis. See also United
Nations Security Council 2006; United States Library of Congress 2009.
45 Barma 2014.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
168 Neopatrimonial Post-Conflict Political Order




























































wealth to relieve poverty, kick-start growth, and create much-needed
employment had contributed substantially to the population’s
widespread disaffection with the party.
New presidential and parliamentary elections were held in May and
June 2007, respectively. Xanana Gusmão stepped aside as president
to run for prime minister, the real seat of power in the country, and
his ally José Ramos-Horta easily won the presidential election against
the FRETILIN candidate. In the parliamentary elections, FRETILIN
received the largest number of votes but, in a serious rebuke from the
voters, it saw its tally slip from 57 percent in the 2001 elections to
29 percent and it was unable to form a coalition government. (Offi-
cial electoral results from 2007–2012 are presented in Table 5.2.) Gus-
mão’s new National Congress for the Reconstruction of East Timor
or CNRT – conveniently the same acronym of the enormously pop-
ular national resistance front under whose banner the independence
referendum was won in 1999 – won 23 percent of the vote, the next
highest share after FRETILIN’s. In a contentious decision, President
Ramos-Horta exercised his constitutional right in selecting the CNRT
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to form the new government – but Gusmão was only able to do so at
the head of a volatile new coalition.46
A precedent for the peaceful transfer of power was thus set relatively
early in East Timor’s post-conflict years. Yet this was still a govern-
ment where authority was concentrated in the hands of a small group
of revolutionary-era political elites. The crisis had also clearly thrown
the country into a serious constitutional and political crisis, the reso-
lution of which was not uncontentious. For example, observers crit-
icized Gusmão for having initially compromised the constitution by
demanding Alkatiri leave office; yet there is no legal process in East
Timor for determining the constitutionality of his actions as president.
There appeared to have been a reversal of some degree of earlier behav-
ioral democratic consolidation among core political elites – but public
attitudes toward democracy remained encouraging. In a more promis-
ing sign of renewed political institutionalization, smaller parties were
proliferating and growing in strength, capitalizing on the frustration of
young, urban, and educated East Timorese with the older, Portuguese-
speaking, conservative leaders of FRETILIN and attempting to better
channel the political participation of the East Timorese population.
On the statebuilding front, the insistence on political participation and
development on the part of both the UN and the Timorese elite contin-
ued to overshadow responsibility being undertaken for reconstructing
the still-eviscerated structures of state. Although the formidable state-
building challenge may have been obscured by the attempts to repair
the country’s fragile democracy, the lack of attention to institutional
and human capacity-building contributed in no small part to the polit-
ical instability experienced in 2006.
Under the Gusmão-led coalition government, the neopatrimonial
nature of politics in East Timor has become increasingly apparent.
Political elites began to benefit from the oil price spike and the sig-
nificant stream of petroleum revenues in the late 2000s, distribut-
ing the patronage made possible by these fiscal receipts and gaining
political support on that basis. East Timor thus began to follow a
pattern familiar to rentier states, with public sector hiring and pay
increasing along with growing concerns over elite capture of petroleum
46 Politically motivated violence continued after the election, with rebel soldiers
undertaking coordinated, unsuccessful assassination attempts against President
José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão in February 2008.
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concessions and lucrative procurement contracts.47 The new governing
coalition viewed the Timorese population’s dissatisfaction upon failing
to see some immediate benefits emerging from the country’s newfound
peace and its petroleum wealth as a key dimension in the downfall of
FRETILIN. The electoral campaign run by Xanana Gusmão’s CNRT
thus pledged to increase social spending rapidly in order to deliver a
peace and petroleum dividend. Once in office, Gusmão’s administra-
tion delivered on that promise by initiating social transfers to specific
groups in the population and opening up decentralized mechanisms for
rapidly increasing public infrastructure spending – with immediate and
sustained results. Capital spending climbed from less than $25 million
in 2005 to about $180 million in 2008 and $600 million in 2011.48
Cash transfers constitute a very large share of the budget – $234 mil-
lion, or 13 percent of the 2012 budget, and a great deal more than the
$153 million spent on the health and education sectors.49 These spend-
ing increases were made possible through the government’s repeated
annual requests to Parliament to exceed the legally prescribed level
of petroleum revenue spending established to prevent the short-term
squandering of resource wealth.50
In short, since the 2007 elections, it has become both legitimate and
relatively easy for the government to engage in the neopatrimonial dis-
tribution of ever-higher shares of the country’s petroleum rents. View-
ing the various public spending measures in the best possible light, the
new coalition government acted in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis
to “buy the peace” with the country’s best interests in mind. From
this viewpoint, the government fulfilled its campaign promises and per-
ceived mandate to distribute rents in the form of public expenditures to
key constituencies – thereby maintaining post-election political stabil-
ity by pacifying the social dissent and controlling the internecine elite
47 Barma 2014; and Blunt 2009. 48 International Monetary Fund 2009, 2013.
49 República Democrática de Timor-Leste, “State Budget 2012: Budget
Overview – Book I.” Dili, October 2011.
50 East Timor’s Petroleum Fund Law of 2005 established a concept known as
Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI) that is intended to ensure intergenerational
saving. ESI is defined as the maximum amount that can be appropriated from
the fund in any given fiscal year, such that enough revenue is left in the fund for
the same value to be appropriated in all subsequent years. The Petroleum Fund
Law sets ESI at 3 percent, on the assumption that the Petroleum Fund will
generate an annualized 3 percent return on investment. República Democrática
de Timor-Leste, Petroleum Fund Law, Law No. 9/2005.
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conflict that had together led to the 2006 crisis. A preliminary analysis
of the geographic allocation of public spending in East Timor found
that the government was spending more – in terms of both cash trans-
fers and public investment allocation – in those districts most strongly
supportive of the coalition partners in the 2007 election.51 The coali-
tion was rewarded with another victory in the 2012 elections, in which
FRETILIN failed to make an expected comeback in the polls; and there
has been no return to widespread conflict since 2006.
Yet this is an equilibrium underpinned by a neopatrimonial politi-
cal order, rather than the effective and legitimate governance envisaged
by the international community and the major UNTAET intervention.
A small group of political–economic elites has cemented its place in
authority by dispensing patronage in exchange for broad political sup-
port. The coalition government, for example, has targeted its major
clientelistic practices to very deliberately and very successfully co-opt
the veterans of the clandestine resistance. High-level veterans are best
understood as being still-armed militia leaders who represent a sub-
stantial threat to political stability. They are the specific individuals
dispersed throughout the country who still have the capacity – and,
if their demands are unmet, the expressed willingness – to mobilize
civil conflict and even violence against the regime.52 Of the aggregate
spending on cash transfers, $85 million – a full 5 percent of the total
2012 budget – went to veterans.53 The official annual veteran pay-
ment averaged just under $3,200 per beneficiary in 2011, representing
137 percent of the Timorese average total household budget.54 These
transfer payments to veterans have been framed as recognition for past
service to the country rather than as a form of social assistance and
outpace and crowd out other social spending. Veterans have also been
explicitly targeted as the beneficiaries of the government’s decentral-
ized public investment efforts. Several interviewees in 2013 urged me
to imagine the counterfactual – asking, in particular whether politi-
cal stability would have persisted had major patronage distribution
51 Catherine Anderson, Naazneen Barma, and Douglas Porter, 2009, “The
Political Economy of Natural Resource Management in Timor-Leste: A Value
Chain perspective,” Unpublished report, Washington, DC: The World Bank.
52 International Crisis Group 2011.
53 República Democrática de Timor-Leste, “State Budget 2012: Budget
Overview – Book I.” Dili, October 2011.
54 Dale, Lepuschuetz, and Umapathi 2014: 292.
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through government spending channels not been initiated and targeted
to veterans.55
A different dimension of the neopatrimonial political order has man-
ifested itself at the national level, through elite rent-seeking and the
capture of significant elements of the government’s public investment
program and recurrent public sector contracts. In contrast to the distri-
bution of government spending to different groups of the population,
this latter channel of rent distribution benefits only an extremely small
and concentrated political–economic elite and their clients. Reports
abound of well-connected contractors – especially the family members
and business partners, both Timorese and foreign, of senior govern-
ment officials – winning single-sourced contracts, in contravention of
the procurement law, with extremely high profit margins.56
This type of predatory rent capture by elites is a typical rentier state
syndrome – but the East Timor experience exhibits an interesting twist.
During the term of the first coalition government from 2007 to 2012,
there was the sense that individuals and companies with particular ties
to the coalition partners were capturing the lion’s share of the con-
tracts, thereby excluding those connected with the opposition from the
lucrative rent streams. Since the government’s re-election in 2012, how-
ever, there have been signs that opposition elites are also being incor-
porated into the system of rent-sharing. In one sign of this increasingly
collusive elite behavior and capture of petroleum rents, the CNRT gov-
ernment and FRETILIN opposition in February 2013 came to a budget
agreement behind closed doors that led to an unprecedented unani-
mous budget vote in Parliament. Many surmised that the implicit quid
pro quo for the opposition’s agreement was their increased access to
rents through preferred procurement channels.57 As in Cambodia, it
appears that neopatrimonial practices may be as important, if not even
55 Author’s interviews with government officials and donor and civil society
representatives, Dili, East Timor, November 2009 and February 2013.
56 Author’s interviews with government officials and donor and civil society
representatives, Dili, East Timor, February 2013. A number of interviewees
mentioned a recent Deloitte audit of procurement in East Timor, circa 2012,
that catalogued specific irregularities and sources of leakage. During my visit to
Dili in February 2013, newspapers focused on the particularly egregious case
of the award of a lucrative hospital provisions contract to the husband of the
Minister of Finance.
57 Author’s interviews with opposition politicians and donor and civil society
representatives, Dili, East Timor, February 2013.
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more important, to establishing inter-elite compromises and accommo-
dation as they are to bolstering popular support for the governing party
and the reigning political order. At the same time, the Timorese pop-
ulation has also demanded cleaner and more efficient government. In
February 2015, Gusmão stepped aside as prime minister to make way
for a new generation of leadership. In a sign of a continuing thaw in
elite political rivalries – combined with a move toward a more tech-
nocratically inclined executive – Gusmão and his ruling CNRT party
recommended FRETILIN member Rui de Araujo, the country’s suc-
cessful health minister at independence, to be prime minister.
Elite collusion in neopatrimonial governance is unsurprising in the
context of East Timor’s contemporary political history. Leaders across
the political spectrum in the small country come from a small slice of
society – being primarily drawn from three main groups: the mestiço
elite; smaller groups of Indonesian-Chinese-affiliated businessmen; and
a handful of “Timorese–Timorese” leaders of the clandestine resis-
tance, many of whom come from indigenous royal houses. The cur-
rent generation of leaders for the most part grew up together while
attending one of two major Portuguese seminaries near Dili; divided
themselves into opposing factions in the 1975 civil war; and then
came together again, albeit playing diverse roles, during the resistance
and the post-independence UN transitional period. Their political–
economic incentives are, for the most part, aligned – especially in
the context of the relatively short time horizons in place as a result
of the known end circa 2022 of the revenue stream from the coun-
try’s only operational major gas field and the projected depletion
at current spending rates of the country’s petroleum revenues by
2028.58 The number of politically and economically powerful fami-
lies in East Timor has certainly multiplied since independence, with
the Indonesian–Chinese-affiliated group particularly in the ascendant.
Nevertheless, the core political–economic elite in East Timor repre-
sents, in essence, a very small winning coalition necessary to remain
in power.59 Over the past five years, moreover, through a deliberate
58 La’o Hamutuk, “How Timor-Leste Got Ten Billion Dollars . . . and How
Quickly We Will Spend it All.” Dili, May 30, 2012. Blog posting accessed at:
http://laohamutuk.blogspot.com/2012/05/how-timor-leste-got-ten-
billion-dollars.html.
59 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.
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neopatrimonial strategy, this elite has elicited and reinforced the polit-
ical support of the only real potential spoilers, veteran leaders, by dis-
tributing just enough of the gains to pacify dissent and secure an ele-
ment of legitimacy across the country.
Post-Intervention Afghanistan: Competitive
Neopatrimonialism and Persistent Insecurity
The inauguration of the new Afghan national assembly on Decem-
ber 19, 2005 marked the official conclusion of the Bonn peace pro-
cess as Afghanistan met its milestones. UNAMA’s role in the after-
math of the Bonn process was to support the new government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in its various dimensions of peace-
building, including the identification of a new security framework,
the improvement of governance, and the promotion of development.
A new roadmap, known as the “Afghanistan Compact,” was drawn
up at the London Conference on Afghanistan held in early 2006. At
this gathering over sixty countries and international agencies commit-
ted themselves, in partnership with Afghan government leaders, to the
principles and targets laid out in the Compact, which was to guide the
international community’s support to Afghanistan in state capacity-
building and the institutionalization of democracy. The express goal of
the compact was to rely more heavily on Afghanistan’s nascent insti-
tutions, with pledges of financial support from the international com-
munity.
Political stabilization, implicitly the international community’s over-
arching goal in Afghanistan, has proceeded in fits and starts. Many
have guessed that the fragmented parliament that resulted from the
single non-transferable voting system adopted for the 2005 parliamen-
tary elections was what Karzai intended in order to keep the executive
stronger than the legislature: the elections led to three roughly equal-
sized blocs in the assembly – one pro-government, one comprising
the opposition parties, and one unaligned.60 Even for the supposedly
empowered executive, however, a fragmented parliament can make
the formation of government and legislative politics very hard to han-
dle. Legislative gridlock is undesirable everywhere and in post-conflict
60 “Multi-multi-party Democracy.” The Economist, October 22, 2005. See also
Reynolds 2006.
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situations can even be dangerous given the immediate need for effec-
tive governance to underpin political stability. Constitutional experts
consider a stable party system to be an asset in post-conflict democra-
cies. The SNTV system typically impedes party-building, making elec-
toral alliances personality-driven and beholden to regional and other
particularist power bases rather than being formed on the basis of pro-
grammatic and collectivist appeals articulated by ideologically coher-
ent parties. The parliamentary fragmentation induced by the SNTV
system impeded Karzai’s reform agenda, since in practice it meant that
for each executive initiative he had to assemble anew a legislative coali-
tion through piecemeal deals and logrolling.61 Moreover, since Karzai
was unable to maintain a coalition of support for his program, the
Afghan parliament was able to assert itself vis-à-vis the government. In
May 2006, for example, the legislative body approved most of Karzai’s
proposed cabinet – but only after refusing to rubberstamp the whole
body and insisting on individual hearings for each member.
Power tussles with parliament aside, Karzai acted to make the cabi-
net more his own by dropping the powerful trio of Panjshir Valley lead-
ers who dominated the political and military scene after the Taliban’s
defeat and finally freeing himself from accusations that his government
was under the control of the Northern Alliance faction. The move was
seen as a step away from the “compromise government” that Karzai
and his foreign allies built initially as a power-sharing mechanism.
Later iterations of the cabinet included more technocrats as well as
some remaining leaders of ethnic and political groups from around the
country. Bringing local leaders to govern in the capital had the added
benefit of neutralizing their influence in their regional strongholds.
Thus, in the mid-2000s, it seemed that the Karzai administration was
making progress in curbing the most egregious displays of patron-
age – for example, by moving Ismail Khan out of the governorship of
Herat and into the post of Minister of Energy and Water, by demoting
Gul Agha Shirzai from the governorship of Kandahar province to that
of Nangahar province, and by removing Marshal Mohammed Fahim
from his post as defense minister. By later in the decade, however, more
ominous patterns of neopatrimonialism had asserted themselves.
Core choices made about Afghanistan’s institutional architecture
during the Bonn process and under UNAMA’s supervision have had
61 Reynolds 2006.
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lasting effects on both state capacity-building and democratic con-
solidation in the country. Analysts have argued that the international
community’s preference for a “broad-based,” compromise government
over the course of the Bonn political process had the drawback of set-
ting aside the pursuit of federalism, which many believed would have
been a more natural fit for delivering public services and building gov-
erning legitimacy in the ethnoregionally diverse country. Federalism
proponents argued that political contestation could have been trans-
ferred fruitfully to places other than Kabul, thereby recognizing the
true loci of power – military, political, economic, and administrative –
in the country. In attempting to create a strongly centralized national-
unity government – which grew, in turn, out of UN efforts to solve the
civil war dating back to the 1990s – critics argued that the interna-
tional community fell prey to wishful thinking rather than designing
appropriate institutions for the fissiparous reality of Afghan politics.62
Others have maintained that the appropriate solution to state col-
lapse in Afghanistan was indeed a centralized state that could build
effectiveness and maintain a credible monopoly on violence. In this
view, decentralized or federal systems create insurmountable center–
region tensions.63 The highly centralized, unitary state model was
intended to bring the provinces, once and for all, firmly under Kabul’s
political, administrative, and financial control – something that had
not been achieved in modern Afghanistan. Many Afghan policymak-
ers and observers themselves preferred the strong central state model,
believing that persuading local strongmen to incorporate their power
bases into a Kabul-led statebuilding process was an effective way to
neutralize their extralegal power, and that decentralization or devolu-
tion could come later if still desired. Amin Saikal, for example, empha-
sized that meaningfully incorporating Afghanistan’s “micro-societies”
into the new fabric of the state was essential but possible within either
a centralized or devolved state structure.64
One of the key aims of the broad-based coalition idea advocated
by the international community was to ease fears that Pashtuns, who
accounted for two-fifths of the Afghan population, making them the
largest single ethnic group, would grow too strong. Pashtuns, on the
other hand, believed that the concept of broad-based government
62 Goodson 2005; and Reynolds 2006. 63 Cramer and Goodhand 2002.
64 Saikal 2005.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Post-Intervention Afghanistan 177
was actually “code for rule by non-Pashtun figures from the old anti-
Taliban coalition, the Northern Alliance,”65 and that the Interim and
Transitional Administrations overly represented these other groups.
During the transitional period precisely the ethnic dynamic that
national unity government proponents were trying to avoid was set in
place, whereby Pashtuns, with the encouragement of Karzai, reasserted
themselves politically and aroused the suspicions of Afghanistan’s
other major ethnic groups. The October 2004 presidential elections
took on a significantly ethnic cast as a result of this ethnic electioneer-
ing,with Tajik,Hazara, and Uzbek leaders leading the vote in provinces
dominated by their own ethnic groups.
In a promising sign for political institutionalization, some of these
leaders – the Tajik Yunus Qanooni and the Uzbek Rashid Dostum fore-
most among them – would later form political parties in the run-up
to the September 2005 parliamentary elections in order to broaden
their appeal across ethnic lines. Despite the reluctance of Karzai and
other senior officials to see the formation of parties for fear that they
would deepen ethnic divisions, more than fifty parties registered prior
to those elections. A few months ahead of the parliamentary elections,
Qanooni announced the formation of an opposition front to compete
in the elections, intended to forge a serious opposition bloc to Karzai’s
government.66 Such moves toward party-building and other elements
of political institutionalization could represent important advances in
terms of behavioral consolidation of democracy among core political
elites.
Yet the perception of corruption and personal empowerment and
enrichment has also been a constant in the narrative of contemporary
Afghan democracy. In August 2009, Hamid Karzai failed to secure an
outright majority in the presidential election, being dogged by accu-
sations of corruption in his administration and concerns about his
attempts to secure victory by allying with unsavory warlords with doc-
umented human rights abuses. He nonetheless won re-election when
the runner-up, Abdullah Abdullah, refused to participate in the second-
round run-off due to widely acknowledged problems of voter intimida-
tion, media censorship, and electoral fraud perpetrated by government
65 Goodson 2005: 31.
66 Carlotta Gall. 2005. “Afghan Parties Form Opposition Front to Oppose Karzai
in Elections.”New York Times, March 31.
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supporters. (Official electoral results from 2005 to 2014 are presented
in Table 5.3.)
Even in the face of elite acrimony around elections, the consolida-
tion of democratic attitudes among the Afghan public showed early
signs of progress, in that Afghans quickly embraced the concepts of
elections and democracy. Over the course of successive elections, voter
turnout has remained quite high, although it fell from 84 percent in the
2004 presidential election to just about 60 percent in the 2014 pres-
idential election, in part due to increased Taliban intimidation in the
run-up to the latter. Richard Ponzio’s 2005 public opinion survey also
found significant internalization of democratic norms.67 But, in a sign
that power is still bifurcated between formal and informal, Afghans’
voting behavior does not necessarily match with their views on where
power lies in their society. Ponzio’s survey data also revealed that
67 Ponzio 2011.
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religious leaders were seen as having the most power and influence
in local communities, followed by roughly equal perceptions of mili-
tia commanders, provincial and local government administrators, and
tribal leaders, with elected officials coming in a relatively distant last
in power and influence perceptions.68
The need to neutralize or incorporate alternative loci of power in the
political system continues to be the major obstacle besetting both state-
building and democratic consolidation in Afghanistan. While provin-
cial governors and district officers are appointed by the center, most
governors received their posts in the interim, transitional, and sub-
sequent administrations because of their independent and traditional
power bases. AndrewReynolds noted that of the 249 legislators elected
to the first national assembly 40 were commanders still linked to
militias;69 moreover, nearly half of all the original crop of MPs were
mujahideen veterans of the war against the Soviets in the 1980s.70 The
persistent and instrumental patron–client culture associated with the
militias has yet to be replaced by government and civil society insti-
tutions that offer public services in an accountable and programmatic
manner.A frequent complaint of Afghans living in Kandahar, for exam-
ple, is that life has reverted to the chaos under warring mujahedeen
factions.71
Most subnational leaders, initially appointed in recognition of their
power and granted renewed legitimacy through the transitional gov-
ernance process, have further entrenched their predatory activities
and bolstered their patronage networks. These warlords have devel-
oped sophisticated political–economic strategies to sustain their power
bases,managing their own resources and position in regional economic
networks, both licit and illicit, while also tapping into international
support.72 Dipali Mukhopadhyay notes, however, that there is impor-
tant variation in terms of the behavior of local strongmen and their
strategy for governing provincial areas, when granted formal power by
the central government to do so.73 She observes how some of the gov-
ernment’s most formidable would-be competitors, the regional war-
lords, have turned into valuable partners in governing the country and
68 Ibid.: 158–159. 69 Reynolds 2006: 112.
70 “Let’s Make a Deal: A Democracy Arrives, Afghan Style.”New York Times,
December 4, 2005.
71 Chayes 2006. 72 Goodhand 2008; and Mac Ginty 2010.
73 Mukhopadhyay 2014.
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establishing a political order that, albeit suboptimal in comparison to
the modern political order sought by the international community, is
certainly better than what came before. Even as they practice tradi-
tional clientelist politics, some local strongmen are delivering an impor-
tant measure of provincial governance on that basis.74
The political accommodation choices made over the course of the
Bonn process exposed two major political consolidation challenges in
Afghanistan. On the one hand, the Karzai government has not been
able to extricate its reliance – sometimes problematic, sometimes sur-
prisingly beneficial – on the successful warlords, among the winners at
the end of the conflict,who have since posed problems for the represen-
tativeness of democracy and the legitimacy and authority of the central
government. On the other hand, the political process in Afghanistan
has been unable – because of the unwillingness of successive Afghan
governments and their foreign backers – to incorporate the Taliban,
the losers of the conflict. Violent clashes increased in the run-up to the
2004 and 2005 elections, with Taliban militants stepping up attacks
against soft government targets, particularly in Afghanistan’s majority
Pashtun southern and eastern provinces; these intensified again around
the 2009 and 2010 elections.
These attacks increasingly undermined the government’s legitimacy
and, by the end of the decade, the steadily mounting clashes also com-
promised the government’s authority, resulting in large swaths of terri-
tory in those provinces being ceded to the control of the Taliban and its
allies. In short, the question of how to handle the Taliban re-emerged
with pressing urgency after 2006, when the movement stepped up its
campaign of instability and attacks against the governing authorities,
both central and provincial. The Bonn Agreement was clearly a win-
ners’ deal – but it was not necessarily the case that the longer-term
political arrangements that emerged from the transitional process had
to exclude the Taliban. By 2007, the Karzai government was hold-
ing informal talks with Taliban insurgents about bringing peace to
Afghanistan, yet neither side has met the other’s conditions to begin
formal peace talks.
The challenges of political consolidation and government effective-
ness that resulted, in part, from the narrowness of the Bonn peace deal
threatened the stability of the Karzai government on dual fronts.While
74 See also Migdal 1988 on the everyday realities of such strongman politics in
the developing world.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Post-Intervention Afghanistan 181
the deal itself probably needed to be narrow to be struck, the Bonn
process and international involvement subsequently continued to con-
strain the outcomes of the political transition in specific ways, espe-
cially because the UnitedNations and the United States were concerned
with political expediency and having a government counterpart they
could rely on. One manner in which both the warlord and the Taliban
problem could have been dealt with outside the political process would
have been through a substantial, focused effort on structuring a polit-
ical economy as well as a political and civil society arena in which the
benefits of participation were clearly more rewarding than continued
opposition. Afghanistan has the ingredients for a robust and vibrant
civil society, made up of interlocking layers of tribe, religion, ethnic,
and linguistic networks – what Saikal terms “micro-societies.”75 The
transitional governance process through which the international com-
munity instinctively pursued political stabilization failed in many ways
to tap into the sources of legitimacy embedded in these micro-societies
in a meaningful manner in order to leverage their salience and their
power for central governance purposes.
Instead, it seems clear, as Hamish Nixon and Richard Ponzio argue,
that the international community’s peacebuilding strategy “resulted
in the privileging of elections and institutions – however fragile and
ill-prepared – over a coherent and complete vision for statebuilding
and democratization.”76 Nixon and Ponzio observe that key interna-
tional players, including the United States, and Karzai wanted power
strengthened in the president’s hands in order to be able to co-opt or
defuse regional strongmen – hence, in order to fulfill political stabiliza-
tion goals, the parliament was deliberately kept weak and the broader
democratization and statebuilding agendas were adversely affected.
They provide another example with the story of the Provincial Coun-
cils, which are intended to provide local representation and bottom-
up development coordination and planning. Although these have been
hailed as an essential part of the Afghan statebuilding process, they
have yet to be endowed with the resources or competency to perform
their stated functions.77
Progress on the statebuilding front has proven even more disheart-
ening, although this is perhaps unsurprising since political stabilization
was prioritized regardless of its longer-term impact on state capacity or
75 Saikal 2005. 76 Nixon and Ponzio 2007: 29.
77 Ibid.: 32–33.
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effectiveness.78 Measures of government effectiveness in Afghanistan
demonstrate that state capacity may have improved somewhat in the
last few years of the Taliban regime and the first few years of inter-
national presence, the latter probably due to the large amounts of ser-
vice delivery and even central governmental functions carried out by
aid organizations, but government effectiveness declined quite quickly
once international attention drifted away from the country and it
remains extremely low to this day.79 A key measurable dimension of
state capacity is the government revenue to budget ratio, an indicator
of the ability of a state to finance its governing priorities and activities.
In Afghanistan, Astri Suhrke reports, the government’s 2002 tax rev-
enue was less than 10 percent of the national budget and there was no
change by 2004–05, when domestic revenues were expected to cover
only 8 percent of the total national budget and the gap to be financed
by donor funds; furthermore, this pattern was projected to continue
for five years.80 Based on this heavy dependence on external resources,
Suhrke goes so far as to diagnose Afghanistan as a rentier state. Con-
tinued reliance on these external aid flows, no matter how efficiently
handled, hampers the government’s ability to strengthen its own legit-
imacy and authority vis-à-vis the population. Moreover, the Afghan
government did not have the capacity necessary to absorb large inflows
of aid –much of the money went to financing international consultants,
who were not focused on transferring skills to their few Afghan coun-
terparts and hence did not contribute to long-term capacity-building
in the Afghan government.
Recognizing the immense reconstruction challenges still ahead of the
country at the close of the Bonn process, the Afghan government and
international donor community signed the Afghan Compact in Decem-
ber 2006. This strategy framed international assistance, tying it to gov-
ernment planning over five years; and follow-up meetings have since
been held. In an equally promising development, alternative visions
have begun to emerge in the country as the government attempts to
78 Freeman 2007; Rubin 2006; and Rubin and Hamidzada 2007.
79 Such measures include, for example, the World Bank’s Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) public sector management and institutions
cluster score for government effectiveness, as well as the “government
effectiveness” measure in the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset.
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010.
80 Suhrke 2009. This echoes Barnett Rubin’s diagnosis of the Daoud regime of the
1970s as a rentier regime. Rubin 2002.
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continue the logic of the Bonn process. An opposition group formed in
April 2007, theNational Front, called for changes to the constitution to
elevate the post of prime minister to share governance responsibilities
with the president and demands direct elections of provincial gover-
nors, who are currently appointed by the president. This new opposi-
tion front, which included some members of Karzai’s cabinet, formed
to challenge the president amid growing frustration with his rule and
the government’s progress.
A decade after the conclusion of the Bonn Process, however, the
deep elite power struggles at the heart of Afghanistan’s political
instability persist, continuing to manifest themselves in a center–
periphery contest over political order and stability. Early successes in
constitution-making and elections through the transformative peace-
building approach gave way to a deteriorating security environment
and setbacks in the international community’s pursuit of modern polit-
ical order in the country. Many hoped that the 2014 presidential elec-
tions would mark a turning point for post-conflict Afghanistan, as it
began the transition away from Karzai’s weak and fractious regime,
which was also regarded as increasingly petulant in the eyes of the
international community. The new president, Ashraf Ghani, is viewed
widely as a modernizing technocrat. Yet the 2014 presidential elec-
tion was, like the one preceding it, marred by widespread allegations
of voter fraud and intimidation. Abdullah Abdullah, the Northern
Alliance leader and then foreign minister under Karzai, was a clear
leader in the first round of voting and insisted that he was the victim of
large-scale electoral fraud in the second round – an assertion later con-
firmed by European Union election monitors. The standoff threatened
to boil over into violence until the two politicians eventually came to
a co-governance compromise, with the Pashtun Ghani taking the pres-
idency and the Tajik Abdullah assuming the newly created position of
the government’s Chief Executive Officer.
Since taking office, however, Ghani has acted to centralize power
in the office of the presidency, marginalizing both Abdullah and his
own vice president, the Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum. Albeit in the
guise of fighting endemic administrative corruption, Ghani has under-
mined state capacity in several ways. He has, for example, brought bil-
lions of dollars of government procurement under the direct purview
of his office, bypassing the line ministries that are supposed to handle
this state business; his aides, too, are taking policy formulation and
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implementation into their own hands, sidelining appointed officials.
Even those who support Ghani’s consolidating reforms are reported
to be concerned about the effects of his changes on the prospects for
sound governance.81
Afghanistan’s foremost challenge to the consolidation of effective
and legitimate governance comes from the continued salience of the
traditional neopatrimonial equilibrium – a political order organized
around subnational strongmen at the head of complex patronage net-
works endowed with alternative sources of authority, legitimacy, and
wealth that empower them vis-à-vis the central government. Having
failed in the first instance to incorporate their resources into the cen-
tral government, the Karzai regime then acted to neutralize the salience
of these patrimonial networks by competing with them at their own
game: it attempted to build its own clientelist base in the provinces
by distributing government positions to allies. Timor Sharan describes
how, in return, this strategy delivered the quid pro quo of electoral
support for the Karzai regime, which warned tribal leaders that if they
failed to support the Kabul administration they would be excluded
from local government and its attendant patronage spoils in the form
of jobs, aid, and other privileges.82
The international community’s strategy of prioritizing the stabiliza-
tion of the country through a combination of democratization and
political deal-making appears to have acted against the peacebuild-
ing imperative by reinforcing traditional fragmentary loci of power,
many of which have now come to operate in zero-sum opposition to
the central state rather than in cooperation with it.83 Antonio Giustozzi
argues that, compared with previous periods of political development
in Afghanistan, political parties in the country are now intent on secur-
ing for themselves a system of electoral support in exchange for patron-
age distribution. Examples of such political mobilization include par-
ties associated with the Uzbek leader Rashid Dostum and the Hazara
leader Haji MohammedMohaqeq: in both cases, organizational devel-
opment took place around the logic of securing and distributing
patronage instead of along the lines of ideological or programmatic
81 Azam Ahmed. 2015. “Afghan Leader Said to be Centralizing Power as Unity
Government Plan Stalls.”New York Times, March 15.
82 Sharan 2011.
83 Importantly, by contrast, some warlords have become able and willing
governors on behalf of the state. Mukhopadhyay 2014.
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goals.84 This system of patronage is fed, in turn, by internationally pro-
vided resources, such that the post-conflict intervention in Afghanistan
can itself be said to have cemented in place a rentier-driven neopat-
rimonial political economy in the country.85 William Maley goes so
far as to argue that flaws with the peacebuilding enterprise, including
decisions to put in place a presidential and centralized political system,
have driven Afghanistan from “institutionalization in the direction of
neopatrimonialism.”86
Those dynamics – which have resulted both from the narrowness
of the Bonn peace deal and from the transitional governance strategy
itself – have contributed to a lack of consolidation of modern political
order. The transitional governance process privileged and legitimized
Karzai at the center and subnational elites in the provinces, many of
whom are now enmeshed in a predatory political economy equilibrium
where state structures are fragmented and captured. The drug econ-
omy and other avenues of patronage and corruption have both created
pockets of stability in some parts of the country and fuelled sociopolit-
ical breakdown and violent conflict in others.87 As Barnett Rubin pre-
dicted, the criminalized peace economy has expanded rapidly in the
country, leaving power-holders as unaccountable as they were under
previous governing regimes.88 Jonathan Goodhand notes, for example,
that the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that
an estimated 80 per cent of parliamentary candidates in the provinces
had some form of contact with drug traffickers and armed groups.89
Poppy cultivation reached an all-time high in 2014, “stoking corrup-
tion, sustaining criminal networks, and providing significant financial
support to the Taliban and other insurgent groups.”90 Pervasive cor-
ruption, drug-related and otherwise, has undermined both state capac-
ity and the government’s legitimacy; political groups out of power,
including the Taliban, use the widespread patronage and corruption to
perpetuate a sense of injustice and legitimize continued fighting against
84 Giustozzi 2013: 328–330.
85 Suhrke 2013; and Wilde and Mielke 2013. 86 Maley 2013: 255.
87 Rangelov and Theros 2012 argue that conflict persistence in Afghanistan can
be explained by the emergence of a hybrid governance regime where the
exercise of power – by various international and domestic political actors at all
levels of the state – is defined by its abuse.
88 Rubin 2000: 1799–1780. 89 Goodhand 2008, fn. 34.
90 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014, “Poppy
Cultivation in Afghanistan,” Special Report SIGAR-15-10-SP, October 2014.
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the government.91 The transitional governance process through which
the international community instinctively pursued political stabiliza-
tion was co-opted by domestic elites into this conflictual neopatrimo-
nial environment. The Afghan state remains splintered, both politically
and administratively – in turn making the quest for sustainable peace
in the country elusive.
Neopatrimonial Political Order in Comparative Perspective
Francis Fukuyama cautioned, in his sweeping study of political order,
that patrimonialism “constantly reasserts itself in the absence of strong
countervailing incentives.”92 Neopatrimonial political order has been
reasserted in post-conflict Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan,
despite the enormous resources devoted to achieving modern political
order through transformative peacebuilding interventions. The polit-
ical elites in the three countries who were empowered by the tran-
sitional governance approach to peacebuilding are, unsurprisingly, as
motivated to retain control over the state as they were to seize it ini-
tially. Through their control of the administrative apparatus of gov-
ernment, these elites have access to sanctioned streams of rent creation
and distribution, which underpin, in turn, the clientelistic networks of
support that keep them in power. But neopatrimonialism is a hybrid
form of political order – the elements of rational-legal authority that
behoove elites persist. Patron–client relationships are not coercive –
they are instrumental and centered on reciprocal exchange, such that
the patron uses his influence and resources to provide benefits or pro-
tection to the client, who reciprocates with political support and per-
sonal services.93 Hence elites build and support some minimal degree
of state capacity and continue to rely on the legitimacy bestowed upon
them by elections, both of which are necessary to retain support from
the population and international community and to continue a strategy
of rent extraction.
At the same time, however, the institutional trappings of mod-
ern political order can feed into the neopatrimonial equilibrium. The
91 The Taliban has had an inconsistent approach to the poppy economy. Its
leader, Mullah Omar, banned its cultivation in 2000 on religious grounds yet
the Taliban has benefitted greatly, both before and after that decree, from
farming taxes and illicit financial flows related to opium smuggling.
92 Fukuyama 2011: 17.
93 Scott 1972. See also Stokes et al. 2013; and Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and
Nichter 2014.
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pursuit of electoral democracy increases the size of the selectorate, or
the fraction of society that is allowed to choose the political leadership,
without meaningfully affecting the size of the winning coalition, or the
fraction of the selectorate that enables the leadership to stay in power.94
The resulting elite incentives mean that narrow patronage distribution
to key supporters will be relatively high and broad-based public goods
provision correspondingly low. The demand for effective government
and public goods and services in the absence of the strong institutions
to deliver them, similarly, only exacerbates the reliance on particularist
distributive strategies as the source of legitimacy and political power.
The survival or demise of political elites in a newly institutionalizing
neopatrimonial system depends on the success of their network at tap-
ping patronage resources for distribution. Thus, once entrenched, and
fearing the consequences of losing power, elites face short time hori-
zons that lead to a vicious circle in terms of the quality of governance.
Elites with high discount rates increase rent extraction and distribu-
tion in the present time period; they also have less incentive to invest
in institutional capacity for the future, thus failing to lengthen time
horizons and intensifying the current stakes.
There are clear differences in the nature and patterns of neopatri-
monialism across the three countries studied, especially in the degree
to which elites collude in rent-seeking and distribution. Cambodian
elites across the political spectrum appear to be enmeshed in a sys-
tem of mostly exclusionary and competitive clientelism where patron-
age has replaced outright violence in seeking electoral support but the
threat of violence looms large. In East Timor, with the group in power
controlling the levers of patronage distribution, intra-elite schisms and
underlying sources of conflict persist but there are signs that elite
groups are increasingly colluding with one another. In Afghanistan,
patterns of rent-seeking and neopatrimonialism manifest themselves
in a more conflictual manner, with multiple patron–client networks
engaged in persistent conflict. The varied levels of stability, govern-
ment effectiveness, and democratic legitimacy in the post-intervention
phase in each country can be understood through a historical institu-
tionalist lens on the long-term challenge of constructing political order.
Particular governance outcomes depend especially on the time hori-
zons facing post-conflict elites, which, in turn, are determined by path-
ways into conflict and the critical juncture represented by transitional
94 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003.
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governance. Where institutions are weakest, i.e., Afghanistan, short
time horizons make politics a zero-sum game, hence elites concerned
with making the most of their time in power develop a predatory rela-
tionship with society. Where formal institutions and informal norms
extend the shadow of the future, as in East Timor, elites are more likely
to orient some elements of policymaking to the provision of collective
goods for society. Intermediate outcomes are also possible, as seen in
Cambodia, where systemic patronage practices along with low-level
violence still permits the delivery of economic growth and collective
social services and public goods.
The neopatrimonial political order that has emerged in post-conflict
Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan is typically viewed with
unease and disappointment by the international community. It does
indeed reflect the fact that international peacebuilding fails to achieve
the lofty ultimate goal set for it, framed as a sociopolitical transfor-
mation to underpin lasting pace. Yet the hybrid order depicted here is,
in reality, a neopatrimonial equilibrium that achieves in post-conflict
countries a certain measure of political stability along with particu-
lar forms of governing effectiveness and legitimacy. The final phase
of the peacebuilding pathway examined in this chapter – the ongo-
ing aftermath of intervention – illustrates two major patterns, both of
which are apparent in examining how post-conflict institutions evolve.
The first is the gradual whittling away and undermining of the institu-
tional forms preferred by the international community – rationalized
bureaucracy and electoral democracy. The institutional forms of these
modes of governance may persist over time but the evidence suggests
that they become hollowed out quite quickly in terms of the functions
they are supposed to serve once international peacebuilders have left
the scene. While formal institutions become empty scaffolding, true
political contestation takes place in the arenas I have identified in this
chapter. That contestation, moreover, can be seen to be a dual battle to
gain political authority and to use that power to continue to perpetu-
ate political advantage into the future. This fits perfectly Paul Pierson’s
observation on the path-dependent nature of power: “The exercise of
authority is not just an exercise of power; it is potentially a way of
generating power.”95 The second pattern offers cause for rather more
optimism. Even as they unravel, to different degrees, the institutional
95 Pierson 2015: 130
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Neopatrimonial Political Order in Comparative Perspective 189
fruits of peacebuilding interventions, domestic elites in Cambodia, East
Timor and Afghanistan have established and reinforced a stable polit-
ical order that underpins their ability to deliver some measure of col-
lective benefit to their populations. Assessed against the yardstick of
modern political order, this neopatrimonial system is suboptimal – but
it is, at least, a relatively secure equilibrium.
If we accept that peacebuilding must be improved, rather than dis-
carded – as I argue in the conclusion – then we must fully apprehend
how it has unfolded to date, which means seeing its results not simply
as falling short of modern political order. The post-conflict neopatri-
monial equilibrium constitutes a set of outcomes that we can fruit-
fully understand and explain. It is a political order, lying between the
Hobbesian state of nature and the modern liberal ideal, that benefits
elites while being suboptimal for the rest of society.Only if post-conflict
elite incentives can be reoriented toward building institutions and state
capacity to lengthen the shadow of the future and alleviate the commit-
ment problems that perpetuate neopatrimonialism will moves toward
more effective and legitimate governance be possible.
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Conclusion
The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding
There is a paradox at the heart of the international community’s
approach to transformative peacebuilding. Modern political order –
rule-bound, effective, and legitimate government – is asserted theoret-
ically and known practically to be optimal for achieving political sta-
bility, economic productivity, and collective social welfare. Yet the two
essential components of modern political order – a capable state and a
democratically chosen government – cannot be built at the same time
and certainly cannot be transplanted from the outside over a short time
period. This is true in the theoretical sense: state formation and democ-
ratization are long-term, messy processes, subject to reversals and con-
tradictions. It is also true in the empirical sense, as demonstrated by
the intervention experiences of post-conflict Cambodia, East Timor,
and Afghanistan.
The simultaneous pursuit of statebuilding and democratization
through the transitional governance approach embodies this paradox –
and, as a result, this peacebuilding strategy has resulted in a great deal
of disappointment in the countries in which it has been applied. The
UN’s peacebuilding approach is derived from international norms sur-
rounding appropriate forms of statehood and governance, and holds
that a stable and lasting peace is made possible specifically by the cre-
ation of the core administrative and political institutions of democratic
governance. On the administrative front, the theory of peacebuilding
privileges the construction of the rationalized bureaucratic state; on
the political front, the theory emphasizes the construction of the insti-
tutions of representative electoral democracy.Most centrally, the inter-
national community’s implicit theory of peacebuilding assumes that
statebuilding and democracy-building can and should be undertaken
in tandem toward the goal of consolidated peace.A great deal of formal
institutional change takes place in post-conflict countries during inter-
ventions, through the exertions of the international community. In the
aftermath of intervention, however, the cases of Cambodia, East Timor,
190
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and Afghanistan demonstrate that powerful domestic elites reassert a
neopatrimonial political order. These elites subvert the effective and
legitimate governance sought by the international community, in large
part by using the very resources bestowed upon them by peacebuilding
interventions.
This conclusion reviews the core causal logic that underpins these
findings and discusses its implications for the practice of peacebuild-
ing and its future study. After a brief recap of the causal dynamics that
play out over the peacebuilding pathway in Cambodia, East Timor, and
Afghanistan, I probe the broader validity of the argument with some
brief discussion of other peacebuilding interventions. Although this
book has described and explained troubling outcomes for an endeavor
as inherently optimistic as transformative peacebuilding, it should not
be read as an outright indictment of the peacebuilding enterprise, nor
should the evidence provided be seen as justification for simply dismiss-
ing peacebuilding out of hand.The bulk of this conclusion is devoted to
a discussion of how peacebuilding might be improved upon to achieve
more effective and more legitimate governance in post-conflict states.
It does so by first disentangling the statebuilding and democratization
imperatives that have been linked together in the pursuit of transfor-
mative peacebuilding. It then builds a series of targeted policy impli-
cations, along with one caveat, for improving peacebuilding practice.
Finally, I reflect on the implications of the historical institutionalist
framework applied here – with its emphasis on viewing “in time” the
incentives facing domestic elites and the way they interact with interna-
tionally supported reforms – for research on peacebuilding and other
issues central to the study of developing and fragile countries.
The Mirage of Modern Political Order in Post-Conflict States
Transformative peacebuilding attempts fall short of achieving their
core objective of effective and legitimate governance in post-conflict
countries because the interventions themselves enable, and are co-
opted by, post-conflict elites intent on forging a neopatrimonial politi-
cal order. This book has explained the disconnect between the formal
institutional engineering undertaken by international interventions
and the governance outcomes that emerge in their aftermath. It has
done so through the lens of the incentives motivating domestic elites
in those countries over the temporal sequence of three peacebuilding
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phases: the elite peace settlement; the transitional governance period;
and the aftermath of intervention. The international community
advances certain forms of institutional design at each phase in order to
achieve the goals of effective and legitimate governance. Yet, over the
course of the peacebuilding pathway, powerful domestic groups co-opt
the process to shape formal institutions and dominate the practice of
governance within those institutions to their own ends. Subsequently,
these elites consolidate their holds on power by both working through
and actively subverting the very institutions intended to guarantee
modern political order, thereby damaging the prospects for effective
and legitimate governance. The significant resources brought to post-
conflict settings via the liberal peacebuilding model – foremost among
them legitimacy and enormous sums of foreign aid – become a new
source and site of power for domestic elites.1 One of the core insights
of historical institutionalism is that “incremental shifts often add up
to fundamental transformations.”2 This study has demonstrated, in a
subtle twist, that the incremental shifts pursued by post-conflict elites
undo what are intended by the international community as fundamen-
tal sociopolitical transformations to build lasting peace.
In undertaking peacebuilding through transitional governance, the
UN acts on an implicit theory about how best to change the domes-
tic political game in order to create the foundations for sustainable
peace. Yet, in practice, at each phase of the peacebuilding pathway
domestic political realities trump international objectives. The interna-
tional community has pursued elite peace settlements through a pro-
cess of institutional engineering without grappling adequately with the
fact that this phase simply initiates the hyperpolitical experience of
peacebuilding for those countries going through it. Peace settlements
are viewed by the international community as elite pacts to end con-
flict and embark upon the business of post-conflict governance. Post-
conflict elites, by contrast, treat these agreements as simply delimiting
the grounds and terms of continued struggle. They do not bring an end
to long-term conflict; instead they move it into the political arena.
In turn, the transitional governance phase of peacebuilding requires
a domestic counterpart to help govern the country while embarking
upon a time-bound process of statebuilding and democratization. This
approach, paradoxically, enables certain domestic elites to take an
1 Richmond 2006. 2 Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 2.
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iterative series of actions to lock in their power and bestows legiti-
macy upon them through democratic elections along with the other
power and patronage resources that come with control of the state.3 As
David Roberts observes, “Victorious elites are routinely overwhelm-
ing in postconflict spaces”4 – such that an attempt to create a new,
improved power balance usually comes up short. At the same time, the
emphasis on consensus and power-sharing typically embodied by the
intervention approach comes at the cost of governance efficacy. In
the implementation of transitional governance, a specific tension lies
between the statebuilding and democratization components of the
peacebuilding model: whereas democratization involves the inclusion
of many actors and, ideally, the construction of bottom-up repre-
sentative institutions, statebuilding focuses on top-down efforts to
strengthen the bureaucratic apparatus, including instruments used to
control citizens. Neither political rebalancing nor improved gover-
nance is fully achieved through the transitional approach – let alone
both together.
In the post-intervention phase, a neopatrimonial political order
that rests on pervasive patron–client networks fortifies itself, blocking
the effective and legitimate governance sought through interventions
and forming a low-level political economy equilibrium. The institu-
tions engineered through transitional governance are manipulated by
domestic elites intent on remaining in power. The patterns of clien-
telism and even predation are familiar to observers of developing coun-
tries – especially those where there are large and exclusive benefits to
holding power.5 Time horizons are short in an environment where
institutions are weak and the shadow of the future is of uncertain
length. Elites benefit from neopatrimonial practices while in power –
and, fearing the consequences of losing office, are motivated even fur-
ther to distribute the resources of the state as patronage in exchange
for political support. The hybrid political order becomes even more
pronounced as leaders intent on such practices prevent the consolida-
tion of autonomous state structures. The state, instead of becoming an
arena of rational-legal authority and legitimacy, comes to mirror the
clientelist political balance.
3 Barma 2007. 4 Roberts 2011: 70.
5 Hutchcroft 1997; Le Billon 2003; and Robinson 2001.
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A neopatrimonial political order is a self-reinforcing and subopti-
mal equilibrium that is quite simply the norm in newly democratizing
developing countries suffering from low commitment credibility and
weak institutions. Yet transformative peacebuilding purports to build
modern political order – and this book demonstrates that it fails to do
so because domestic elites are intent on something else entirely. The
resources conferred by international peacebuilding interventions upon
these elites are co-opted in a neopatrimonial order that is extremely
resilient to the attempts of the international community to achieve rule-
bound, effective, and legitimate governance. Brief examples from two
additional cases illustrate the generalizability of this causal logic. The
US-led nation-building endeavor in Iraq re-emphasizes the inherent
tension between statebuilding and democratization. The peace process
negotiated by the international community in Burundi, in turn, reiter-
ates the manner in which steady elite interests reassert themselves over
the institutional trappings of the liberal peace, with post-conflict elites
using the resources and legitimacy conferred by the peace process to
reinforce a neopatrimonial political order.
Transformative Peacebuilding Elsewhere
It is a striking comment on the persistence of the international norms
represented in the strategy of peacebuilding through transitional gover-
nance that the Bush Administration, having invaded and occupied Iraq
in March 2003 without the consent of the UN Security Council, nev-
ertheless implemented a transitional governance sequence parallel to
that the UN pursued in the three cases examined in this book. Follow-
ing its military victory in Iraq, the Bush Administration in April 2003
installed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) overseen by Paul
Bremer, vesting it with full executive, legislative, and judicial authority
in Iraq and thereby making it the country’s transitional government.
Just like the UN transitional authorities examined in this book, the
CPA consulted and worked with a handpicked semi-sovereign domes-
tic counterpart, the Iraq Interim Governing Council headed by Ayad
Allawi, which was intended to represent Iraq’s various political, eth-
nic, and tribal groups. In June 2004, the CPA transferred sovereignty
to the Iraqi Interim Government, also led by Allawi. National Assem-
bly elections were held in January 2005 and a few months later the
Iraqi Transitional Government assumed the reins of power in the
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country, headed by Ibrahim al Jaafari.One of its main responsibilities –
akin to those of the Afghan Transitional Administration – was to draft
a permanent constitution for Iraq. After a constitutional referendum
and new national elections, the first permanent government of Iraq,
headed by Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, came to power in May
2006.
In Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan it is at least possible
to point to some successes of the UN’s peacebuilding operations. In
Iraq, however, the overall failure of the reconstruction strategy and
the decade-long civil war that followed overshadow small victories
such as the ratification of a constitution or the holding of elections.
The failure of peacebuilding in Iraq was over-determined and a com-
plex causal chain led to deteriorating security and civil war.6 Neverthe-
less, the Iraq experience also illustrates how the state- and democracy-
building processes pursued simultaneously in peacebuilding acted at
cross-purposes to each other and contributed to reinforcing a neopat-
rimonial political order. In post-invasion Iraq, too, the most power-
ful political elites – those at the head of the Shia parties – designed
institutions that guaranteed the inclusion of their own support bases
without acting to broaden political participation. The transitional gov-
ernance arrangements meant, for example, that it was possible for
Shia elites to avoid incorporating the Sunni voice meaningfully in the
constitution-drafting process. Sunni negotiators walked out of the con-
stitutional drafting committee and refused to be present at the signing
ceremony of a document they viewed with deep suspicion; Sunni insur-
gents, in turn, used the noninclusive process as a pretext for ratch-
eting up their attacks against Shia civilians and the Shia-governed
state.
In both the UN-led cases and in Iraq, furthermore, viewing elec-
tions as a primary sign of progress and a potential exit strategy led
to a shortening of time horizons that further empowered those groups
with pre-existing political organization, rather than focusing on broad
political inclusion. The ex post power outcomes – conceived as “who
governs?” – came, in each case, quite quickly to reflect the political and
organizational power balance in place at the end of the conflict, instead
6 A great deal has written about what went wrong in Iraq. Chandrasekaran 2006
and Galbraith 2006 provide nuanced and persuasive accounts of the
transitional government phase.
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of a deliberated and elected outcome. Like the CPP’s grab for the reins
of government and political power in Cambodia, the political and
administrative dominance of the de facto one-party FRETILIN gov-
ernment in East Timor, and the strength of regional power-brokers
vis-à-vis the Karzai government in Kabul, organizationally powerful
groups in Iraq – such as the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI), one of the two main Shia groups – managed quite
easily to consolidate their hold on power through elections and sub-
sequently to dominate the constitution-drafting process. The prior,
much-criticized, Bush Administration policy of de-Ba’athification had
previously stripped the Sunnis of representation in the state apparatus
as a countervailing source of leverage as well as leeching the state of
much of its institutional capacity.
Finally, as with the choice of the single non-transferable vote system
in Afghanistan, a precipitous path toward elections in Iraq led to the
choice of an electoral system with serious adverse consequences that
were foreseeable. Many experts argued that the electoral system that
likely made most sense for the January 2005 Transitional Assembly
elections in Iraq was one of proportional representation (PR) in multi-
member districts. This would have given constituencies strong ties to
the assembly, with meaningful local connections for governance; and
it would have been a worthwhile attempt to transcend the substan-
tial sectarian identity divisions in Iraq. Yet party elites were writing
the electoral laws and, in order to hold onto their power bases, they
wanted a closed-list PR election in a single nation-wide district instead.
The United States and the United Nations, running election logistics,
agreed to the plan, since it made it easier to hold elections quickly. The
result was that the elections became a blatant identity referendum. In
turn, this ensured that constitutional negotiations would proceed along
sectarian lines and contributed to setting in motion the ethnic secu-
rity dilemma dynamic that spiraled into civil war.7 Moreover, during
and after the civil war, political order such as there was in the country
rested upon sectarian and regional patron–client networks. Replicating
the pervasive neopatrimonial rent distribution of the Saddam Hussein
era, a small group of post-conflict Iraqi elites ensured their continued
political dominance through the narrow, particularist distribution of
7 Kaufmann 2007.
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spoils – including the country’s oil wealth as well as foreign arms and
money – to their supporters.8
Major UN peacebuilding interventions have been staged across the
Great Lakes region of Africa – in Burundi, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda – with the support of regional
and international power-brokers.Devon Curtis’s analysis of the Burun-
dian case illustrates that the liberal peacebuilding endeavor there inter-
acted with domestic elite preferences in much the same manner as
observed in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan.9 The Burun-
dian experience – which shares the characteristic transitional design
of the interventions examined here, albeit without international gov-
ernance – is often promoted as a peacebuilding success story. There, a
domestic power-sharing approach to liberal governance, underpinned
by carefully designed institutional engineering by the international
community, is believed by many to have achieved a good measure of
the political stability and effective and legitimate governance sought
through peace operations. Yet Curtis demonstrates convincingly how
Burundian elites, over time, have reinterpreted liberal governance,
reappropriating its symbols and resources to build a political order
where coercion and neopatrimonialism remain central to the country’s
stability. For those Burundian elites, “the practice of peacebuilding as
control became dominant.”10 Traditional governance in the country
functioned on the basis of clientelism and patronage, with elites seek-
ing and distributing rents in order to ensure political support and to
protect and advance their own economic interests.
The international community believed that Burundian elites, by
agreeing to the power-sharing mechanisms negotiated in the Arusha
peace process, would become socialized to the norms of liberal gover-
nance. But power-sharing was, in reality, a mechanism for these elites
to pragmatically expand the spoils of neopatrimonial order among
themselves, just enough to ensure stable governance. Mirroring how
Cambodian elites also accepted power-sharing as a necessary way sta-
tion on the path to asserting more hegemonic control, Burundian elites
embraced the institutional designs advanced by the international com-
munity as a way to buy themselves time to adjust to the changing power
8 Erika Solomon. 2016. “Iraq’s Parliament in Turmoil as MPs Battle Over
Attempt to Curtail Patronage.” Financial Times, April 14.
9 Curtis 2013. 10 Ibid.: 74.
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balance in the country. Thus, “Power-sharing governance was a tool of
control, not a break from neo-patrimonial logic.”11 The way in which
government positions were divided and the state captured through the
peace process was more akin to elite horse trading than a reflection
of any meaningful compromise over the deeper social and political
grievances that affected the population. Susanna Campbell notes that
important attempts were made by peacebuilders to build meaningful
local accountability into the process and these successes should not be
diminished.12 Nevertheless, as in the cases considered in this book, the
overall impact of international intervention was to confer legitimacy
on specific elites who had not earned that legitimacy in the eyes of
the Burundian people. In so doing, it reinforced their grip on author-
ity and perpetuated the neopatrimonial and hegemonic political order
they preferred.13
Whither Peacebuilding?
Peacebuilding has gone through a remarkably fast cycle over the past
25 years: coming into its own as a major international undertaking
in the immediate post-Cold War period with great optimism about
the possibility of what interventions could achieve; moving on at the
turn of the century to a big surge in peace operations, increasingly
complex and ambitious, across the globe; and turning today to more
humility in the scope and scale of interventions, with the retrospec-
tive recognition that much of this global endeavor has been filled with
hubris. Yet the implicit theory that sociopolitical transformation is
desirable and possible in post-conflict states has remained unchanged.
The practice of peacebuilding has suffered from a lack of critical think-
ing about this underlying theory, abetted by two major assumptions.
First, the implicit theory underpinning the transformative peacebuild-
ing endeavor is highly normative. It reflects the consensus reached in
the second half of the twentieth century on the logic of the appropri-
ateness of the bureaucratic nation-state form rather than resting on
any empirical case for the success of that form in achieving effective
11 Ibid.: 82.
12 Susanna Campbell, 2015, “Global Governance and Local Peace:
Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding,” Unpublished
book manuscript.
13 Curtis 2013: 85. Also International Crisis Group 2012.
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and legitimate governance. Second, the implicit theory of peacebuild-
ing represented in the UN’s transitional governance strategy for con-
structing a stable and lasting peace reflects the uncontested assumption
that state- and democracy-building are complementary processes.
The scholarly approach to the topic of peacebuilding has, in many
respects, abetted this faulty logic. The literature on peacebuilding has
gone a long way toward conceptualizing peacebuilding practice and
its various guises, identifying the contextual factors that support the
probability of success of peace operations at their close, and developing
technocratic lessons for improving interventions. Yet the almost exclu-
sively short-term focus in the peacebuilding literature combined with
the logic of appropriateness inherent in the “liberal peace” perspective
regarding the Weberian state and electoral democracy has resulted in
a narrow focus on the formal institutions transplanted through peace-
building without any systematic attention being paid to outcomes in
the aftermath of intervention.14 I have sought to develop a logic of
consequences by generating a theoretically informed and causally ori-
ented explanation of outcomes to explain why the international com-
munity is not really building the peace it thinks it is in post-conflict
countries.
The practical dilemma faced by international peacebuilders at the
turn of the twenty-first century has been sharply articulated by Roland
Paris.15 On the one hand, peacebuilding operations were under pres-
sure to expand their scope and duration in order to build the necessary
state capacity and legitimate governance for sustainable peace to take
hold.The evolution of the peacebuildingmodel fromCambodia to East
Timor, where the latter was more all-encompassing and more intrusive
into the sovereign affairs of the state, can be seen in this technocratic
mindset. More recently, on the other hand, these interventions have
also faced pressure to reduce the extent of international intrusion and
increase local ownership. This sentiment is best captured in Lakhdar
Brahimi’s “light footprint”approach for the Afghanistan operation. As
Paris observes pithily, neither the heavy nor the light footprint seems
to have worked.16
14 Critical theorists have, of course, argued that the liberal objectives
underpinning the model are an inappropriate imposition of externally
generated ideals in post-conflict countries. See, for example, Chandler 2006;
Hughes 2009a; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Pugh 2005.
15 Paris 2010. 16 Ibid.: 343.
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The pendulum has swung back and forth on such questions of the
“right”degree, scope, and modes of implementation of UN peacebuild-
ing presence, with critics remarking upon the UN’s tendency, like gen-
erals in war, to develop strategic plans that fight the last battle. The
lack of critical thinking about peacebuilding theory has generated a
series of policy prescriptions that address only a truncated subset of
the problems with the international community’s peacebuilding prac-
tice. Incremental adjustments of mandate and organization represent
a series of decisions about the optimal operational structure for imple-
menting the transitional governance strategy – they do not challenge
the implicit theory of peacebuilding. The latter has remained constant,
with the UN time and again attempting to pursue simultaneous state-
and democracy-building in a manner that defines the state and democ-
racy in normative terms and assumes that they are complementary.
Sequencing the Pursuit of Effective and Legitimate Governance
The key to improving peacebuilding rests in rethinking the theory that
motivates and orients it, not in tinkering with the size of the foot-
print or the precise mechanisms of institutional engineering deployed
by international peacebuilders. A major root of the disappointing con-
solidated outcomes of peacebuilding through transitional governance
is that the UN and the international community writ large tend to see
peacebuilding as a technocratic puzzle that can be solved with the right
mandates and institutional design, rather than seeing it for the domes-
tic political game it truly is. A sustainable post-conflict peace that rests
on modern political order must be crafted from the inside, rather than
delivered from the outside. In turn, this requires viewing the pursuit of
modern political order as a sequence in time – and recognizing, there-
fore, that the process of strengthening the state must be separated from
the process of democratization.Otherwise, the elites left most powerful
at the end of the conflict period capture the nascent institutions of the
state even as they ostensibly abide by the peace settlement. The make-
up of the state comes to mirror the political balance and the long-term
organic project of statebuilding is in turn hijacked by political maneu-
vering to stay in power.
The single most important implication of this book is that the inter-
national community must fundamentally change the way it perceives
the peacebuilding enterprise if it is to achieve its goal of creating
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effective and legitimate governance in post-conflict countries. Improv-
ing peacebuilding is a task worth undertaking in the interests of both
human security in post-conflict countries and global stability. Paris has
noted that “denunciations of liberal peacebuilding are both unwar-
ranted and imprudent,”17 a sentiment with which I concur.Transitional
governance mechanisms are valuable and probably necessary for ini-
tiating peacebuilding processes in post-conflict countries because they
provide much-needed international assistance in carrying out the func-
tions of the state as well as the political space and incentives for elites to
agree on a new institutional architecture. The question then becomes:
how can transitional governance be improved? Since the strengthening
of the state and democratization act at cross-purposes to each other
when pursued at the same time, different elements of the two projects
must be somehow separated and sequenced. What if the international
community privileged either the statebuilding or the democratization
side of the equation?
Focusing on the Leviathan
Leading peacebuilding scholars have emphasized the need to focus
on capacity-building and institutionalization in post-conflict contexts,
some even arguing that political liberalization through elections may
have to be put off in order to achieve statebuilding goals.18 This book’s
assessment adds the following insight: not only is capacity-building
hindered by an emphasis on early elections, but it is also stunted by
the very process through which transitional governance assumes state
administrative functions and designates a semi-sovereign counterpart
for day-to-day governance and post-transition planning. The strat-
egy of transitional governance itself constrains the potential depth of
capacity-building because international officials are more concerned
with carrying out their immediate administrative tasks than trans-
ferring long-term skills to their local partners. In addition, because
interventions focus on a specific subset of domestic counterparts, the
potential scope of capacity-building is also constrained because the
organizationally most powerful domestic group is essentially handed
the reins of the administrative apparatus. The story of UNTAET’s
17 Ibid.: 338. 18 For example, Caplan 2005; and Paris 1997, 2004.
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travails with “Timorization” acutely distills both these patterns, which
are also on display in Cambodia and Afghanistan.
Logically, then, deepening the statebuilding dimension of peace
operations would entail two things. First, it would require devoting
greater resources to skills transfer to local administrative officials over
a longer transitional period that is better oriented toward effective
international–domestic collaboration in governance. Skills transfer and
capacity-building through technical assistance is a notoriously diffi-
cult endeavor. Despite a strong consensus on the notion that an effec-
tive state is an essential basis for setting post-conflict countries on
the path toward sustainable peace, the international community has
yet to devise a coherent strategy for reconstructing and strengthening
administrative institutions in post-conflict settings.19 Yet instances of
institutional success in fragile and conflict-affected states offer impor-
tant lessons about capacity-building,which include: identifying specific
capacity obstacles to fulfilling an agency’s immediate objectives; devel-
oping a building-block approach to deploy existing capacities more
effectively and expand them more gradually; deliberately cultivating
organizational identity and pride; developing monitoring tools and
analytical skills for self-evaluation; and building implementation part-
nerships to tap into complementary capacity.20
Second, meaningfully reconstructing the leviathan would entail
deferring the political contestation of electoral democracy to first build
up the state as a countervailing arena of legitimacy and authority in
the nascent polity. This complements the view that a push for early
elections in peace operations has the adverse effect of destabilizing
the political arena and hence that elections should be postponed until
further institution building has been undertaken.21 Following Samuel
Huntington, scholars have focused on the need for greater political
institutionalization before elections and argued that democracy can
only serve constructive participatory and integrative ends following
political stabilization and institutional consolidation. Roland Paris
warns, for example, that elections, if held at the wrong time and in the
wrong manner, can legitimize the power of elected politicians to sub-
sequently sabotage the transition to democracy and never again face
19 OECD 2008a; and World Bank 2011.
20 Barma, Huybens, and Viñuela 2014; and Cliffe and Manning 2008.
21 See, especially, Chesterman 2004; and Paris 2004.
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a democratic challenge.22 The Cambodia case study sharply illustrates
how such a dynamic can play out, while East Timor and Afghanistan
also show signs of truncated democratization. To avoid this trap, Paris
suggests a strategy of “institutionalization before liberalization” that
would specifically postpone elections and concentrate on constructing
a framework of effective state and political institutions before promot-
ing political competition.23
Yet postponing elections to focus on statebuilding does not necessi-
tate the wholesale rejection of the democratization objective. Instead,
statebuilding can itself comprise approaches to trump political fissures.
In this view, the international community should consider alterna-
tive mechanisms of political participation that could be complemen-
tary to enhancing state capacity – because concerns that UN transi-
tional administrations can be dictatorships, even if benevolent ones,
are worth heeding.24 In addition to the suggestions I outline further
below, Charles Call and Susan Cook appeal, for example, for moves
toward democratization that better integrate legitimate local voice and
participatory practices into post-conflict governance institutions, rec-
ognize the multiplicity of legitimate governance models, and exercise
patience in building representative institutions.25 In Afghanistan, the
use of the traditional consensus-building institution of the loya jirga
for outlining the transitional administration arrangements and ratify-
ing the constitution was an intelligent choice that went a long way
toward balancing competing political groups and fostering a sense
of inclusion in an otherwise externally mandated process. Andreas
Wimmer and Conrad Schetter suggest that the loya jirga format should
have been institutionalized as a traditional consensus-building sys-
tem among bureaucrats, warlords, and tribal chiefs over the medium
term, instead of deployed only for the purposes of transitional
governance.26 Susanna Campbell shows that what measure of peace-
building success was achieved in Burundi can be attributed to the local
accountability mechanisms that the international presence put in
22 Paris 2004: 164. Diamond 1996 called the sabotage and manipulation of
democratic procedure and legitimacy by elected strongmen
“pseudo-democracy”; Levitsky and Way 2002 characterized the outcome as
“competitive authoritarianism”; and Zakaria 2003 termed it “illiberal
democracy.”
23 Paris 2004.
24 Caplan 2005; Chandler 2006; Chesterman 2004; and Chopra 2000.
25 Call and Cook 2003. 26 Wimmer and Schetter 2003: 530.
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place.27 In East Timor, by contrast, lost opportunities to incorpo-
rate subnational political participation and the failure to widen polit-
ical inclusion at the center while UNTAET still governed had last-
ing adverse consequences for the statebuilding dimension of the peace
operation and the country’s longer-term stability.
Letting Democracy Make the State?
The less obvious insight that can be drawn from this book is that it
may be possible to achieve greater success in building sustainable peace
in post-conflict countries by focusing on democratization and leaving
aside the statebuilding dimension in the immediate term. Such a strat-
egy would follow the United States’ path to nationhood and democ-
racy,where statebuilding was purposefully retarded and central admin-
istrative institutions kept deliberately weak to allow the flourishing of
democracy, albeit at the cost of a high level of patronage.28 In turn,
robust democracy and the civil society it nourished led eventually to the
Progressive Era of successful state and administrative institution build-
ing. A number of scholars have advanced the perspective that enabling
democratization first can even play a significant role in the develop-
ment of state capacity, especially if a basic state infrastructure exists –
which is almost invariably the case in the twenty-first century, even in
fragile states.29 In particular, where competitive elections lead to party-
building, those parties encourage elected governments to enhance their
ability to deliver programmatic and collectively oriented policies and
public services.30 Even in competitive authoritarian regimes there is
evidence that experience with elections can result in “liberalizing elec-
toral outcomes,” especially when opposition elites mount a strategi-
cally coordinated challenge to the incumbent.31
Could a sequence of putting democracy before the state work in
post-conflict developing countries, as contrarian as it might seem? Alex
Bellamy and Paul Williams have argued, from a critical theory per-
spective that deconstructs the international norms of statehood, that
it may be desirable to de-emphasize the state during the course of
27 Susanna Campbell, 2015, “Global Governance and Local Peace:
Accountability and Performance in International Peacebuilding,” Unpublished
book manuscript.
28 Shefter 1994; and Skowronek 1982.
29 Carbone and Memoli 2015; and Mazzuca and Munck 2014.
30 Reilly 2013; and Slater 2008. 31 Howard and Roessler 2006.
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peacebuilding in order to “help open up the space for conflict reso-
lution within civil society.”32 If this tactic had been implemented in
Afghanistan, for example, an emphasis on democracy in lieu of central
statebuilding could have been pursued in a decentralized, even fed-
eral manner. This might have successfully given the voters the voice
in governance they still crave by making local strongmen account-
able to them for providing security and public services rather than
being able to blame an illusory central government. In practice, patches
of better governance in Afghanistan have emerged on an ad hoc
basis when certain local strongmen undertook this contract with their
societies.33
For the goal of building a democratic process that encourages
accommodation between groups of elites rather than the reach for
hegemonic control, Philip Roeder and Donald Rothchild suggest that
“power-dividing”solutions are better placed to ensure democratic con-
solidation in post-conflict countries than the typical power-sharing
solutions favored by the international community.34 Michael Bar-
nett raises the same notion in his suggestions to build a “republican
peace.”35 One of the hallmarks of the power-dividing approach – also
pursued through institutional design, especially via constitutional con-
straints – is the elevation of civil liberties instead of a state-centric
orientation, along with the support of civil society and bottom-up
governance mechanisms. This approach potentially opens opportu-
nities for dynamic, issue-specific majorities to form, thereby moving
away from the reification of the social cleavages upon which power-
sharing is predicated and from the static power freezes that often result.
The caveat is that the utility of the power-dividing approach may be
hampered in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts because it is, to some
extent, predicated on reasonable degrees of state capacity, rule enforce-
ment, and norm adherence that do not often exist in many developing
countries, let alone those that have undergone violent conflict.
Six Principles and a Caveat for Modifying
Peacebuilding Practice
In reality, it is unlikely that thinking on or the practice of peace-
building will shift in a wholesale manner such that it moves toward
32 Bellamy andWilliams 2004: 13. 33 Migdal 1988; andMukhopadhyay 2014.
34 Roeder and Rothchild 2005. 35 Barnett 2006.
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separating statebuilding and democratization in the attempt to build
lasting peace in post-conflict countries. The international community
has a strong normative commitment to the rationalized bureaucracy
and electoral democracy that define modern political order – and pur-
suing effective and legitimate governance resonates more with inter-
national norms than pursuing effective or legitimate governance. As a
result, peacebuilders face a basic practical conundrum: they need coun-
terparts for the purposes of statebuilding but they must attempt to be
neutral in initiating democratization. The UN transitional governance
process essentially takes a shortcut on the statebuilding side by relying
on specific elites as local governing counterparts and agents of progres-
sive change – and, as a result, privileges those elites in the run-up to
electoral competition.
Giuseppe Di Palma observed that social scientists have blind spots
that lead them to consider democratic regime transitions “as a kind of
black box – interchangeable steps to a foreclosed outcome – rather than
open processes of interaction.”36 I now offer six complementary prin-
ciples – each with some specific, incremental suggestions – for attempt-
ing to modify the transitional governance approach to peacebuilding,
along with one important caveat. Each principle emerges from the
recognition that state- and democracy-building are indeed open pro-
cesses of interaction between international interventions and domestic
elites.
Keep the Power Balance Fluid
Themutating nature of domestic elite incentives over the peacebuilding
pathway becomes apparent when we view this pathway as a series of
concrete phases. Critics of power-sharing solutions attempted through
institutional engineering have observed that while they may seem nec-
essary for the initiation of a peace settlement, they adversely affect
the consolidation of peace and democracy.37 In other words, power-
sharing may be necessary to reach agreement at the time an ini-
tial peace settlement is being negotiated but subsequently the dom-
inant political group’s impetus to share power is much lessened. The
international community undertakes institutional engineering with the
intention of making politics a non-zero-sum game. In the unstable,
36 DiPalma 1990: 10. 37 Rothchild and Roeder 2005: 12; also Licklider 2001.
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disequilibrated reality of post-conflict states, however, these choices of
institutional architecture can freeze a stalemated and typically quite
arbitrary political balance over the longer term. The transitional gov-
ernance process in each of the cases examined – albeit to varying
degrees – facilitated the entrenchment of already powerful groups
rather than ensuring the dynamic political contestation over time that
is the hallmark of a consolidated democracy. Thus, the power-sharing
approach is of questionable utility as a means to building peace and
democracy in highly conflictual political environments where power-
holding is seen as zero-sum. Any power-sharing concessions that are
necessary to reach a settlement should be bounded in time and later
renegotiated so as to allow more fluid power dynamics to manifest
themselves and be accommodated.38
The international community must, quite simply, avoid picking win-
ners during the transitional period and thereby avoid locking in a par-
ticular domestic power configuration. Elections, too, can reinforce the
strength of the already powerful and lead to anti-democratic outcomes.
Considerable care must thus be taken at the outset in designing demo-
cratic procedures. The goal should be, perhaps counterintuitively, to
enforce uncertainty rather than inevitability about who will take the
reins of power at transition and thereby align competing elite incen-
tives toward moderation in institutional design. If elites are uncertain
about their prospects, they will bemore willing to agree on institutional
arrangements that make elite alternation more likely and increase over-
all political inclusion and participation. For example, Jeremy Wein-
stein argues that in an excessively centralized and therefore zero-sum
political system, Mozambican elites unsure of the results of the next
election should have supported electoral decentralization that would
have diffused political power away from the elected government and
made some degree of power-sharing possible.39 Similarly, the one-
shot game of constitution-writing introduced by the transitional gov-
ernance process is problematic because elites with short time horizons
38 Du Toit 2003 discusses the notion of coming to “post-settlement settlements”
to deal with the changing incentives over time in democratic transitions. The
same would apply to post-conflict settlements and transitions. On the
recognition that power-sharing deals may not have the desired consequences
for the longer-term project of creating a sustainable peace, see also Jarstad
2008; Rothchild 2002; and Sisk 2013.
39 Weinstein 2002.
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will write rules that entrench themselves in power. The possibility of
revising the rules of the game at several defined future intervals could,
by contrast, encourage more moderate institutional choices. A gen-
uinely participatory constitution-writing process could be mandated
before national elections. The benefits would be twofold: preventing
powerful groups from dominating decisions about institutional archi-
tecture; and encouraging a nascent democratic participatory culture.
Charles Call’s fascinating account of security and justice sector
reforms in El Salvador offers the insight that major and rapid state
transformation is possible in a context in which the “prior state is
not victorious” – with the proviso that the window of opportunity
for formal institutional reform is short, while informal attitudes are
difficult to change so quickly.40 This is the flipside of the coin to the
argument I have advanced here, which holds that the UN transitional
governance model’s need for a domestic counterpart perversely enables
specific elites to get that precious grip on the state. Echoing the insight
that the fluid uncertainty of transitions creates moments of extraor-
dinary agency, Call points out that the window of opportunity can be
seized in the service of lasting reform instead of captured by status quo
forces – but that antecedent context determines how likely this will be.
Another possible, albeit difficult, adaptation of the transitional gover-
nance model would be to ban elites central to the transitional process
and its attendant institutional decisions from taking elected office for
some specified period of time post-transition – for example, in the first
five or ten years. This approach would turn the cadre of domestic elites
who act as counterparts in transitional administration officials into a
caretaker government – like Ayad Allawi’s Iraqi Interim Government,
which was term-limited in this manner. It would, importantly, meet the
UN’s practical need for collaboration with domestic elites while pre-
venting those particular elites from entrenching themselves in power
through the transitional governance process.
Focus on the Non-Electoral Ingredients of Democratization
To similarly prevent state capture by anointed elites, a gradual
and more expansive course of peacebuilding that defers elections
and focuses on institutionalization seems inescapable. Roland Paris’s
40 Call 2003: 859–860; also Wood 2003.
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call for a strategy of “institutionalization before liberalization,” for
example, is echoed by Francis Fukuyama, who argues that democ-
ratization before statebuilding is often a recipe for patronage and
corruption.41 Moreover, both the peacebuilding and democratization
literatures hold that the transition to democracy in post-conflict states
is inherently more destabilizing than stabilizing, especially as elites seek
ways to mobilize popular support in thinly institutionalized contexts.42
Thus, a gradual and expansive course of democracy-building that
defers elections seems most desirable, together with processes of politi-
cal accommodation and institution building to strengthen political and
governance arrangements at national and subnational levels.
In particular, postponing elections does not mean that participation
has to be attenuated. Non-electoral forms of national- and local-level
input can be brought into policymaking and accountability mecha-
nisms – through, for example, traditional consensus institutions such as
the Afghan loya jirga, or grand council meeting, or the Timorese nahe
biti bo’ot system of conflict resolution handled by village elders.43 But
it is almost invariably the case that the various UN agencies and part-
ners associated with multidimensional peace operations view elections
as the main end point and goal of the transformative peacebuilding
effort, even if they are not explicitly mandated as an exit strategy.44
Hastily designed and held elections from Bosnia to Afghanistan to
the Congo have further polarized political groups and reinforced the
authority of political entrepreneurs with non-moderate viewpoints.
Traditional sources of authority, by contrast, while certainly often
arbitrary and parochial, typically serve some of the objectives asso-
ciated with effective and legitimate governance, especially when cus-
tomary forms of participation and consultation are built in. This is not
to propose traditional authority in lieu of democratic legitimacy, nor
to suggest that the traditional is intrinsically desirable; it is simply to
note that the innovative coexistence of different forms of governance is
possible and can be constructive. Indeed, transformative attempts that
ignore customary governance practices typically find major obstacles
to constructing effective and legitimate governance.45 Even kinship-
based patrimonial networks, in this view, might serve as important
41 Fukuyama 2005, 2011; and Paris 2004.
42 Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Paris 2004; and Snyder 2000.
43 Anderson 2014b. 44 Caplan 2012; Lyons 2002; and Zaum 2012.
45 Bowles and Chopra 2008; and Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009.
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building blocks of effective and legitimate political order – in particular,
neopatrimonial networks can serve a crucial function in binding local
elites to a center-driven statebuilding process.46 Attempts to incorpo-
rate traditional forms of authority into a peacebuilding strategy must,
of course, be rooted in locally contextualized knowledge and engage-
ment. Caution and even skepticism are certainly warranted as to the
notion that international actors could properly interpret traditional
practices and incorporate them into interventions – but peace opera-
tions could and should at least create political and institutional spaces
in which traditional practices could assert themselves more organically.
This would constitute a peacebuilding approach very different from the
technocratic norm managed by international agencies from on high.
In a similar vein, instead of relying simply on a centralized semi-
sovereign body to provide local input and validation, peacebuilding
interventions can emphasize and foster broader political involvement
during the transitional process at both the central and subnational lev-
els. Here, I am echoing Oliver Richmond’s call to view peace forma-
tion as a bottom-up process emerging from non-elite sites of legitimate
authority.47 In East Timor, the UN failed to capitalize on an ambitious
community empowerment project that could have helped it to generate
and incorporate political participation at the provincial level, thereby
paving the way for FRETILIN to consolidate its power at the center. In
Cambodia and Afghanistan, too, the focus of transitional governance
was squarely on the capital city and a small strata of urban political
elites, with little attention paid to subnational participation even as
peacebuilders recognized the importance of state–society and political
ties at the local level. In Afghanistan, and probably also in Cambodia
after the defection of the Khmer Rouge, this approach was due in part
to the security situation – but it also reflected the elite-oriented nature
of the theory underpinning these interventions.48 In all three coun-
tries, the elites empowered by the UN as key counterparts were able
to rely on and build upon their existing subnational infrastructure –
and, in each case, that strategy deepened after the first election. The
policy implication is straightforward: more attention must be paid to
46 Kelsall 2012; Migdal 1988; and Smith 2014.
47 Richmond 2005, 2014.
48 Autesserre 2010 delivers a vivid indictment of the capital- and elite-centric
strategy of the UN’s peace operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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subnational political dynamics and potential power balancers outside
the capital.
Political Parties are the Key to Programmatic Policy
The political arena closes down very rapidly during and after tran-
sitional governance interventions, as the case narratives in this book
have made clear. This recognition points to the broad imperative to
introduce the space and mechanisms necessary to encourage legitimate
political opposition and healthy political dialogue during transition.
Transformative peacebuilding approaches have quite simply lacked
the space for opposition. Governments of national unity are conve-
nient counterparts for peacebuilders but breed an absolutist form of
power.49 A major plank of the deeper political institutionalization that
is necessary is a nonpartisan process of party-building. Benjamin Reilly
observes that “there is an increasing focus in the policy world – which
has yet to be adequately digested by scholars – on the need to build
broad-based, programmatic political parties in new democracies, and
to avoid the narrow, personalized and sectarian parties and party sys-
tems that have undermined so many democracies.”50 Developing a
nonpartisan program of party-building as part of peacebuilding inter-
ventions is thus an important area for both policy experimentation and
further scholarship.
In terms of the political economy perspective advanced in this book,
party-building is essential toward achieving effective and legitimate
governance because it cuts into the vicious circle of weak credibil-
ity that enables neopatrimonialism to thrive. Parties serve as insti-
tutionalized mechanisms to enhance the credibility of the political
elite and thus reorient their incentives toward providing broad-
based programmatic policies and public goods rather than distribut-
ing narrow patronage spoils.51 To be sure, partisan political mobi-
lization is not without its dangers in conflict-affected countries.
Leaders in all three countries studied here have expressed a fear of
political parties as a vehicle for hardening lines between political fac-
tions. They offer their countries’ experiences – Cambodia’s civil war
factions, East Timor’s antagonistic independence parties, ethnoregional
49 Thier and Chopra 2002. 50 Reilly 2002: 134.
51 Joshi and Mason 2011; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; and Reilly 2013.
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factions in Afghanistan – in maintaining that political parties draw
lines between social groups that contribute to rigid and escalating con-
flict between them. More cynically, however, powerful individuals dis-
like parties because they undermine their own political advantages.
Privileged elites will be more dominant where there are no powerful
parties; and the absence of programmatic parties appealing to collec-
tivist values makes it easier for them to perpetuate the particularist
and instrumental logic that underpins neopatrimonial political order.
Political parties also enforce discipline and compliance within their
organizations;52 in turn, therefore, they offer an opportunity to weaken
opportunistic and parasitic elites who exploit formal institutions.53
The key to the party-building imperative is to emphasize the value of
programmatic approaches to policy and governance.
Expand and Extend International Post-Conflict Engagement
There is no doubt that the short timeframe of transitional governance
interventions, typically two to three years, contributes to some of the
perverse outcomes on display in the countries examined here. The log-
ical implication would be to extend the transitional period and inter-
national assistance in order to enhance the prospects of both state
capacity-building and political institutionalization. The practical limi-
tations facing suggestions to lengthen the transitional process are sim-
ple and twofold. First, most external actors are simply unwilling or
unable to accept the enormous human and financial responsibilities
of extended transitional support. The desire of foreign stakeholders
to disengage from the Cambodian civil conflict was instrumental in
reaching the Paris Peace Agreement but also meant that there was
no will to extend the UNTAC mandate. Second, would-be recipient
countries have become increasingly concerned, even resentful, regard-
ing the sovereignty implications of extended international tutelage. The
early enthusiasm of Timorese elites for an extended transitional period
quickly evaporated in the face of their frustration with UNTAET’s
approach to shared governance.Nevertheless, the costs associated with
premature international exit have become all too clear, not least in the
attenuated peacebuilding experiences discussed here. The international
community must develop pragmatic mechanisms through which to
52 Keefer 2011. 53 Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 24.
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remain constructively involved in recovering post-conflict states. Some
scholars have gone so far as to suggest extended co-governance periods
of neotrusteeship or shared sovereignty.54 David Lake and Christopher
Fariss have cautioned, however, that trusteeship-type models fail due
to the mismatch between international and domestic incentives, in a
perspective complementary to that in this book.55
The more promising strategy lies in what Aila Matanock character-
izes as “governance delegation agreements,” whereby host countries
enter into arrangements with external actors to exercise joint authority
over specific statebuilding tasks.56 Mark Baskin, for instance, encour-
ages the substitution of the idea of “engagement” for that of “exit”
to prevent would be domestic spoilers from simply waiting out the
international intervention.57 A strategy that emphasizes international
engagement could lengthen the shadow of the future, allowing the evo-
lution of combined international–domestic forms of authority in which
various agents are responsible for those tasks they can implement effec-
tively. Similarly, Jarat Chopra advocates an approach of peace mainte-
nance,where transitional administration is seen as a “brokerage frame-
work” in which ministries and departments are contracted out for
some period of time to those agents who can best provide the service or
perform the function, be they international organizations, development
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, or private companies.58
The notion that transitional administrations could perform better by
serving brokerage or coordinating functions is crucial for three addi-
tional reasons. First, there is a need to improve domestic capacity-
building through governance that is truly joint. As was clear in East
Timor, too high a degree of international involvement stifles the build-
ing of the effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability the state needs
going forward. Astri Suhrke aptly named this the international com-
munity’s “too tight embrace”of post-conflict countries.59 Second, there
is a need for better harmonization of international assistance toward
the pursuit of collaborative strategic goals. Devon Curtis illustrates
vividly how fragmented and contradictory international assistance in
the Burundian case increased the leverage of domestic elites;60 much
the same can be seen in the three cases considered in this book. The
54 Fearon and Laitin 2004; and Krasner 2004.
55 Lake and Fariss 2014; also Krasner and Risse 2014. 56 Matanock 2014.
57 Baskin 2004. 58 Chopra 1999. 59 Suhrke 2009. 60 Curtis 2013: 82.
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international development community has devoted a great deal of
attention to this issue over the past decade, resulting in frameworks of
aid coordination principles.61 Aid harmonization of this sort has two
major inter-related benefits: it allows strategic coordination, preventing
donors from working at cross-purposes to each other; it also empha-
sizes “country ownership” in a manner that should enhance capacity
building. Third, a major test of any state-building experiment should
be the extent to which it enhances the ability of the governing regime
to deliver on the state–society compact and thereby generate at least a
process-based form of legitimacy, if not normative legitimacy. If domes-
tic elites know they will be penalized for failing to continue to deliver
on that compact, they might even moderate their extractive behavior
at least enough to remain in power.
View the State–Society Compact as Multidimensional
In addition to considering longer timeframes to elections, the inter-
national community would do well to emphasize alternative, non-
electoral mechanisms for building the state–society compact, particu-
larly from the ground up. Séverine Autesserre has noted the persistence
and effects of the post-conflict peacebuilding culture and framework
orienting international interventions in her study of the extensive UN
peace operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.62 Two of the
faulty elements of this framework are that international peacebuilders
view the national level as the appropriate forum for intervention and
tend to believe that holding elections is the suitable and effective route
to peacebuilding, instead of finding local mechanisms and forums for
statebuilding and peacebuilding endeavors. This is a particularly prob-
lematic set of blinkers since a great deal of conflict across the world
emerges from micro-level contestation over traditional, kinship-based
claims to authority as well as land and other resources.
Moreover, this bias in international intervention is difficult to over-
come because, as Autesserre demonstrates, individual habit as well as
organizational culture and narrative in international agencies is rein-
forced by the need to implement practical, workable solutions on the
ground that can be linked to log frames and exit strategies.63 But
61 OECD 2005, 2008b. 62 Autesserre 2009, 2010. 63 Autesserre 2014.
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the local level is a crucial site for reform of international peacebuild-
ing practice.64 In addition to the conflict resolution systems identified
above, potential locally oriented service delivery models include decen-
tralized development programs like Cambodia’s Seila community pro-
gram, aimed at increasing local-level participation; and Afghanistan’s
National Solidarity Program, a similar community-level block grant
initiative. The risk with such programs may be that they fail to build
state institutions – but at least they enhance participation and ensure
some element of programmatic, non-instrumental service delivery. A
complementary tactic could be the contracting out of service delivery
to the agents that can best perform the function – be they enclaves
within government or a range of external providers, both public and
private.65 The goal is for international donors to focus their partner-
ships with post-conflict governments on providing public services to
the collective – thereby undercutting the value to elites of providing
particularistic benefits to targeted groups of supports.
Focus on Institutional Function, Not Form
Finding ways to improve peacebuilding means recognizing that insti-
tutionally engineered, “ideal” forms of governance are the enemy of
“good enough governance,” a concept first articulated by Merilee
Grindle that has become increasingly popular in the field of interna-
tional development.66 The notion centers on discarding best-practice
governance recommendations for good-fit approaches, or contextu-
ally grounded and feasible institutional arrangements that achieve a
de minimis degree of quality sufficient to enable government agen-
cies to fulfill their purpose.67 Scholars of development and governance
have, more generally, asserted the importance of focusing on the devel-
opment of functional ability to execute core administrative activities
instead of focusing on specific institutional forms, arguing, for exam-
ple, that the latter can create a “capability trap” instead of enhanc-
ing capacity.68 The core insight is the importance of finding heterodox
means of working with elite and social incentives to achieve specific
64 Autesserre 2008 emphasizes the importance of “thinking local, acting local” in
the Congo.
65 Chopra 1999. 66 Grindle 2004, 2007.
67 Barma, Huybens, and Viñuela 2014; and Levy 2014.
68 Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews 2013.
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ends, instead of butting up against those incentives by blindly attempt-
ing the orthodox.69
The transitional governance model of peacebuilding, with its institu-
tional engineering approach to building modern political order and its
static emphasis on institutional form as outcome, becomes co-opted in
implementation by post-conflict elites.Yet I have also shown, as the his-
torical institutionalist paradigm would suggest, that some institutional
outcomes were not sought by any particular actors, coming about
instead as the unintended consequences of distributional battles.70
Over time, too, these institutions become “multi-purpose tools”
that can be used to different ends and continue to have contested
functions.71 The peacebuilding literature, especially the large body of
practitioner work on the subject, typically treats institutional choice as
bounded, rational, and technical. This study has instead demonstrated
that the institutions that emerge from the design process engineered by
peacebuilding interventions represent a series of “messy contradictions
abounding with inconsistencies and contradictions based on coalitions
of convenience.”72
This institutional mismatch between what domestic political actors
want and what outcomes actually obtain represents an important
opportunity. A more subtle peacebuilding approach attuned to insti-
tutional function would instead focus on reforming and building the
facets of the state that serve and resonate with elite incentives. Timo-
rese elites invested a great deal of energy into building the capacity of
the Ministry of Social Solidarity in the aftermath of the 2006 political
crisis because it was central to the new coalition government’s strategy
of delivering a peace dividend to the population through social transfer
programs.73 As Cambodia faces the prospect of a unifiedmarket within
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, government and party
officials have elevated the importance of enhancing education service
delivery.74 The insight here is that surprising governance improvements
can be achieved if the puzzle is approached through the lens of the
governance challenges and problems that domestic elites must solve,
instead of through the typical international intervention approach of
69 Rodrik 2014. 70 Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 22–23.
71 Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2015: 185.
72 Ibid.: 192. 73 Anderson 2014b.
74 Author interviews with donor officials and Cambodian analysts; Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, October 2014.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/155E4450DEEE8533AADA45F659E6A0A6
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. NPS Dudley Knox Library, on 05 Jan 2018 at 21:24:05, subject to the Cambridge Core
Six Principles and a Caveat for Modifying Peacebuilding Practice 217
offering to these elites predesigned solutions and institutions that,
in reality, challenge their interests and incentives. Function obvi-
ously dictated form in these ways in the long-term, organic processes
of state formation and democratization in Western Europe and the
United States.
Cutting-edge work in the field of the political economy of devel-
opment pushes this line of thinking one step further. Borrowing con-
cepts from physics and evolutionary biology, Owen Barder asserts
that all human systems – political, social, economic, government – are
“complex adaptive” systems, which do not display linear properties of
change.75 As a result, attempting to deliberately engineer these systems
is folly. Instead, the inherent adaptiveness of political systems should
be exploited for its advantages – and the way to do this is through
processes that encourage innovation and experimentation. As unwel-
come, even threatening, as such recommendations may seem to tech-
nocratic international peacebuilders, this book’s account of the causal
logic that unfolds along the peacebuilding pathway certainly sup-
ports a more adaptive, incentive-based, and experimental approach to
attempting to build effective and legitimate governance in post-conflict
states.
The Caveat: A Neopatrimonial Peace?
These half-dozen suggestions for improving the pursuit of modern
political order notwithstanding, it is dangerous to view neopatrimonial
political order as a way station to more effective and legitimate gover-
nance. It is much more realistic, both intellectually and pragmatically,
to view neopatrimonialism as an extremely persistent, even default,
equilibrium – as evidenced over time and across the world. What is
surprising, in light of this insight, is not that peacebuilding fails but
that that any elements of the institutions transplanted by transitional
governance prevail at all – and yet they do. The political and institu-
tional spaces in which limited successes are achieved illuminate what
incremental movements toward better governance may continue to be
75 Owen Barder. 2012. “Complexity, Adaptation, and Results.”Center for Global
Development blog, September 7. www.cgdev.org/blog/
complexity-adaptation-and-results (accessed on May 7, 2015). See also
Ramalingam 2013.
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gained. Yet international interventions are not immune from neopatri-
monial dynamics – on the contrary, they in part enable and are co-opted
by them. The transitional governance strategy provides new sources of
patronage, power, and legitimacy to domestic elites, even rewarding
those who begin with the strongest patron–client networks, because
they are the elites the international community must have on board.
The international community’s relative failure in fully meeting its goals
of rationalized bureaucracy and electoral democracy can be equally
viewed as the success of domestic elites in serving their own governing
vision and objectives much more concretely.
The hybrid political order logic reminds us that modern political
order hardly exists outside the advanced, industrialized world – and
that statebuilding in post-conflict developing countries could be better
achieved if combined with traditional modes and customary practices
of governance and legitimacy, which show considerable adaptiveness
and resilience.76 It is possible to argue that the political economy of
patronage is simply to be expected in post-conflict states, that collu-
sive rent-seeking among elites and the distribution of benefits through
patron–client networks are simply the price of peace and are preferable
to outright conflict.77 In this line of thinking,moreover, neopatrimonial
political order represents a secular improvement in the post-conflict
country’s journey from war to sustainable peace, with patronage sys-
tems representing a form of routinization of politics and governance
in a thinly institutionalized environment. Post-conflict elites have co-
opted transitional governance to put in place a neopatrimonial peace –
and great care must be taken with regard to any further decisions that
would disrupt what measure of stability and order that equilibrium
affords.
Future Research and Theoretical Implications
Although the foregoing discussion has focused on the practical impli-
cations of this study, the six principles advanced for modifying peace-
building practice, as well as the caveat, each point to potential
76 Boege, Brown, and Clements 2009; and Smith 2014.
77 I am indebted to Ed Aspinall for this point. Cheng and Zaum 2012 outline this
logic and illustrate how international assistance can become complicit due to
the rapid disbursement of aid, a reliance on local elites, an emphasis on
stability, and the push for quick elections.
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agendas for problem-driven research. This final section reflects on how
rethinking peacebuilding in the manner I have suggested also opens up
new lines of theoretical inquiry.
Indigenous Statebuilding and Peacebuilding
Given how widespread is the consensus that statebuilding is a crucial
element of peacebuilding, there is a significant intellectual lacuna in
the lack of attention paid to how the construction of effective states
and the achievement of lasting peace are related to each other.78 The
experiences of post-conflict Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan
illustrate that different types of elite bargain are necessary at different
critical junctures on the pathway to peace. In particular, the nature of
the elite settlement required to achieve a peace agreement is very differ-
ent from that required to sustain peace and build state capacity in the
long term. The former requires locking in elite commitments to peace
maintenance and stability such that they are credible. The latter, by
contrast, requires creating an incentive structure that institutionalizes
uncertainty and hence encourages elites to build intertemporal cred-
ibility, accountability, and state capacity by delivering programmatic
policies and collective public goods.
A crucial avenue for future research thus lies in problematizing the
relationship between statebuilding and peacebuilding – with the goal
of better understanding the trade-offs and complementarities between
the two processes, along with empirical investigation of the condi-
tions under which those trade-offs and complementarities hold.79 An
important element of this research program is to gain a better under-
standing of how countries that have not been the targets of ambi-
tious peacebuilding interventions have, nevertheless, achieved signif-
icant gains through their own, autonomously driven and implemented
statebuilding programs. There are numerous instances of indigenous
efforts by domestic actors to pursue reforms to achieve sustainable
peace and improvements in state capacity in the relative absence of
coordinated international intervention: a partial list would include, at
different points in time, Angola, Eritrea, Indonesia, Laos, Lebanon,
78 Jones and Chandran 2008 and Paris and Sisk 2009 are notable exceptions that
have helped to identify the problem.
79 Barma, Levy, and Piombo 2015 outline the conceptual motivation for such a
program of research, along with one proposed method for undertaking it.
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Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Somaliland, and Uganda.80 Yet surprisingly lit-
tle comparative research has been undertaken on the similarities and
differences between international peace operations and what can be
thought of as autonomous or indigenous processes of statebuilding and
peacebuilding.81 It seems likely that the establishment of neopatrimo-
nial political order by post-conflict elites will be a recurring theme.
Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, for example, defines “illiberal peacebuild-
ing” experiences in Angola, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka as processes of
post-war reconstruction by hegemonic elites who structure the politi-
cal economy of rent extraction and distribution in their favor.82 Ironi-
cally, the neopatrimonial outcomes in post-conflict countries that have
gone through international interventions, such as those described and
explained here, may come to reflect, in large part, how post-conflict
elites structure political order when left entirely to their own devices.
Peacebuilding, Historical Institutionalism, and Political Science
A number of the principles for modifying peacebuilding discussed
above bring to bear accumulated knowledge on the comparative polit-
ical economy of development on the pressing policy issue of post-
conflict peacebuilding. Some of the conclusions of this book also have
implications for theoretical debates in political science. Peacebuilding
through transitional governance is, for example, part of a broader post-
Cold War trend in which the international community has increas-
ingly emphasized liberal interventionism to protect individual human
rights. In tandem with the material challenges to international order
that resulted from the increasing incidence of internal conflict imme-
diately after the Cold War, thinking around the sovereignty norm has
begun to shift away from the inviolability of borders and the presump-
tion of nonintervention in the internal affairs of a state.83 The UN’s
80 A number of revealing single-country case studies indicate that this would be a
fruitful research effort. On Angola, see Soares de Oliveira 2011; on Indonesia,
see Smith 2014; and, on Uganda, see Weinstein 2005.
81 Weinstein 2005. 82 Soares de Oliveira 2011.
83 Krasner 1999 examines the ways in which sovereignty has always been
compromised in the modern international system. International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 articulates the “Responsibility to
Protect” doctrine, which is emblematic of the rethinking of the sovereignty
norm.
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peacebuilding strategy is built on an internal contradiction regard-
ing Westphalian sovereignty: the transitional governance approach is
predicated on and designed to replicate and preserve the foundations
of Westphalian order by emphasizing the formal trappings of nation-
statehood, but it implements these international norms by violating in
part the state sovereignty that is the most fundamental Westphalian
assumption.84 As peacebuilding theory and practice evolve, they will
necessarily continue to impact international relations scholarship on
the sovereignty norm.
One major insight I take from this study of building the institu-
tions of the modern state is the need to construct multiple centers of
legitimate authority in post-conflict and developing countries. Legiti-
macy is, of course, not solely a function of the electoral process. Non-
elected branches of government, such as the bureaucracy, judiciary,
and military, must also embody legitimacy and authority to function
effectively– and these attributes come from systematic attention to
institutional capacity-building. A strong state, in turn, can exist “only
with a tremendous concentration of social control”;85 otherwise, frag-
mented social control weakens the state and poorly institutionalized
governance reinforces fragmentary social control. We know that the
state and society disintegrate together in the course of state failure, so
it is only reasonable that they must be reconstituted together for a suc-
cessful process of state regeneration. A promising avenue of research
would be to widen the historical institutionalist lens adopted here to
investigate how the nature of the state–society compact evolves over
the course of the peacebuilding pathway.
This book has tried to improve our understanding of peacebuilding
by bringing to its study insights from the political economy of develop-
ment literature on how institutions and resources shape elite incentives
to deliver political order, economic development, and a collectively ori-
ented state–society compact. In their landmark volume, Bringing the
State Back In, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol
believed that “comparative and historical examinations of watershed
periods in which state apparatuses are constructed or reconstructed
may be the most promising approach” to sharpen our understanding
of the state while allowing us to grapple with substantive problems.86
84 Zaum 2007. 85 Migdal 1988: 262.
86 Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985: 361.
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A deep, contextualized analysis of transformative events that is cen-
tered on cases adds much that cannot be determined by probabilistic
analysis resting on variable-based coding of cases.87 The causal the-
oretical framework of this book, which focuses on how post-conflict
elites could be expected to respond to transformative events, is gen-
eralizable to other subsets of contemporary governance challenges,
such as international–domestic forms of collaboration around natural
resource governance or public goods provision. In particular, develop-
ment interventions would be fruitfully viewed in time, with the specific
goal of understanding the path-dependent and endogenous change they
bring about – and through which their outcomes affect the sociopoliti-
cal context in developing countries in deep and lasting ways. The case-
centered, conjunctural logic of this study is also amenable to the com-
parative analysis of development interventions, typically studied with
a variable-centered evaluative logic. Moreover, the practice of interna-
tional development assistance offers a promising issue area in which
to make advances on historical institutionalist theory itself. Scholars
working in this paradigm have focused mostly at either the compar-
ative or the international level. Although they have examined, as in
this book, how international–domestic interaction occurs, political sci-
ence scholarship would benefit from deeper theorizing about how feed-
back loops of such interaction across different levels of analysis occur
around critical junctures of transformation.
Conclusion
The fact that it is difficult, if not impossible, to refashion post-conflict
states in the guise of modern states, effectively governed and democrat-
ically legitimate, has become a truism – and yet we still do not fully
know why. The historical institutionalist lens applied in this book has
contributed to a better understanding of why peacebuilding typically
falls short of its aspirations. It has done so by combining an analysis
of exogenously imposed transformative peacebuilding interventions,
conventional in the literature, along with a unique examination of
the more gradual and endogenous processes of institutional change
that occur during their implementation and in their wake. Viewing
87 Thelen and Mahoney 2015: 13–14.
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international interventions in this temporal manner leads to the impor-
tant recognition that peacebuilding comprises a series of critical junc-
tures, each with its own distinct set of challenges and incentives. The
approach illuminates how international interventions and domestic
elites approach the peacebuilding puzzle of how to construct post-
conflict political order in two very different ways. The peacebuilding
pathway represents a series of connected phases over time in which
competing local and international visions of political order are man-
ifested through the contestation of governance institutions. The bad
news is that the international community’s peacebuilding approach is,
at least in part, itself responsible for the eventually disappointing gover-
nance outcomes that emerge in post-conflict countries. The good news
is that – if we are prepared to rethink the theory that motivates and ori-
ents peacebuilding – there is still much that could be done to improve
the prospects of interventions that aim to contribute to political order
in post-conflict states.
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Appendix: Interviews Conducted
Afghanistan
Pamela Constable, Deputy Foreign Editor and former Kabul Bureau Chief,
Washington Post. March 29, 2005, Berkeley.
Kevin Evans, United Nations Development Program Governance Advisor.
June 18, 2002, Kabul.
Ray Jennings,World Bank Consultant. June 22, 2002, Kabul and November
1, 2004, Washington, DC.
Nick Leader, Advisor, Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority. June 28,
2002, Kabul.
Clare Lockhart, Advisor and Assistant to the Director, Afghan Assistance
Coordination Authority. June 28, 2002, Kabul.
Nick Manning, Governance and Public Sector Advisor, South Asia Region,
World Bank. June 13 and July 3, 2002, Washington, DC.
Raquel Ragrario, United Nations Development Program payroll office. June
17, 2002, Kabul.
Abdul Ahad Sartep, Employment Chief of the EducationMinistry, Personnel
Department. June 19, 2002, Kabul.
Larry Seale, US Treasury, Budget Advisor to the Minister of Finance. June
18 and June 26, 2002, Kabul.
Alex Thier, Director of the Project on Failed States at Stanford University’s
Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and former
legal advisor to Afghanistan’s Constitutional and Judicial Reform Com-
missions. February 16, 2005, Palo Alto.
Anne Tully, Deputy Country Director for Afghanistan,World Bank. June 13,
2002, Kabul.
Juanita Villarosa, United Nations Development Program payroll office. June
17 and June 24, 2002, Kabul.
Sami Walli, Advisor to the Minister of Finance. June 17, June 19, and June
27, 2002, Kabul.
Jim Wasserstrom, Consultant to the United Nations Development Program
Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. June 23, 2002, Kabul.
Fazel Wassit, World Bank Consultant. June 21, 2002, Kabul.
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Director and Officials at the Manpower Department, Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs. June 22, 2002, Kabul.
Officials at the Office of Administrative Affairs. June 22, 2002, Kabul.
Officials at the Personnel Department, Ministry of Health. June 20, 2002,
Kabul.
Professors in the Economics Faculty, University of Kabul. June 27, 2002,
Kabul.
Cambodia
Rebecca Black, Chief of Mission, USAID, US Embassy. October 17, 2014,
Phnom Penh.
John Burroughs, AusAID Governance Advisor. May 17, 2005, Phnom
Penh.
Stacey Crevello, Country Director, International Relief & Development.
October 14, 2014, Phnom Penh.
Kate Elliot, AusAID Representative. May 17, 2005, Phnom Penh.
Eng Netra, Cambodian Development Research Institute. October 21, 2014.
Tsuyoshi Fukao, Education Specialist, World Bank. October 17, 2014,
Phnom Penh.
Christophe Grundmann, Director, University Research in Cambodia. Octo-
ber 23, 2014.
Kao Kim Hourn, Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Inter-
national Cooperation, and President, University of Cambodia. May 16,
2005, Phnom Penh.
Keat Sukun, Professor, Panyasasra University. May 18, 2005, Phnom Penh.
Kem Sokha, Director, Cambodian Center for Human Rights. May 18, 2005,
Phnom Penh.
Paul Keogh, Counsellor, Development Cooperation, Australian Embassy.
October 20, 2014.
Kristina Kuhnel, Head of Development Cooperation, SIDA. October 23,
2014.
Lao Mong Hay, Head of Legal Unit, Center for Social Development, for-
mer Director, Khmer Institute for Democracy. May 10, 2005, Phnom
Penh.
Nareth Ly, Health Operations Officer, World Bank. October 24, 2014.
Eva Mysliwiec, former Director, Cambodian Development Research Insti-
tute. May 11, 2005, Phnom Penh.
Jan Noorlander, CARE International. October 20, 2014.
Ok Serai Sopheak, Center for Peace and Development. May 16, 2005,
Phnom Penh.
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Jackie Pomeroy, Resident Representative, The Asia Foundation. May 11,
2005, Phnom Penh.
Say Bory, Member of Constitutional Council and former expert on Consti-
tution Drafting Committee. May 17, 2005, Phnom Penh.
Son Chhay, Member of Parliament (Sam Rainsy Party). May 12, 2005,
Phnom Penh.
Son Soubert, Senator, Constitutional Council and former expert on Consti-
tution Drafting Committee. May 17, 2005, Phnom Penh.
Birgit Strube, Deputy Head of Cooperation, German Embassy. October 16,
2014, Phnom Penh.
Robert Taliercio, Country Economist, The World Bank. Several conversa-
tions in October 2005, Phnom Penh.
Un Leang, Department of Higher Education, Ministry of Education, Youth,
and Sport. October 16, 2014, Phnom Penh.
East Timor
Mericio Akara, Director, Luta Hamutuk (NGO – governance). February 20,
2013, Dili.
Saku Akmeemana, Advisor, Justice for the Poor Program, World Bank.
March 1, 2013, Dili.
Dionisio Babo Soares, Deputy Director, Asia Foundation. April 15, 2005,
Dili.
Laura Bailey, World Bank Consultant. April 18, 2005 and April 20, 2005,
Dili.
Hans Beck, Senior Country Economist, World Bank, February 26, 2013,
Dili.
Maria Braz,Human Resources Unit,Ministry of Planning and Finance. April
26, 2005, Dili.
Nelson Belo, Director, Fundasaun Mahein (NGO – conflict/security). Febru-
ary 21, 2013, Dili.
Pedro BeloDa Silva.DeputyDirector (Civil Society),Catholic Relief Services.
May 1, 2005, Bali (Indonesia).
Keryn Clark, Program Director, AusAID. February 27, 2013, Dili.
Deborah Cummins, Subnational Governance Advisor, Asia Foundation.
February 22, 2013, Dili.
Aderito Hugo D’Acosta, Editor, Timor Post. April 19, 2005, Dili.
Pamela Dale, Social Development Specialist,World Bank. February 28, 2013,
Dili.
Angelo De Almeida, Head of Internal Revenue, Ministry of Planning and
Finance. April 22, 2005, Dili.
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Sarah Dewhurst, Program Director, Belun (NGO – conflict/security). March
1, 2013, Dili.
Jill Engen, former UNTAET Subdistrict Administrator. April 26, 2005, Dili.
Hugo Fernandes, Unit Manager, Asia Foundation. February 25, 2013, Dili.
João Cancio Freitas, Director, Dili Institute of Technology. April 20, 2005,
Dili.
Ambassador Peter Galbraith, former Director of UNTAET’s Department of
Political, Constitutional, and Electoral Affairs. February 25, 2005, by
telephone.
Louis Gentile, Law and Justice Specialist, Asia Foundation. April 21, 2005,
Dili.
Edio Guterres, Program Coordinator and Advisor, Justice for the Poor Pro-
gram, World Bank, February 21, 2013, Dili.
Vergilio Guterres, Director, Haburas (NGO – environment and land). Febru-
ary 27, 2013, Dili.
DavidHook,Governance and Public Sector Specialist,World Bank, February
23, 2013, Dili.
Elisabeth Huybens, Country Manager and Resident Representative, World
Bank. April 17, 2005 and April 19, 2005, Dili.
Fidelis Magalhaes, Chief of Staff, Office of the President of Timor-Leste.
February 20, 2013, Dili.
Francisco Monteiro, President and CEO, Timor GAP (National Oil Com-
pany). February 27, 2013, Dili.
Guteriano Neves, Economist Analyst, Office of the President of Timor-Leste.
February 28, 2013, Dili.
Rui Paulo, Health Sector Specialist, World Bank. April 20, 2005, Dili.
Lucio Pinto, Subdistrict Administrator, Viqueque Province. April 30, 2005,
Viqueque.
Doug Porter, Advisor, Justice for the Poor Program, World. March 1, 2013,
Dili.
Jose Ramos-Horta, President of RDTL. November 7, 2009, Dili.
Anita Reddy, AusAID. April 22, 2005, Dili.
Edward Rees, Political Economy Analyst (independent). March 2, 2013,
Dili.
Tamrat Samuel, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations and former
Representative of the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor.
March 4, 2005, New York.
Estanislau Saldanha, Rector, Dili Institute of Technology. February 20, 2013,
Dili.
Joao Saldanha, Senior Management Advisor for Economic Policy, Ministry
of Finance of Timor-Leste. March 1, 2013, Dili.
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Alexandre Sarmento, National Advisor, National Development Agency of
Timor-Leste. February 26, 2013, Dili.
Charles Scheiner, Director, La’o Hamutuk (NGO – governance, petroleum/
budget management). February 25, 2013, Dili.
Nicole Seibel, Resident Representative, USAID. April 27, 2005, Dili.
Aderito Soares, President, Timorese Jurists Association. April 27, 2005.
Aderito Soares, Commissioner, Anti-Corruption Commission of Timor-
Leste. February 26, 2013, Dili.
Karol Soltan, Professor of Government and Politics, University of Mary-
land and former Deputy Director of UNTAET’s Department of Political,
Constitutional, and Electoral Affairs. November 1, 2004, by telephone.
Jose Teixeira. Member of FRETILIN Central Committee and former Min-
istry of Natural Resources. February 21, 2013, Dili.
Manuel Tilman, Member of Parliament (KOTA), Chair of Economic,
Finance, and Planning Committee. April 21, 2005, Dili.
Adelgiza Ximenes, Member of Parliament. April 22, 2005, Dili.
Luis Ximenes, Director, Belun (NGO – conflict/security). February 22, 2013,
Dili.
Valentim Ximenes, Dean, Faculty of Social and Political Studies, National
University of Timor Leste. April 14, 2005, Dili.
Additional
Matt Cordova, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, US State Depart-
ment. October 27, 2004, Washington, DC.
Ambassador James Dobbins, RAND. February 28, 2005, Berkeley.
Michael Doyle, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia
University and former Assistant Secretary-General and Advisor to
Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the United Nations. March 2, 2005,
New York.
Gordon Hein, Vice President, Asia Foundation. August 8, 2007, San
Francisco.
Lise Howard, Director of MA Program in Conflict Resolution, Georgetown
University. October 28, 2004, Washington, DC.
Ray Jennings, Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace. 2005, Wash-
ington, DC.
Homi Kharas, Chief Economist, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank.
October 26, 2004, Washington, DC.
Lizanne McBride, Director, International Rescue Committee. February 16,
2005, Palo Alto.
Kara McDonald, Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, US State
Department. October 27, 2004, Washington, DC.
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Barbara Nunberg, Governance and Public Sector Manager, East Asia and
Pacific Region, World Bank. Numerous conversations over the course
of 2002–2007, Washington, DC and Phnom Penh.
Murray Proctor, Director, Governance Division, AusAID. April 25, 2002,
Dili.
Jim Tullock, Resident Representative in Cambodia, World Health Organi-
zation and former Minister of Health in the East Timor Transitional
Administration. May 17, 2005, Phnom Penh.
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